FIELD MANUAL

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REAR AREA PROTECTION (RAP) OPERATIONS

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*This manual supersedes FM 19-45-1 (Test), 27 April 1967.

FOREWORD

This manual provides doctrine and guidance to commanders and staffs for the organization, administration, and employment of resources in the conduct of rear area protection (RAP) operations and updates interim guidance provided in FM 19–45–1 (Test) which is superseded. It provides guidance on RAP operations for the communications zone, field army service area, and corps rear area.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual provides commanders and staff officers with doctrine pertaining to rear area protection (RAP) operations in the theater of operations. It is a guide for the organization, employment, supervision, planning, and training of designated RAP units. The principles and procedures outlined are applicable to the corps rear area and the field army service area in the combat zone and to the entire communications zone.

b. This manual is in consonance with the following International Standardization Agreements which are identified by type of agreement and number at the beginning of the appropriate chapter in the manual: NATO STANAG 2079, CENTO STANAG 2079, SEATO SEASTAG 2079, ABCA SOLOG 48R, Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control.

c. This manual is to be used in conjunction with publications listed in appendix A.

1-2. Recommended Changes

Users of this publication are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Military Police Agency, Fort Gordon, Georgia 30905.

1-3. Changes in Unit Tables of Organization and Equipment

To facilitate the presentation of material in this manual concerning the organization, capabilities, and employment of specific units, the basic tables of organization and equipment (TOE) under which the units are organized are cited in the text by basic numerical designation, without any alphabetical suffix, since TOE's are changed or revised from time to time. This fact should be kept in mind, and the current version of cited TOE's should be consulted when detailed information is required.

CHAPTER 2

COMMAND ORGANIZATION FOR REAR AREA PROTECTION (RAP) OPERATIONS (NATO STANAG 2079, CENTO STANAG 2079, SEATO SEASTAG 2079, ABCA SOLOG 48R)

Section I. CHARACTERISTICS OF A THEATER OF OPERATIONS

2–1. Characteristics of a Theater (Area) of Operations

a. A theater of operations comprises that portion of a theater of war necessary for military operations pursuant to an assigned mission and for the administration incident to such military operations.

b. A theater of operations is generally divided into a combat zone and a communications zone (COMMZ).

(1) The combat zone contains that area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations. It extends from the rear boundary of the field army to the enemy controlled area. It may be divided for tactical control into field army, corps, and division areas.

(2) The COMMZ contains the rear part of the theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces.

c. See figure 2–1 for an illustration of a territorial organization of a theater of operations.

2–2. Theater Headquarters

A US theater headquarters is a unified or specified command designated by the President, who also designates the theater commander. The theater commander organizes the command and administrative structure of the theater, exercises operational command of all assigned forces, and is directly responsible for all combat operations in the theater.

2–3. Theater Army Headquarters

a. Theater army is a component command, a major subordinate echelon of the theater, and is responsible for broad plans and policies pertaining to the conduct of all operations of the US Army Forces in the theater. The theater army commander is primarily an organizer, a supervisor, a planner, and a coordinator who decentralizes and delegates combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to his major subordinate commanders and exercises command through them.

b. The theater army commander assigns geographic responsibility for both the combat and communications zones to the field army and theater army support command (TASCOM) commanders, respectively.



Figure 2–1. Territorial organization, theater of operations (schematic).

Section II. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RAP OPERATIONS

2–4. General

a. The rear area is defined as the geographic space within a command where the majority of the combat support and combat service support functions are performed. It is usually to the rear of the combat areas.

b. RAP is a territorial command responsibility and includes those measures taken to protect the resources of the command from interruptions caused by enemy activity, sabotage, or natural disaster. The basic philosophy of RAP doctrine is to maximize the capability of combat support and combat service support elements to defend themselves and render mutual support without requiring tactical assistance from combat forces. If support by combat forces becomes necessary, a progressive integration of resources is implemented and continues until a point is reached where control is passed from the area commander to a tactical commander as the threat increases.

c. The purpose of RAP is to prevent interruptions to combat support and combat service support operations. In order to accomplish this task, RAP is divided into two separate functions —rear area security (RAS) and area damage control (ADC).

(1) RAS includes measures taken to minimize the effects of an enemy attack, sabotage action, infiltration-guerrilla action, or the initiation of psychological warfare, any of which may pose a threat, potential or real, to friendly units, activities and installations. These measures may be taken prior to, during, and after the anticipated or actual enemy action. RAS, as used in this manual, excludes active air defense operations by organized air defense units.

(2) ADC includes those measures taken before, during, and after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects.

d. When employed as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), or American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) armed forces, US military personnel participate in rear area security and area damage control operations in accordance with NATO STANAG 2079, CENTO STANAG 2079, SEATO SEASTAG 2079, and ABCA SOLOG 48R. Details of these agreements are contained in appendix B.

2–5. Command for RAP Operations

a. Command for the RAS and ADC operations of RAP is a territorial responsibility based on the assumption that the area commander is provided the authority required to exercise operational command over units tenanted in his area when he determines that an emergency exists.

b. It is imperative that command structuring for RAP provide unity of command while preserving simplicity. The need to maintain clear-cut lines of authority for specific responsibilities must be constantly appreciated and emphasized by higher headquarters. Mixing military and political controls in an active operational environment creates confusion and indecision brought about by the inability to determine who is in command. To preclude undue interference with mission accomplishment, specific command channels and areas of responsibility that are readily understood by military personnel and the indigenous government, its agencies, and population as a whole must be established and adhered to by all concerned.

2–6. RAP in the Combat Zone

a. General. Overall responsibility for RAP in the combat zone rests with the field army commander. He assigns responsibility for RAP operations to the corps and field army support command (FASCOM) commanders for their respective geographical areas of responsibility. The field army staff monitors RAS and ADC operations to assure an orderly, effective, and timely escalation from the use of indigenous and organic combat support and combat service support units to combat troops for conducting RAP activities.

b. Corps Area.

(1) Division commanders are assigned RAP missions for their respective areas of responsibility by the corps commander. For a discussion of division RAP operations and procedures, see FM 61–100 and FM 54–2.

(2) Unlike the division, independent corps, and FASCOM commanders, the corps commander has no organic or direct command relationship with the major service support commander who is located and operating in the corps rear area. Normally, a very large percentage of the units operating in the corps rear area are field army units responsive to the demands of FASCOM. For this reason, the corps commander is given authority

over all units tenanted in the corps area for RAP purposes. When operating as an independent corps and the task organization includes a corps support command (COSCOM), RAP responsibility is normally assigned to the COSCOM commander by the corps commander. The responsible headquarters develops plans incorporating the RAP potential of all available combat support and combat service support units to assure a coordinated response should an emergency arise.

(3) The corps support brigade commander, subordinate to FASCOM, has the same responsibilities as any other unit commander in that he is responsible for unit or installation local security and damage control. He is provided a small RAP staff within the ACofS, security, plans, and operations section, to insure compliance and coordination with corps RAP directives and plans.

(4) The corps COSCOM commander exercises control of the RAP potential of combat support and combat service support units through his rear area operations center (RAOC) when and if he declares an emergency. To accomplish this, the corps or COSCOM headquarters is provided a RAOC organized in accordance with TOE 29–408. The RAOC is capable of determining the RAP potential available from designated corps and tenant units including other services within the corps rear area, if so directed. The tedious part of RAP is keeping abreast of the multitude of units which possess a RAP potential in the corps rear area. Each unit move, each change of priority or potential, and each emergency precipitates the need for updating and reevaluating the RAP plan and operations order.

c. Field Army Service Area.

(1) Most support elements of the field army (except those elements organic to the combat divisions) are grouped together to form the field army support command. It is a major subordinate command of the field army and provides the field army commander with a single agency to direct and control most support operations of the command. The FASCOM is composed of command and control elements, selected Army-wide services, specialized and miscellaneous combat support and combat



Figure 2–2. Command relationship of RAOC in FASCOM, TASCOM, and independent corps.

service support elements, and functionalized general support and direct support elements of the types and numbers appropriate to the force to be supported within the operational environment. See figure 2–2 for command relationship of RAOC in FASCOM.

(2) The FASCM commander is responsible for RAP throughout the field army service area. To accomplish this mission, he assigns the responsibility for RAP operations to the army support brigade commander for the entire army service area. Separate boundaries are established by the support brigade commander and support group commanders are designated subarea controllers to coordinate RAP operations.

(3) RAOC's are assigned to each support group in the army support brigade to provide for RAP contingency planning, potential measurement, and mission execution.

(4) The army support brigade and FASCOM staffs monitor operations and coordinate interarea activities to insure the overall effectiveness of RAP throughout the field army service area.

2–7. RAP Operations in the COMMZ

a. The theater army commander assigns the responsibility for RAP operations in the COMMZ to the TASCOM commander. The TASCOM commander normally assigns the responsibility to the area support command (ASCOM) commander(s) for specific geographical area(s). The ASCOM is a major subordinate command of TASCOM and is coequal with all other TASCOM commands.

b. TASCOM headquarters provides broad policy guidance and supervision to the ASCOM for area support and RAP planning. The ASCOM exercises area control and delegates the execution of the RAP mission to area support groups (ASGP) which plan, coordinate, and supervise intelligence, physical security, and RAP activities. Within each ASGP is located a RAOC which executes the day-to-day RAP planning and training. See figure 2–2 for command relationship of RAOC in TASCOM.

CHAPTER 3

CONSIDERATIONS FOR REAR AREA PROTECTION OPERATIONS

Section I. PRINCIPLES OF RAP

3–1. General

There are fundamental principles which guide commanders and units involved in RAP. This section outlines and discusses each of these principles.

3–2. Austerity

The RAP system is designed with austerity in mind. Major austerity factors considered are—

a. Minimum degradation to unit mission performance while providing designated RAP forces.

b. Maximum effectiveness of RAP task forces.

c. Utilization of *potential* RAP units as opposed to full-time RAP dedicated forces. RAP must be an inherent task of all units to the extent that minimum security measures initiated by the unit contribute to the RAP system.

3–3. Command

The success of RAP operations hinges on the binding together of diverse resources. To eliminate a potential problem involving confusion, indecision, and divisiveness, and to achieve a cohesive RAP effort, the following requirements must be met:

a. There must be a single responsible commander.

b. Geographic areas of responsibility must be clearly defined.

c. A commander must know his area, the strength and RAP potential of available units, terrain data, intelligence information, and current operations. The RAOC must maintain an inventory of unit missions, RAP potential and locations, and continually revise RAP plans.

3–4. Economy of Force

a. No organization should be employed in a role or configuration for which it is not principally designed unless such action is unavoidable.

b. RAP elements are normally employed for short periods of less than 24 hours for ADC operations and less than 12 hours for RAS operations.

c. The RAP potential of combat support and combat service support units is employed to counter hostile actions in RAP missions. The RAP potential is that portion of a TOE unit which may be used for short periods of time to participate in RAP operations with minimum degradation to overall mission capability. Combat forces are not diverted for RAP missions unless essential.

3–5. Integrated Protection

All RAP measures must complement the total RAP effort. The protection of a fuel dump and the means by which fuel is delivered (i.e., pipelines, truck parks) is an example of integrated protection. The fundamentals of base defense, discussed in FM 31–81 (Test), are essential to insure integrated protection.

3–6. Offensive

All security measures must have an inherent offensive capability. Aerial surveillance, ground sensors, patrolling, and intelligence collection activities are important to the commander to detect possible indicators of planned enemy action. The RAP potential is the rear area commander's offensive capability. This potential must be identified, organized, and trained to conduct limited offensive actions against small enemy elements. Emphasis must be placed on aggressive engagement of hostile aircraft with organic nonair defense weapons. Guidance on the use of nonair defense weapons against enemy aircraft is contained in appendix C.

3–7. Responsiveness

a. All echelons assigned commitments in RAP

situations have an automatic responsibility to fulfill that commitment rapidly and effectively.

b. The commander must be capable of communicating operational requirements to units in his area. The chain of command will frequently change upon the implementation of a RAP plan. Therefore, normal communications that filter through various levels of command must be critically analyzed and tested to assure that they are responsive under given emergency conditions.

c. Responsiveness may be attained by many different procedures, some of which are listed below:

(1) Clearly established authority granted to RAP responsible commanders.

(2) An area oriented communications system not dependent on normal command channels will provide a flexible warning alert system for a larger variation of situations.

(3) Continuous identification and employable resources will assist a responding echelon in determining which of its elements it is going to commit to a RAP situation.

(4) RAP elements should possess their own mobility whenever possible. Responsiveness is lessened when mobility must be provided a responding element from nonorganic resources.

(5) Flexibility in employment tends to increase responsiveness. Thus, although the planned commitment of resources from a base might identify a team with a single function, that team might well have capabilities in several other areas which should be known to both the unit and the RAOC. For example, an RAS platoon consisting basically of personnel from an engineer unit might also have the skills required to perform as a rescue or labor platoon in a damage control mission. However, a RAS element normally is not concurrently identified as an ADC element.

(6) Periodic simulated implementation of the RAP plan in order to insure effectiveness of the alert system, proficiency of key individuals, and identification of potential problem areas.

3–8. Supervision

a. RAP operations are secondary missions for combat support and combat service support units. The headquarters charged with a RAP responsibility and the parent organization of the RAP potential element must insure that RAP missions are not neglected.

b. Supervision of RAP functions must maintain simplicity by making the minimum number of existing plans workable.

3–9. Vulnerability

a. The commander having a RAP responsibility must measure and continually evaluate the various risks to his area and equate one risk to another. An adversary will usually concentrate his resources on the most sensitive or vulnerable targets. By establishing logical priorities, the commander can improve his capability to effectively use manpower and materiel.

b. Resources available to protect personnel, supplies, and facilities must be allocated in consonance with the degree of risk involved. Usually sufficient personnel and materiel will not be available in the rear to provide protection simultaneously to all activities in the area.

c. A major contributing factor to vulnerability in the rear area is the relatively fixed nature of operations. Stable facilities and existing defensive measures can be studied and compromised.

Section II. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3–10. US Forces and International Agreements

a. The degree of control which US Forces will exercise over indigenous authorities and the populace when they enter a theater of operations will depend primarily upon the political conditions under which they entered. Generally, US military presence will occur in one of two ways:

(1) Entry by invitation of the nation concerned.

(2) Entry by force of arms.

In either of these environments, the extent of and limitations on military activities will be prescribed by customary international law or by international agreements to which the US is a party, or by both.

b. Commanders may encounter a range of situations extending from a host-guest relationship to total US authority under conditions of military government. In some cases, the commanders will have no power over the indigenous authorities and populace except that which they can exert

through influence, persuasion, and coordination. Populace controls, mutual support between civilian and military resources, and coordination of civilian and military security and damage control measures are of utmost importance to RAP operations and commanders must constantly be aware of and understand their relationship with the population located in land areas. A clear understanding of their authority is essential to commanders in exercising that degree of control necessary in the rear areas to insure security and safety to all friendly military forces and indigenous personnel.

3–11. Entry by Invitation of the Nation Concerned

Through legitimate agreement by interested governments, US Forces may be requested to assist a nation for a mutually agreed upon reason. Liaison, advice, and coordination are the primary means of establishing acceptable military-civilian communications. The commander's initial requirement is the provision of maximum civilian support for and the prevention of civil interference with military operations. If US Forces enter in an advisory role, they assist in stabilizing a host country government. The US may be given the authority to organize, equip, train, and advise internal defense units for RAP measures. Host country forces may be effective in RAP type missions because of their knowledge of the area, its language, and customs. Their capability is enhanced when afforded US military advice in combat, combat support, and combat service support activities.

3–12. Entry by Force of Arms

When US combat forces enter enemy territory in order to occupy it, initial action to disclose the nature and extent of US authority should be taken by the promulgation of basic occupation directives in accordance with FM 41–10 and FM 27–10. These actions include issuing necessary proclamations concerning US authority as it relates to civil government, curfew, movement control, public order, and similar matters. Civil affairs units will initiate, coordinate, and supervise local compliance with these directives.

3–13. US-Indigenous Relationships

a. The US commander in RAP operations must have the authority required to protect and secure his installations and protect his resources on lines of communications (LOC). Since this control affects the indigenous governmental agencies and the populace, he must remember that the authority is used in a manner which does not alienate the civilian environment to the US mission and objectives.

b. Within the limits of the authority granted to them under local law, host country civil officials may delegate political authority over local government to the military commanders of their own nation. When this condition exists, the US commanders must coordinate their operations with the indigenous military area commander in conformance with US policy directives and requirements.

c. During offensive operations, as friendly guerrilla forces are uncovered, the relationship of these units to the US and their responsiveness to control should be examined by the rear area security planner. These forces may be under the control of US forces, or as part of an integrated US-indigenous area command responsive to US forces. For further discussion of US-indigenous relationships as they pertain to forces organized primarily for unconventional warfare, but sometimes available to support conventional military operations, see FM 31–21, Special Forces Operations US Army Doctrine.

d. The host country military commander normally takes upon himself all responsibility for reconnaissance and security outside the confines of US military installations. The US military commander provides for interior guard and control within the confines of his installation and the security of his perimeter. The US commander may not have exclusive authority over indigenous labor within his installation. Authority to hire and fire, investigative jurisdiction in matters of sabotage or espionage, and other vital matters of mutual concern to both commanders must be delineated and agreed upon if RAP operations are to be effective. The US commander must maintain authority to control access to his installations when the situation warrants RAP measures. Counterintelligence units are responsible for the conduct of investigations in the fields of sabotage, espionage, and subversion.

Section III. CONTROL EXERCISED BY US AREA COMMANDERS

3–14. General

There are two basic factors to be considered in determining senior command policies establishing the authority and limitations of US area commanders in RAP operations.

a. A threat situation in which the rear area environment is tranquil, as opposed to frequent enemy activity, impacts upon the degree of control required to maintain stability and security in the rear area and conduct effective combat support operations. The following threat situations are examples of conditions which will impact on the degree of control exercised by the area commander. See figure 3–1 for the command and control spectrum for RAP.

(1) *Tranquil to disorderly.* In this condition, a high degree of control exists and is sporadically interrupted by uncoordinated violations of laws, orders, and regulations. Effective law enforcement precludes the necessity for involvement of US military forces. Control of local populace is maintained by the indigenous law enforcement and judicial structure.

(2) *Disorderly to threatening.* In this condition, the degree of disorderliness indicates a widespread contempt for civil authority. Gangs or groups have formed and operate against civil institutions with impunity. No significant activities are directed against the military establishments. Impact on US service support resources is minimal.

(3) *Threatening to harrassing.* Isolated, limited harassing activities commence against military and paramilitary forces. These activities are significant because they represent the first overt resistance experienced by or against these forces. Frequent harassing actions may indicate a definite pattern of organized resistance. When the frequency requires deliberate US defensive actions, service support resources begin to experience an adverse effect on the accomplishment of their mis-



Figure 3–1. Command and control spectrum for RAP.

sions due to the requirement for additional local security.

(4) *Harassing to prolonged.* In this situation, organized forces initiate sustained actions to destroy "soft" targets. These actions are limited in duration and include minor holding actions against service support elements but not against tactical forces. There will be substantial reductions in support functions during the period forces are deployed to defend the affected area.

(5) *Prolonged to severe.* During the prolonged to severe phase, major actions are initiated to attack, destroy, and occupy a given target area. These offensive measures are designed to force the commitment of combat resources in the service area. Combat resources are required on a continuous basis to preclude interruption of the service support effort.

(6) *Severe phase.* A second front exists. Tactical operations are begun.

b. The utility of a geographical area is a vital factor to the area commander. There are areas "critical" to his operations, areas which have "priority" for his operations, and those areas where he must exercise some general "control" but which are neither critical nor priority areas.

(1) *Critical area.* That area essential to the accomplishment of the support mission. The loss, neutralization, or interdiction of this terrain allows no alternate operations and adversely affects support functions. The US area commander is given authority to establish curfew, circulation control, resources control, and similar policies as dictated by his requirements.

(2) *Priority area.* Same as a critical area except that within an acceptable amount of time support functions can be transferred to an alternate location without an immediate significant impact on the total logistical effort. The area commander requires less authority than in a critical area, but is still given broad guidance in indigenous personnel matters.

(3) *Movement area.* Primarily an access area through which supplies move. It is the best area for its purpose, but rerouting through other areas offers no major problems. The area commander exercises minimal authority over indigenous personnel.

c. The defintiions above may be applicable in insurgency operations, as well as in conventional RAP operations. As an alternative, the definitions used in FM 31–16 or FM 31–81 (Test) may be applied during insurgency operations.

3–15. Policy Guidance for RAP

In addition to classifying the utility of various types of geographical areas and the threat situation, the corps, field army, and theater army support commanders must consider the following:

a. Relationship between a US area commander, tenant units, allied military authorities, and civilian authorities.

b. Relationship of critical, priority, and movement areas to populace and resources control measures and the limits of US authorities to impose such measures.

c. Minimum security requirements for both area commanders and tenant units.

d. Existing command control arrangements for IAP and the transition from service support to tactical control if the threat situation increases.

3–16. Combined Forces

a. Theater or higher command pronounces in clear, concise terms the general relationships between forces of diverse allied nations occupying the same geographical area. As a minimum, a single command structure is provided within any one area. This structure unifies the diverse forces to the maximum degree feasible. Resulting language, doctrinal, and philosophical differences may be resolved by—

(1) Recognizing national affinities and permitting homogenous elements to operate together.

(2) Combining units of different nationalities only where a clear and evident desire or requirement exists.

(3) Cross assigning of liaison personnel to improve understanding.

(4) Organizing area and subarea responsibilities along lines of national affinity.

(5) Capitalizing on the effects of a situation resulting in adverse effects to tenants within an area.

(6) Establishing a mutually supporting warning system.

b. The use of allied forces because of their knowledge of an area, its language, and customs present a distinct advantage to an area commander. All possible efforts are taken to utilize this asset effectively.

Section IV. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR RAP OPERATIONS

3–17. General

Major command echelons must constantly keep in mind that lower level units initially cannot be expected to possess detailed knowledge concerning the geography, political considerations, or mores in the area in which they are operating. Major support and area commanders must, therefore, issue clear and concise instructions to insure a high degree of uniformity in troop conduct in relation to indigenous personnel throughout the rear area.

3–18. Command Relationships

a. One of the fundamental considerations in RAP is the resolution of command authority. Before any plans, actions or operations are initiated, command relationships must be clearly defined. A major conflict of interests can stem from the fact that combat support and combat service support operations are command oriented along *functional* lines. Transportation units are commanded by transportation organizations regardless of geographical location. Within functional commands, units tenanted in a specific geographic area are responsive to the *area* commander. Therefore, an area commander is given operational command over tenant units for the planning, training, and execution of RAP missions. The area commander is given the authority to declare and subsequently terminate emergency situations which occur in his assigned area of responsibility. Potential conflicts between command elements are resolved by an echelon senior to both.

b. Throughout the theater of operations, there are tenant units subordinate to a commander other than the designated area commander. However, the area commander is held responsible for RAP measures for all units in his assigned area. Consequently, relationships between area commanders and commanders of tenant units must be clearly established by higher authority. This action is accomplished by the field army and theater army support command commanders in basic RAP policy documents. The major consideration is that, unless otherwise excepted by priority designation, all units tenanted in a specific area become responsive to that commander when an emergency or tactical situation exists requiring implementation of RAP measures. As a result, command relationships must be adjusted with tenant units based on the situation and mutual needs.

c. Operational command of functional units by an area commander will be for brief periods and on an infrequent basis. Where the situation requires prolonged attention to RAP problems, tactical units are requested by the area commander.

3–19. Support to the Area Commander

The field army and theater army support command RAP policies will outline the support to be provided from resources not normally allocated to area commanders. For example, an area commander usually will not have sufficient resources to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the entire geographical area for which he is responsible. Command policies must establish procedures for providing assistance as requested by the area commander.

3–20. Basic Assumptions

The degree of emphasis placed on RAP by various commanders may differ considerably. Differences can arise since area support units are widely separated and possess diverse structures and strengths. To establish uniformity, major command policies must consider conditions existing in the entire operational area and certain basic assumptions. These assumptions include such matters as—

a. The yield of enemy nuclear weapons that most probably will be used against resources in the corps rear area, field army service area, and the communications zone.

b. The size of irregular enemy ground attacks which area commanders are expected to counter with existing resources.

c. The frequency and duration of area damage incidents which combat support and combat service support resources must be able to handle.

d. The minimum time that selected or predesignated tactical resources will require to react in support of rear area facilities.

e. The impact of enemy chemical and/or biological attacks upon combat service support operations.

f. The extent of signal intelligence and electronic warfare activities which the enemy can be expected to direct against rear area support elements.

3–21. Mission and Functions of the Responsible Area Commander in RAP

a. The mission of the area commander exercising RAP control is to protect the resources of his area from interruptions caused by enemy activities or natural disaster. This does not, however, include provision for air defense or major enemy actions that are a threat to the entire command.

b. RAP is executed by an area commander based on authority, procedures, and policies delineated by the TASCOM commander in the COMMZ, by the field army commander in the field army service area, and the corps commander in the corps rear area. RAP functions include—

(1) Influencing the organization of a land area and delineating RAP responsibilities.

(2) Promulgating policies to control the people and resources within the area.

(3) Collecting and disseminating an integrated and accurate estimate of the local friendly and enemy situation.

(4) Planning RAP measures and designating the forces to execute plans.

(5) Exercising command and control over RAP forces as required.

(6) Integrating or supporting tactical resources when provided for RAP missions.

CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION FOR THE EXECUTION OF REAR AREA PROTECTION OPERATIONS

Section I. RAP PLANNING FACTORS

4-1. Planning Considerations

a. RAP problems generally develop as tactical forces leave void areas in excess of the geographical requirements of support units. Upon completion of combat operations in any given area, enemy organizations may be formed to threaten support activities. The execution of RAP missions demands that planning be aimed at countering the worst possible threat. The following precepts should guide all plans:

(1) Plans must be kept as simple and as general as possible.

(2) Only the minimum number of plans should exist. Voluminous numbers of plans create delay and confusion.

(3) Plans should be oriented toward the most effective utilization of support units. Employment for RAP purposes is a responsibility of the designated area commander.

(4) Plans must consider TOE personnel and equipment authorizations. The effectiveness of RAP units is largely predetermined by current troop strength and equipment availability.

b. Area commanders plan for the employment of tactical resources when the effect of enemy rear area activities is beyond the limited capabilities of available RAP resources.

4-2. Planning Sequence

a. The first positive RAP action is to plan local security measures. Of paramount importance is to plan for the security of newly established bases.

b. Service support operational requirements do not correspond to security requirements. Supporting units need a good road net, ready source of labor, storage areas, and other facilities which are available in established commercial areas; however, such placement decreases the security capability. The best site, from a security standpoint, is in a cleared area, occupying high ground with sufficient vegetation to conceal positions of the facility from observation. The worst site is a congested or jungle area where friendly base observation is extremely limited. The most common tendency is to occupy the low ground through which most roads run. The cost, time, and manpower needed to relocate a site to more defensible terrain can be justified when compared to the need to secure a poor position. Nuclear warfare favors terrain offering cover from blast and the risks involved in this respect must be evaluated.

c. Prior to occupying a site, a review is made of all available intelligence about the general area. The military intelligence group, counterintelligence (ASCOM), provides intelligence support within the entire TASCOM area; an MI company, counterintelligence, is assigned to each area support group; and the MI company, counterintelligence, MI battalion, field army, provides intelligence support on an area basis in the FASCOM. Intelligence is also available through such sources as indigenous engineers, cross-country trafficability studies, topographical maps, local police, and allied forces.

d. Aerial flights are conducted to identify specific areas requiring ground reconnaissance.

e. Security steps taken after the occupation of a site include—

(1) Establishing communications.

(2) Developing a circulation control plan based upon the volume of military and indigenous traffic operating within and through the area.

(3) Constructing and improving perimeter barriers, establishing clear zones, and implementing physical security measures to improve overall security. Time permits the improvement of security measures up to the point that a stable security system is established. There is a tendency to relax security measures as the threat of enemy action

subsides; however, stability encourages hostile elements to reconnoiter service support areas.

(4) Developing the plan for fire support of the area.

(5) Initiating reconaissance and police patrol action.

(6) Initiating complete integration of RAP plans with existing base defense plans to insure mutual support.

(7) Integrating and coordinating the local indigenous police plan into the overall area patrol plan.

(8) Reviewing periodically the security procedures to include frequent alterations to reduce vulnerability. The continuous monitoring of plans is essential so that operational adjustments based on experience can be incorporated.

f. If support requirements dictate the occupation of a high-risk area, the responsible commander should select an acceptable, alternate site and make every effort to phase into it as operations permit. Prolonged occupation of a site makes subsequent relocation extremely difficult.

g. Since a mere threat to the security of the command will affect its operations, the area commander must identify essential facilities he deems vulnerable to natural disaster or enemy action. Essential areas are either individual or grouped faclities located within a geographical area of responsibility. In specifying priorities, the commander must additionally consider civilian population centers to determine the total impact that casualties and damage will have on his overall operation.

(1) *Essential facilities.* The determination of criticality is based on the need for the facility to be maintained in an operational status. Essential facilities are located where complete control can be exercised to guarantee the viability of support activities. Loss of an essential facility would substantially reduce the ability of combat service support operations within a particular area. Unless otherwise directed by a major command, essential facility priorities for RAP planning purposes are designated by the area commander.

(2) *Patrol areas.* The area commander designates patrol areas which incorporate the minimum land mass outside the perimeter of essential facilities which must be covered by frequent air and ground patrolling. The objective is to provide the early warning required to protect the essential facility.

(3) *Scan areas.* The remainder of an area is referred to as the scan area. This area may extend beyond the surveillance capabilities of the area commander. Surveillance is conducted in scan areas by tenant and transiting ground units and dedicated aviation allocated by the theater, field army, or corps commander. Major portions of LOC's will be located in scan areas.

(*a*) When air LOC's are the primary means for moving personnel and supplies, large scan areas are created. When this condition exists, supporting units and facilities will be located near aerial terminals requiring few RAP resources to cover scan areas. However, increased aerial surveillance may be necessary due to the lack of ground reconnaissance activities.

(*b*) The use of land and inland waterway LOC's reduces the size of scan areas due to scheduled and/or unscheduled traffic movement. Area commanders must coordinate the security of critical portions of land or inland waterway LOC's and plan for the employment of RAP forces in the event of disasters or enemy action.

h. Increased responsiveness of units to react to RAP emergency actions depends on the authority granted the responsible RAP commander in the major command RAP policy document. Integrated communications and universal warning systems will increase responsiveness. Training in the execution of missions and actual practice of RAP plans contributes to the responsiveness of RAP elements.

i. When combat resources are located where they provide a RAP potential, authority may be provided the area commander to utilize these resources. This authority will be modified frequently by major commanders because combat resources are not normally located in a given rear area for prolonged periods. Combat commanders retain responsibility for local security of their facilities at all times. Combat forces involved in RAP operations are deployed as mobile strike forces and execute operations based on mission type orders. Responsibility for RAP may be delegated temporarily to a combat commander when enemy activity exceeds the capability of combat support and combat service support units.

4–3. Area Surveillance

a. To adequately perform RAP operations, it is necessary to plan for the surveillance of the unoccupied portions of the rear area. Surveillance can be conducted by either aerial or ground means.

b. The availability of aerial surveillance depends on the threat to the rear area, size of the area, terrain to be secured, and priorities established by the headquarters controlling aviation support. In planning for the use of aircraft for RAP purposes, it must be realized that area commanders are required to compete with tactical units for the allocation of available resources.

Section II. REAR AREA OPERATIONS CENTER

4–4. General

a. The overall organization for RAP includes two types of elements:

(1) Those permanently assigned RAP responsibilities.

(2) Those assigned RAP responsibilities on an as required basis.

b. Elements permanently assigned RAP responsibilities are the corps, or the COSCOM if the corps is an independent organization, for the corps rear area; FASCOM army support brigade and its groups for the field army service area; and TASCOM, ASCOM, and area support groups for the COMMZ, COSCOM, FASCOM, the army support brigade, TASCOM, and ASCOM provide general guidance and long-range planning functions for their areas of responsibility. The corps normally plans for and controls the execution of RAP operations within its rear area.

c. Elements assigned RAP responsibilities on an as required basis include those combat support and combat service support elements normally located or operating in the corps rear area, field army service area, or in the COMMZ.

d. One RAOC is provided to each corps commander assigned to the field army and to each support group commander regardless of location within the theater of operations on the presumption that their areas of responsibility will not be further subdivided for RAP operations. The corps RAOC operates under the general staff supervision of the corps G3. When the corps is operating independently, two RAOC's are organized and function under each of the COSCOM support group S2/S3 sections. In FASCOM, the RAOC operates under the staff supervision of the support group S2/S3 sections in the army support brigade area. RAOC's in ASCOM execute their responsibilities under the supervision of the director of security, plans, and operations of each support group. Each RAOC is located geographically where it can best accomplish the RAP mission for the respective area of responsibility.

e. The RAOC keeps the commander informed of the RAS and ADC situation in his area and of the resources available to cope with emergencies. It represents the planning capability of the commander and exercises command and control over forces designated to execute RAP missions when committed.

f. In addition to providing the information necessary for effective emergency control, the RAOC can provide functional elements with current information they may require to conduct routine operations such as—

(1) Highway road conditions, new unit or activity locations, security and support activities, refueling points, emergency repair and wrecker facilities, medical facilities, rest stops, and reroutes.

(2) Weather, terrain, and intelligence data.

(3) Location of area communications sites available to units, convoys, or personnel on the move.

(4) Location and level of chemical, biological, or radiological contamination.

(5) Available explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support.

g. The essential elements and principles of RAP planning and operations by the RAOC assist in the prevention of the accidental massing of resources in the rear. By monitoring all unit locations and proper allocation of RAP priorities, a permanent or semipermanent massing of units will be prevented. A real danger exists during the movement of units from one location to another when accidental massing occurs. The RAOC can provide adequate information to enable corrective action to prevent or reduce this type eventuality.

4–5. RAOC Organization

a. The basic organizational structure of the RAOC is shown in figure 4–1. A type RAOC communications system is shown in figure 4–2.

b. The RAOC is organized into five sections:

(1) The center headquarters provides supervision for and support to the other RAOC sec-



Figure 4–1. Organization of the RAOC.

tions. The center commander implements the area commander's policies with regard to control of people and resources within the established area, keeps the area commander informed of the situation and the resources available to cope with RAP emergencies, and plans for deployment and utilization of RAS/ADC task forces.

(2) The administration and logistical section provides administrative support for the unit and, within its capability, augments the functional sections during periods when RAP operations are excessive. Logistical support includes organizational supply and maintenance functions, communications support for the center, mess augmentation, internal security, and unit training. The administration and logistical officer coordinates, administers, and supervises the administrative and logistical support outlined above.

(3) The security, plans, and operations section is composed of personnel possessing various general and technical specialties required to effectively plan for the execution of RAP missions.

(*a*) The security, plans, and operations officer supervises the section and assists the RAOC commander by implementing RAP policies; provides continuous vulnerability analysis of the area and situation; plans for the employment of forces available for RAP missions; coordinates requirements for military intelligence, tactical air, signal, CBR, and EOD; and develops and recommends directives, orders, SOP's, and training requirements for force structures to be utilized in RAP reaction.

(*b*) The chemical plans and operations officer is the principal advisor to the commander and staff, through the security, plans, and operations officer, on CBR matters including not only protection against CBR attacks but also the employment of chemical agents within the capabilities of the RAP forces. He continually coordinates with the RAOC intelligence and security officer to determine the enemy chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. After determining the chemical threat, he gives guidance through the security, plans, and operations officer to commanders for determination of the mission oriented protective posture (wearing of chemical protective clothing and equipment) for friendly forces. Functions of



Figure 4-2. Type, RAOC communications system.

the chemical plans and operations office include the preparation and coordination of plans to minimize the effects of nuclear weapons and chemical and biological attacks upon service support operations; and to minimize the effects of nuclear and chemical accidents within the service support area; preparation of CBR vulnerability analyses; receipt, evaluation, and dissemination of nuclear, biological, and radiological (NBC) reports' preparation and dissemination of fallout prediction resulting from enemy employment of nuclear weapons; evaluation and dissemination of CBR contamination information; preparation of plans for, and coordination of chemical and biological agent detection and radiological monitoring and survey operations; and provision of technical assistance in the planning and coordination of ADC team operations. The security, plans, and operations section is staffed with chemical personnel to assist the chemical plans and operations officer in carrying out his functions. When required, he may, upon approval of the security, plans, and operations officer, organize the chemical personnel into a chemical, biological, and radiological element (CBRE) to carry out these functions under his direction.

(*c*) The engineer plans and operations officer assists in planning ADC operations by providing technical engineer assistance and advice on roads, bridges, structures, rescue operations, control of damage by fire, explosions, or natural disasters; recommends amount of time and type of engineer equipment required to support contingency plans; and provides recommendations and develops detailed plans for employment and requirements for labor parties, light and heavy rescue squads, and firefighting elements.

(*d*) The military police plans and operations officer provides advice on the employment and reinforcement of military police resources for RAP functions; provides planning assistance for assessment of the physical security posture of in-

stallations or areas; recommends physical security measures to be employed as the RAP threat increases or declines; and insures that police intelligence received from law enforcement agencies is evaluated and processed to provide the current law and order situation.

(*e*) The intelligence security officer assists in the formulation of plans, policies, and procedures by developing and obtaining intelligence information which will be of value in planning for and in conducting actual RAS/ADC operations; coordinates ground or inland waterway surveillance operations for the RAOC; recommends and prepares policies, plans, procedures, and orders designed to counteract intelligence efforts of the enemy; and conducts liaison with appropriate counterparts for the purpose of developing close cooperation and mutual exchange of information pertinent to RAP functions.

(*f*) During linkup operations with friendly guerrilla forces, a Special Forces liaison element may be attached to the RAOC. This element assists in the passage of control of these forces from the Special Forces Operational Base to the conventional military force commander. For continuity in the guerrilla forces operations, Special Forces detachments may remain with the supported guerrilla units until relationships have been established with the appropriate US command. Once this occurs the requirements for the Special Forces liaison element diminishes.

(4) The RAS task force command section is provided to assume operational control of designated RAP potential units when activated for RAS purposes. Normally, combat support and combat service support units are functionally oriented and are not organized to conduct offensive combat operations. Therefore, the RAS task force command section organizes and conducts training for designated RAS elements. The command section is capable of controlling two to four company size units.

(*a*) The RAS task force commander, when directed by the RAOC commander, assumes operational control over activated RAS units and immediately assumes responsibility for coordination, direction, and control of the committed RAS effort. He maintains communications with the RAOC for any instructions, orders, or directions that may affect the operation and furnishes situation and condition reports to the RAOC in accordance with standing procedures.

(*b*) The operations officer implements orders and directives received from the task force commander, and maintains up-to-the-minute status of the situation, conditions, and disposition of forces; receives information from committed RAS companies and insures that intelligence and other information is processed and disseminated to the proper agency; requests air and field artillery support from the RAOC when it is not within the existing capability of the task force; and keeps the task force commander and RAS company commanders informed of all developments which may affect the RAS operation.

(5) The ADC task force command section provides planning, supervision, inspection, and command and control for ADC resources when activated.

(*a*) The task force commander, when directed, assumes operational control over the activated RAP ADC potential. He directs and controls resources employed in rescue, firefighting, decontamination, recovery, munitions safety control, and loudspeaker and leaflet operations.

(*b*) The operations officer implements the task force commander's policies and orders; receives situation and condition reports from disaster areas; analyzes and evaluates requirements, resources, and priority of tasks; coordinates operational activities; makes plans; prepares forecasts or estimates and recommends actions for consideration by the task force commander; provides current information to the RAOC on the situation and conditions at the damage site; and maintains communications with the RAOC and operational elements to receive and transmit necessary orders and instructions pertaining to ADC activities.

Section III. RAP TASK FORCES

4–6. Determining Available Resources

In creating forces for RAP, an area commander must first determine what personnel and equipment resources are available and what is required to accomplish possible tasks. A military (Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine) unit occupying a position or base in the COMMZ, field army service area, or corps rear area will report its status to the RAOC controlling RAP measures for that area. This report for Army units is generally limited to identifying the unit, its TOE number, and its location. The RAOC determines the RAP potential of Army units and establishes priorities based on the existing capabilities. Units and activ-

ities other than Army will provide their identity, location, and priority, if known, to the RAOC as specified by their appropriate senior headquarters.

a. Operational requirements will frequently modify a unit's RAP potential. Responsibility for reporting such modifications rests with the unit rendering the report. Unless an exception report is submitted to the RAOC, it is assumed that a unit will be able to provide its total RAP potential.

b. Where a unit is part of an installation or group of units, it renders a status report through the commander or security officer of that facility. The commander or security officer develops the total RAP status report and submits it to the RAOC.

4–7. Unit Priorities

The field army, theater army support command, and corps commander assign RAP priorities to types of units based upon the criticality of the organization to the overall support mission. These priorities serve to inform area commanders of the degree of participation they may expect from various echelons tenanted in their areas. In the absence of major command designations, priorities may be established by agreement between area commanders and tenant units or as a result of reasonable interpretation of command policies. Priority designations are —

a. Priority RAP–I. RAP missions are executed primarily by priority I units. This priority includes units, installations, or facilities which may readly be tasked to meet the requirements specified by the area commander. This priority designation presupposes that not more than 25 percent reduction in the unit's service or support capability will result from its participation in RAP missions. However, in the case of certain engineer units, a 100 percent degradation may result when the entire unit is activated as an ADC task force.

b. Priority RAP–II. Units, installations, or facilities assigned this priority possess a RAP potential; however, their participation in RAP operations is limited to conducting surveillance and defense measures for their static location. Units may be required to double or triple their local security for periods up to 24 hours in order to release forces previously provided by the area commander for high priority missions.

c. Priority RAP–III. Units, installations, or facilities possessing limited RAP capability, and with a mission of such a critical nature that their participation in RAP missions is restricted to close-in defense of the critical site. The area commander may need to provide additional security and protection for these units.

4–8. Considerations in Building Task Forces

RAP task forces are developed from military and, when possible, indigenous elements. The commander must consider all available resources before establishing task force structures.

a. Indigenous police, paramilitary, and military elements will frequently be available for employment in RAP missions. Early clarification of the positions, responsibilities, and authority of these elements in RAP emergencies will reduce possible confusion and/or duplication. Special considerations for US employment of indigenous elements include —

(1) Designated indigenous RAP elements must be responsive to the demands of the task force commander.

(2) Caution must be exercised in the assignment of indigenous elements to tasks requiring specialized equipment or skills. Area commanders may be required to provide selected items of equipment and conduct necessary training to insure that an indigenous element is capable of responding in a CBR environment.

(3) Considerations of impact that the use of indigenous resources might have on tranquillity and viability of the indigenous society must not be overlooked. Critical resources which cannot be totally depleted for RAP operations include —

(*a*) Medical personnel and facilities.

(*b*) Police elements.

(*c*) Public transportation facilities.

(*d*) Stocks of food, clothing, and shelter.

(4) Guerrilla forces, which have been uncovered in linkup with conventional military forces, may be assigned rear area security missions with various tactical commands or within the theater army support command area. These forces are adapted by experience and training for use in counterguerrilla operations in rear areas.

(5) Prior to utilizing indigenous elements in RAP operations, area commanders should consult with appropriate staff sections or civil affairs units to clarify any restrictions that might apply to use of indigenous forces.

b. The size and number of task forces are best determined by an analysis of intelligence from all



Figure 4–3. Creating RAP task forces.

available sources. Based on this intelligence, the RAOC commander organizes the RAP task forces to best meet his mission requirements. Other critical considerations in this determination are —

(1) Task forces must be manageable within the command and control capabilities available in the area.

(2) In larger areas, sufficient task force must be formed to insure adequate response time.

(3) Task forces will usually respond to emergencies on a subarea basis. However, the force is generally employed in only one area at a time. When RAP subarea resources cannot respond to a specific facility or target area, provisions must be made for outside assistance. This is especially true concerning equipment and mobility at a damage control site where the requirements may exceed the resources initially committed.

(4) Task forces should be made no larger than necessary because they represent a drain on the energy and resources of the area. Degradation to a unit's primary mission capability is to be expected when either its RAS or ADC potential is activated.

(5) Aviation support can reduce the requirement for numerous RAP task forces.

(6) Task forces are combinations of elements from diverse sources and locations and, consequently, responsiveness is hampered. Since the task force must act while it grows, it is not practical to delay action pending the arrival of the slowest element. The affected RAOC task force section must be responsive to prevent a RAP element from prematurely acting in the absence of its command structure, thereby disrupting the orderly progression of an integrated effort.

4–9. Creating the Task Force

a. The TOE of designated combat support and combat service support units reflect the RAP potential of that unit. This potential is affected by strengths, equipment shortages or losses, or command revocation of a RAP priority.

b. Once the total potential is determined and confirmed by coordination, the RAOC integrates resources into RAP units and assigns them into the overall RAP task forces.

c. RAP task forces generally are two standby organizations; one for RAS and one for ADC. While units and individuals may be members of both organizations, the activation of a RAP potential unit for a RAS mission may adversely affect the ADC capability. Whenever possible, members

of the RAS task force will not be identified as an ADC element and vice versa.

d. See figure 4–3 and appendix D for creation of RAP task forces.

4–10. Critical Considerations

In organizing RAP task forces, critical considerations are as follows:

a. Unit Compatibility. In the creation of RAP forces, unrelated and unfamiliar groups are brought together. Every effort must be made to retain platoon integrity while structuring task force companies. Steps that will assist in this regard are —

(1) When possible, an RAS or ADC company should consist of a number of platoons from the same facility or organization.

(2) To facilitate coordination, training, rehearsing, and the execution of RAP missions by the RAS or ADC company, platoons must have geographical proximity.

(3) Cross reinforcing of platoons is essential to broaden RAP capabilities.

b. Priority. The platoons making up an RAS or ADC company must have an identical RAP priority.

c. Vulnerability. When forming an RAS or ADC company, the RAOC commander must consider the impact its activation will have on the vulnerability of the parent units. To compensate for this increased vulnerability, the area commander may take such steps as the following:

(1) Place priorities II and III elements on working-standby; i.e., the elements continue their missions but must be ready to respond to a local emergency within the time specified by the area commander.

(2) Increase patrolling and surveillance activities.

(3) If authorized, relocate supporting indigenous resources in the area of the threat.

(4) If authorized, increase circulation control restrictions in the area.

CHAPTER 5

REAR AREA PROTECTION OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

Section I. REAR AREA SECURITY

5-1. RAS Phases

The execution of RAS functions is usually divided into three phases. Phasing is used to minimize problems in RAS activities.

a. Phase I RAS measures are taken before US Forces are assigned areas of responsibility in the theater of operations. Regardless of the political circumstances under which US Forces enter a country, it is probable that certain elements will be operating in place prior to the arrival of support groups. These elements may consist of combat forces, civil affairs, intelligence, communications, and other combat support advisory personnel who have been operating with the US MAAG or mission. They can provide detailed information concerning political, sociological, and economic conditions. They can provide information to US supporting units as they arrive on the existing operational indigenous RAS forces which have been active in tactical combat operations. During this phase, US participation in RAS combat activities may be limited to base defense and protective measures. LOC's and areas adjacent to US installations will frequently be secured by indigenous forces executing tactical missions against the insurgent threat. Phase I measures include —

(1) Analyzing available intelligence to determine the potential or existing threat conditions and classifying the critical terrain required to facilitate the location of bases, installations, or facilities.

(2) Planning for the dispersion of grouped activities as dictated by the enemy chemical, biological, and nuclear threat.

(3) Coordinating communications requirements.

(4) Delineating tentative area boundaries.

b. Phase II RAS measures are initiated subsequent to the arrival of US Forces and include —

(1) Reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, surveillance, counterintelligence, and coordinating with existing indigenous RAS elements.

(2) Identifying and establishing US RAS elements.

(3) Organizing units for operational RAS missions.

(4) Assigning sectors to RAS forces.

(5) Establishing communications and testing alert and warning systems.

(6) Developing and rehearsing RAS SOP's.

(7) Communications between the RAS commander and base defense operations center are essential to insure coordinated protection of the total critical rear area of operations.

c. Phase III RAS measures include utilization of US and, where possible, indigenous RAS forces to—

(1) Defend units, bases, and critical terrain features on LOC's.

(2) Reinforce ambushed convoys.

(3) Locate and eliminate small hostile forces.

5-2. Command of RAS Elements

RAS organizations are relatively small in order to ease command, control, and communication problems created by combining diverse elements. The RAS commander at the RAOC is provided platoons and company command and control teams manned by units designated to provide these elements in their TOE. Types of RAS platoon elements and a company command and control team are shown in figures 5-1 through 5-3. Types of RAS companies thus formed are shown in figure 5-4.

5-3. RAS Employment

RAS elements are employed upon order of the

MISSION TO PROTECT CRITICAL FACILITIES AND THE ESSENTIAL LAND AREA SURROUNDING IT BY ENGAGING, DELAYING, REPELLING, AND MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

CAPABILITIES. A. PERFORMS AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE UNIT IN ABOVE ROLE FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME AGAINST LIGHTLY ARMED FORCES.

B. CAPITALIZES ON ALL FORMS OF MOBILITY.

MOBILITY. 100 PERCENT MOBILE FROM EXISTING UNIT RESOURCES.



DUTY POSITION	FS	RMK
PLATOON LEADER	1	
PLATOON SGT	1	

EQUIPMENT	FS
RADIO SET AN/PRC-25	1
TRUCK 1/4-TON	1

DUTY POSITION	FS	RMK
SQUAD LEADER	1	12
MACHINE GUNNER	2	11
ASST MACH GUNNER	2	11

EQUIPMENT	FS
RECEIVER SET AN/PRR-9	1
LAUNCHER GRENADE 40MM	1
MACHINE GUN LT FLEX	2
PISTOL AUTO CAL .45	5
TRANSMITTING SET AN/PRT-4	1
TRUCK 1/4-TON	2

DUTY POSITION	FS	RMK
SQUAD LEADER	1	
GRENADIER	1	12
RIFLEMAN	3	

EQUIPMENT	FS
RECEIVER SET AN/PRR-9	1
LAUNCHER GRENADE 40MM	1
PISTOL AUTO CAL .45	1
TRANSMITTING SET AN/PRT-4	1
TRUCK 1/4-TON	2

Figure 5-1. Type, RAS reaction platoon.

REMARKS
ALL PERSONNEL ARMED WITH 7.62MM RIFLE UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.
11 ARMED WITH PISTOL AUTOMATIC CALIBER .45.
12 ARMED WITH LAUNCHER GRENADE 40MM AND PISTOL AUTOMATIC CALIBER .45.

MISSION. TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND PERFORM RECONNAISSANCE FOR REAR AREA SECURITY FORCES TO WHICH ATTACHED AND TO ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, OR DELAYING ACTION AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE UNIT.

CAPABILITIES.

A. PERFORMS RECONNAISSANCE AND PROVIDES LIGHT ARMORED ESCORT FOR UNIT SUPPORTED.

B. ENGAGES IN OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, OR DELAYING ACTIONS AGAINST SMALL ENEMY FORCES.

C. CONDUCTS INDEPENDENT ACTION AGAINST LIGHTLY ARMED GUERRILLA ELEMENTS.

MOBILITY. 100 PERCENT MOBILE FROM EXISTING UNIT RESOURCES.



DUTY POSITION	FS	RMK
PLATOON LEADER	1	
PLATOON SGT	1	

EQUIPMENT	FS
TRUCK UT 1/4-TON 4X4	1
RADIO SET AN/GRC-125	1

DUTY POSITION	FS	RMK
SQUAD LEADER	1	12
MACHINE GUNNER	2	11
ASST MACH GUNNER	2	11

EQUIPMENT	FS
RECEIVER SET AN/PRR-9	1
LAUNCHER GRENADE 40MM	1
MACHINE GUN LT FLEX	2
PISTOL AUTO CAL .45	5
TRUCK CGO 3/4-TON 4X4	1
TRANSMITTING SET AN/PRT-4	1

DUTY POSITION	FS	RMK
SQUAD LEADER	1	12
ASST SQUAD LEADER	1	12
DRIVER	2	13
RIFLEMAN	4	

EQUIPMENT	FS
ARMORED CAR	1
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	1
SUBMACHINE GUN CAL .45	1
PISTOL AUTO CAL .45	2

DUTY POSITION	FS	RMK
SQUAD LEADER	1	
GRENADIER	1	12
RIFLEMAN	3	

EQUIPMENT	FS
RECEIVER SET AN/PRR-9	1
LAUNCHER GRENADE 40MM	1
TRUCK CGO 3/4-TON 4X4	1
PISTOL AUTO CAL .45	1
TRANSMITTING SET AN/PRT-4	1

REMARKS

ALL PERSONNEL ARMED WITH 7.62MM RIFLE UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.

11 ARMED WITH PISTOL AUTOMATIC CALIBER .45.

12 ARMED WITH LAUNCHER GRENADE 40MM AND PISTOL AUTOMATIC CALIBER .45.

13 ARMED WITH SUBMACHINE GUN AND PISTOL AUTOMATIC CALIBER .45.

Figure 5-2. Type, RAS reconnaissance/escort platoon.

MISSION. EXERCISES COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FROM TWO TO FIVE REAR AREA SECURITY PLATOONS.

CAPABILITIES. A. COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT OF COMBINED CAPABILITIES OF PARTICIPATING RAS PLATOONS.

B. CONTROLS PLATOONS AND MAINTAINS COMMUNICATIONS WITH RAOC.

MOBILITY. 100 PERCENT MOBILE FROM SPONSORING ELEMENT RESOURCES.

RAP COMPANY COMMAND AND CONTROL TEAM

	O	WO	EM	AGG
FS	2	0	4	6

DUTY POSITION	GRADE	FS	RMK
COMMANDER	CPT	1	11
EXEC OFFICER	LT	1	
LIAISON SGT	E-5	1	
WIREMAN	E-3	1	04
LT VEHICLE DR	E-3	2	

EQUIPMENT	FS	RMK
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-T 4X4	2	
RADIO SET CONTROL AN/GRA-39	1	
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	1	549
RADIO SET AN/VRC-46	1	549
RADIO SET AN/GRC-106	1	
REEL EQUIPMENT CE-11	1	
SWITCHBOARD SB-993/GT	1	

REMARKS

04-ALSO SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR
11-ARMED W/PISTOL AUTOMATIC CALIBER .45
549-MOUNTED IN DIFFERENT VEHICLES

Figure 5-9. Type, RAS company command and control team.



Figure 5-4. Type, RAS companies.

RAOC commander. These elements assemble at preselected locations under the command and control of the RAS task force commander. The principles of basic small unit infantry tactics are applicable to the limited offensive potential of company size RAS forces. Type RAS potentials for selected units are shown in appendix D.

5-4. Combat Support for RAS Activities

a. Field Artillery Support. In rear areas (i.e., COMMZ and field army) field artillery support will be limited or nonexistent for RAS operations. However, this support will frequently be available in the corps area. When available, the RAOC commander should request on-call targets be planned along likely avenues of approach to critical facilities. He should also consider battlefield illumination missions and harassing and interdiction fires to deny concealment and likely assembly areas to enemy elements. The RAS task force commander must maintain close coordination with available firing units to insure effectively and timely field artillery support when RAS forces are employed. If possible, the firing unit should provide a forward observer to the RAS force so that field artillery fires can be efficiently adjusted.

b. Army Aviation Support. Army aviation is ideally suited to assist RAS forces in the conduct of their operations. Specific areas include —

(1) Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance.

(2) Pickup, deployment, and evacuation of RAS forces.

(3) Communications relay support.

(4) Firepower.

(5) Resupply.

c. Tactical Air Support. Normally, RAS forces will not be allocated preplanned air support. However, in emergency situations, aircraft on airborne alert may be committed to assist. Tactical air sup-

port is arranged based on requests submitted through Army command channels.

d. Tactical Forces.

(1) The TASCOM and FASCOM commanders request tactical resources when, in their judgment, the net effect of enemy rear area activities is beyond the limited capabilities of combat support or combat service support resources. The corps commander utilizes his tactical elements in RAS operations when required. Considerations affecting the decision to use tactical troops include the following:

(*a*) *Frequency of activities.* Frequent RAS problems may require counteractions so often that service support missions may be hampered beyond an acceptable degree and out of proportion to the enemy effort or effectiveness.

(*b*) *Intensity of activities.* Service support resources cannot cope with intense combat activities. The firepower and combat skills necessary for complex and coordinated tactical operations are usually not available in service support units.

(*c*) *Prolongation of activities.* Enemy activities that require prolonged countermeasures will best be resolved by employment of tactical resources. Service support resources should only be used to eliminate the adversary quickly or to maintain contact with him until tactical counteractions can be employed.

(2) When tactical resources are available for RAS purposes, special attention must be given to command and control. Considerations in this respect include —

(*a*) The RAOC exercising command and control over all resources in the initial stages of any RAS operation. When tactical forces become the dominant consideration, the area commander directs the RAOC (representing service support resources) and the tactical elements in the area.

(*b*) The highest participating tactical element directs RAS operations as tactical activities increase in scope, frequency, or intensity. The RAOC acts as a cooperating agency supporting tactical elements with information and resources. The RAOC also serves as a link between tactical forces and service support elements.

(3) The transition of command and control for RAS operations to or from tactical resources must be specified in command policies.

5–5. Forms of RAS

There are four basic forms of RAS: point, base, area, and remote. These forms are used singularly or in any combination. If possible, the form or forms used should be altered to reduce vulnerability characteristics.

a. Point security is oriented toward the protection of a single facility or activity. It is employed to increase the protection of the most likely target within an area. Active and passive measures are employed.

b. Base security is oriented toward protection of a base within a given perimeter.

c. Area security is oriented toward retaining key facilities and terrain surrounding a given facility which an enemy would have to occupy in order to conduct effective overt offensive ground actions.

d. Remote security is protecting a facility or a number of facilities by possessing a capability to bring fire onto or within its perimeter or to move forces into its general vicinity very rapidly. All facilities normally are protected by remote security in addition to one or more of the other forms.

5–6. Combination of Forms

a. The most thorough security system consists of a combination of the four basic forms. In this posture, the facility or base provides point security to key targets and perimeter security and backs these up by controlling key terrain surrounding the facility or base. Either by local coordination or through the area commander, remote security is provided by another element (RAS task force) and gives the necessary offensive capability. This complete system is used whenever resources permit.

b. The combining of point security with base and remote security represents the best posture when critical items or activities are vulnerable and sufficient resources do not exist to take area security measures.

c. The minimum security posture is remote security and is used in well-controlled areas or where resources do not permit any of the other forms.

5–7. Linear Security Operations

a. General. The security of LOC's, whether rail, pipeline, highway, or waterway, presents one of the greatest security problems in a rear area. Units performing missons which require the habitual use of LOC's (military police, transportation, supply, and service units) can perform linear

security operations in conjunction with their primary activities. A base, facility, or compound permits the concentration of security resources. LOC security requires dedicated resources at almost infinite points or reaction forces (RAS elements) to counter possible enemy action. One of the most vulnerable configurations found in a field army service area or theater army support command are LOC's. They are more susceptible to enemy attack when compared to a fixed facility with dedicated security forces. Vulnerability can be reduced by concentrating RAS potential resources at critical points along an LOC.

b. Types of Linear Security. The types of linear security are—

(1) Passive security.

(2) Remote security.

(3) Reconnaissance security.

(4) Patrol security.

(5) Escort security.

(6) Strongpoint security.

(7) Combat security.

5–8. Passive Security

a. Passive security measures are those initiated to achieve security without a significant expenditure of manpower or resources and include—

(1) Camouflage.

(2) Formation and march control of convoys so they present the least lucrative target possible under prevailing conditions.

(3) Proper selection of routes.

(4) Patrol security.

(5) Capitalizing on bonus security offered by related activities taking place without regard to security requirements. These activities include—

(*a*) Routine aerial operations traversing the line in question.

(*b*) Maintenance activities along the line.

(*c*) Training exercises or troop movements adjacent to or along the line.

(*d*) Military and indigenous police traffic control activities.

(*e*) Indigenous population activities.

(6) Signal security measures

b. Passive linear security measures are used for all conditions or situations and as an adjunct to any other types of linear security employed. They are the product of a long term and continually improved program for an integrated security system.

5–9. Remote Security

a. It is normally not feasible to secure all points along an LOC by physically allocating resources to the points on or segments of the line. Heliborne or motorized units can be assigned critical points or segments within an acceptable reaction time distance for which they plan security countermeasures in the event of enemy activity. While providing remote security to these points or segments, the unit performs its primary mission.

b. Remote security may be afforded within reduced distances by RSA elements.

c. RAS elements lose considerable combat effectiveness if dissipated over a lengthy LOC. Therefore, unit integrity is maintained at critical points, with the RAS potential at each point providing remote security to other points or segments along the line.

d. A combination of passive and remote security is the most common pattern used over secured LOC's.

5–10. Reconnaissance Security

a. Reconnaissance security is defined as observing each point along the route at a frequency greater than the reaction time of the backup system. Thus, if the remote security system provides a segment of a line with a 60-minute delay in reaction, that segment should be under aerial or ground observation less than every 60 minutes. The purpose here is that the reconnaissance capability will always be within range to cover an affected point or segment prior to the arrival of the backup (i.e., remote security) selement. This is important to linear security as it—

(1) Provides the backup force with a knowledgeable reconnaissance element.

(2) Assists the backup element in finitely locating the site of the incident.

(3) Offers a better possibility of maintaining contact with the adversary.

b. Reconnaissance for a specific mission, i.e., a critical convoy, is planned to meet the special requirements of that mission rather than the generalized requirement discussed above.

5-11. Patrol Security

a. Patrol security involves the adding of some combat (firepower) capability to the reconnaissance effort. The frequency of the patrol effort is computed in the same manner as the frequency of the reconnaissance effort. However, patrols are afforded the time required to inspect in detail the critical points of their route segment and, therefore, a number of patrol segments are established for each reconnaissance segment. Segment oriented communications are maintained between patrol and reconnaissance and other linear security means.

b. Patrol security includes both the LOC's in question and critical adjacent areas from which ambush type operations may be launched.

5-12. Escort Security

Escort security is normally provided by tactical combat units or military police.

5-13. Strongpoint Security

a. Strongpoint security is defined as the securing of two points between which escort or patrol activities may operate and launch offensive actions to counter enemy activities. Strongpoint security requires a considerable expenditure of manpower and other resources. It is used only where a clear and evident requirement exists.

b. Strongpoints dispatch patrols on a frequent but irregular schedule to other strongpoints. Personnel are rotated between duty at the strongpoint and duty on patrol.

c. Normally, each strongpoint is at least a platoon sized element and is equipped with mortars, machineguns, good communications, and the best available ground surveillance equipment. Frequent contact is made with strongpoints via helibrone supervision and support resources.

d. Distance between strongpoints is equated to the estimated "hold capability" of connecting patrols. A patrol should be designed to survive in its most probable contact environment until relief arrives from a strongpoint.

e. Strongpoint security will do little to eliminate the causes that require its adoption. An inherent par of this severe and costly course of action is a series of parallel corrective actions, to include—

(1) Search for a new route.

(2) Vigorous activity to find and fix the enemy.

(3) Destruction of the enemy by overwhelming combat power.

(4) Saturation of the most dangerous areas with chemical and explosive munitions.

(5) Rigorously enforced circulation control measures over the indigenous population.

(6) Defoliation or other clearance of dense areas.

(7) Mass evacuation of towns and villages.

(8) Engineer construction to bypass dangerous areas.

(9) Repositioning of depots to permit better route selection.

f. Loss of complete control over any given line is best recognized early. The continued investment of resources into a "loss route" merely serves the objectives of the adversary. The expenditure of resources and energy used for security in more profitable corrective measures should be adopted whenever feasible.

5-14. Combat Security

Combat security is defined as measures taken by combat arms resources to seize and hold the terrain necessary to permit use of the LOC's in question. This is the most costly form of linear security and, as it draws on the strength of the combat arms, it approaches the ideal response in the eyes of the enemy. Special considerations include coordination with segments manned by rear area resources, integration of combat arms activities with the RAOC, and clarification of command and control arrangements.

5-15. Classification of Surface Routes

The security condition of surface routes may be described in the familiar traffic light descriptive terms as green, yellow, or red.

a. Green Routes. The lack of enemy activity along any given route or within segments of that route is not interpreted to mean security considerations are not important. When a route is designated "green," an asset of extreme importance exists which must be preserved. Steps in this respect include—

(1) Passive measures discussed above.

(2) Selective and continuous measures to eliminate potentially dangerous points or segments.

(3) Continuous collection and evaluation of all available information which could provide early warning of enemy interdiction activities.

(4) Frequent photographic reconnaissance and analysis.

(5) Prompt and thorough investigation of all suspicious developments.

(6) Establishment of a rapid system for reroute around any segment.

(7) Planning for the rapid introduction of combat power at any point or within any segment of the route if required.

b. Yellow Routes.

(1) A route or segment thereof is considered "yellow" when overt or covert identications exist that an enemy intends interdiction activities or when the situation and terrain favor enemy interdiction.

(2) At a minimum, patrol security is employed in conjunction with passive, remote, and reconnaissance security measures when this condition exists. Particularly dangerous segments are bolstered with escort security.

(3) An insecure route or segment thereof may require a task force type organization to constantly monitor and control the situation. These units are bolstered with aviation, photo reconnaissance, civil affairs, and intelligence support as required.

(4) When the route or segment in question is of immediate and direct interest to the area commander, the task force operates under the RAOC.

c. Red Routes.

(1) A route or segment thereof is considered "red" when enemy interdiction activities are actually taking place on a frequent basis.

(2) Increased security measures as described for "yellow routes" are instituted.

(3) Emphasis is placed on escort security and use of combat resources.

Section II. AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

5–16. General

a. ADC operations consist of preventive and control measures taken prior to, during, and after an enemy attack, major accident, or natural disaster to minimize the effects on combat support and service support units and insure the continuation of support to combat operations. The purpose of ADC operations is to prevent the damage from becoming worse, seal off the affected area, save lives, and salvage equipment. The responsibility for reestablishment of disrupted combat service support remains a responsibility of the parent organization or command using available resources of the technical and administrative services involved.

b. Because damage operations may require extensive expenditures of time, materiel, and manpower, it is necessary to coordinate the responsibilities of ADC efforts and the area damage control operations center (ADCOC) located at ASCOM, support brigade headquarters of a corps or FASCOM, and headquarters of FASCOM. The ADC task force usually will assume control at the damage site and assess damage control efforts during the first 12 to 24 hours. If the extensiveness of the damage warrants, the major command ADCOC will assume command and control at the site and coordinate activities which require forces over an extended period of time.

5–17. ADC Phases

The execution of ADC functions is usually divided into three phases. Phasing is used to minimize problems in ADC activities.

a. Phase I ADC measures are very similar to those discussed for RAS measures. Coordination is accomplished with MAAG or other advisory type personnel already on the ground to determine the extent of existing ADC capability. Other phase I measures include—

(1) Analyzing, selecting, and planning for damage control measures to be taken to minimize the effects of massive damage on critical facilities required to support combat operations.

(2) Coordinating communications requirements.

(3) Delineating responsibilities for damage control activities.

b. Phase II ADC measures consist of preventive measures designed to avoid or minimize effects of enemy attacks, major accidents, or natural disaster, and of readiness measures to prepare for initiation of phase III operations.

(1) *Preventive measures.* Dispersion, denial of information to the enemy, and provision for

protective shelters are the principal preventive measures to reduce the effects of mass destruction weapons or the effects of natural disaster.

(2) *Readiness measures.* Readiness measures are undertaken to insure prompt and effective implementation of phase III activities. The area commander must establish and coordinate clear-cut lines of responsibility and operational control among commanders of coequal commands located in his geographic area. Readiness measures include such tasks as designating, organizing, and training ADC teams; designating areas of responsibility; establishing communications and warning systems; making preliminary fallout predictions; determining the mission oriented protective posture (wearing of protective clothing) for friendly forces; preparing plans to reestablish or replace damaged and destroyed service facilities; and planning for care of mass casualties and disposition of the dead.

(3) *Responsibilities of unit commanders.* Unit commanders at all levels are responsible for preparation of plans and incorporation into the unit or command SOP of appropriate ADC measures to be taken. During phase II, commanders of units of company size or larger insure that their units employ adequate preventive measures and readiness measures to reduce unit vulnerability and increase their capability for self-help within unit resources. Unit plans will be compatible with the ADC plan for the area and will be coordinated by the area commander.

c. Phase III measures begin when an attack, major accident, or natural disaster has occurred. Activities undertaken during and after the event include movement of RAOC ADC task force command section or ADC party and ADC teams to the scene of the accident; assumption of control of rescue operations; assessment of damage and the CBR situation; firefighting; first aid; casualty evacuation; traffic control; emergency explosive ordnance and bomb disposal; and decontamination measures. Emergency suupplies are distributed and communication is reestablished. The ADC task force will be relieved to become available for employment elsewhere as soon as operational control can be effectively assumed or the area ADCOC assumes command and control.

5-18. Command of ADC Elements

a. When an incident occurs, the ADC task force command section of the RAOC is dispatched to the site to assume responsibility for subsequent operations. The ADC task force commander assumes control at the disaster site upon arrival. The magnitude of the ADC operation may require formation of a task force organization built upon specific TOE units, such as engineer construction units, EOD teams, or medical detachments.

b. Combat support, combat service support, and tenant units will be designated to contribute the ADC potential identified in their TOE. This support will be provisionally organized into functionally oriented ADC parties and task forces. When committed, activities of ADC teams will be controlled by the ADC task force commander at the scene. The RAOC coordinates requests for assistance and calls on appropriate designated units to furnish ADC or special ADC teams trained and equipped to perform required tasks in connection with firefighting, rescue, food service, billeting, medical sorting, decontamination, EOD, or other services. ADC plans assign appropriate priorities for assistance to be furnished by each unit. ADC teams return to their primary mission assignment upon release by the area commander or the commander at the incident site who is responsible for bringing the emergency under control. The capabilities and composition of ADC teams are shown in appendix D.

c. Most of the functional services required for ADC measures are handled most efficiently by the service or command responsible for that function under normal conditions. Special ADC teams are provided under pertinent plans on the basis of identified ADC potential of normal unit capabilities and responsibilities for the functional services required. They consist of organic elements such as squads or platoons, to be furnished by the parent unit for performing functional, service oriented tasks under unit command in response to professional direction of the ADC task force or ADC party. Unit integrity is the key to efficient employment of these units in performing those tasks for which they had been trained in connection with their primary mission functions. Under such conditions, there would probably be less adverse impact on the normal service support function of the parentunit than if there existed a requirement to train personnel in a secondary ADC function not necessarily related to the primary mission function. Resources in skills and equipment are employed in accordance with their application to the type of ADC function involved, such as—

(1) *Firefighting.* Quick response by local unit resources during the initial stages will permit

most fires to be brought under control while small and within the capability of the unit involved. However, massive fires beyond local unit control can result from enemy attack by nuclear or conventional weapons or from lightning and other accidental causes. Special techniques and equipment are required to bring such fires under control, particularly where extra hazard results from proximity of large quantities of inflammable materials, such as POL and ammunition stocks, or of dry forested areas. Available resources include especially trained firefighting teams equipped with firefighting trucks and trailers, water tank trucks and trailers, and bush fire trucks. These are organic to engineer firefighting platoons which are assigned to the support brigade in FASCOM and area support groups in TASCOM. Heavy truck- or trailer-mounted firefighting equipment is also organic to certain other types of units including ordance ammunition, artillery missile, and Army aviation units which use hazardous or flammable materials in their operations. Usually, these firefighting teams must be reinforced by locally available ADC labor teams equipped with handtools, such as axes, shovels, and picks. In disaster situations involving conflagrations, firefighting teams may be unable to extinguish the fires. They wil direct their efforts to gaining control of the fire, evacuation of troops and equipment, and isolation of fires to allow them to burn themselves out.

(2) *Heavy rescue.* Where personnel have been trapped by collapse of buildings, fortifications, excavations, equipment, or other damage effects, rescue operations will be undertaken by rescue teams retaining their basic squad or platoon organizations and using organic equipment. When the magnitude of the rescue task requires use of heavy engineer mechanical equipment, engineer TOE units may be designated to furnish organic elements, such as squads, platoons, or companies, augmented with appropriate engineer equipment teams, which participate in rescue operations. Engineer knowledge and professional judgment are needed at the site for effective utilization of engineer resources and safety in operation of engineer equipment.

(3) *Earthmoving and rubble clearance.* Engineer equipment and techniques are required for rapid accomplishment of tasks involved in clearance and reopening of routes following nuclear attack, major accident, or natural disaster. Dozers and scooploaders are used for earthmoving, rubble clearance, and reopening passage through areas blocked by tree blowdown or structural debris. Heavy objects may be lifted and moved aside by cranes, shovels, wreckers, and some types of materiel handling equipment. Engineer units may be designated to furnish squads, platoons, or companies augmented with appropriate organic engineer equipment to perform rubble clearance, earthmoving, and route reopening tasks under engineer command and supervision.

(4) *First aid.* All military personnel are trained in first aid techniques, and this function will ordinarily be performed as part of the rescue operation. In some cases, units may be designated to furnish first aid teams to augment rescue team operations or to assist the medical sorting and evacuation teams.

(5) *Medical sorting and evacuation.* In disaster situations where heavy casualties have been incurred, medical teams are organized and furnished from nearby medical installations. The surgeon determines the number, type, and size of these teams which will provide emergency medical treatment for sick and injured personnel at medical sorting and evacuation stations to be established in the vicinity. Nonmedical personnel perform functions of rescue, first aid, and movement of casualties to sorting stations. Medical personnel are responsible for providing subsequent necessary treatment and evacuation. The surgeon designates which hospital facilities will be used for patients requiring hospitalization.

(6) *Light rescue and labor teams.* These teams meet the requirement for the multitude of manpower tasks in damage control functions. They can provide limited first aid, assist in extracting injured and trapped personnel from wreckage and debris, assist in firefighting operations, and perform other limited ADC activities as required.

(7) *Decontamination.* In disasters resulting from accidental or deliberate detonation of nuclear weapons, there will probably be an associated problem of radiological contamination and fallout. A sophisticated enemy could also have the capability of launching attacks with chemical, biological, and radiological weapons separately or in conjunction with other weapons. To accomplish decontamination measures and procedures, decontamination teams are utilized for clearing and decontamination critical areas, supplies, and equipment. Decontamination teams of squad size are organized by each company size unit for clearing and decontamination of their own unit areas. The ADC task force command section has a capability

to supervise and control augmentation teams engaged in decontaminating operations at the disaster site and to perform necessary chemical reconnaissance to detect chemical agent hazards, to collect samples of suspected enemy biological gents or unknown chemical agents, and to conduct radiological surveys. In situtations beyond the capability of the ADC task force to control, the RAOC will coordinate and arrange with decontamination platoons of field service companies in the combat zone and TOE 3–500 decontamination teams (FB) in the COMMZ to provide necessary assistance or augmentation for decontamination of the disaster areas.

(8) *Emergency explosive ordnance disposal.* This task will be performed by teams from the explosive ordnance disposal detachment which normally is responsible for EOD support in the area. The hazardous, highly technical nature of the EOD task requires that it be performed by specially trained, highly skilled personnel. Augmentation by labor teams furnished by other types of units may be required in cases where heavy clearance of debris, rubble, or wreckage is necessary before the EOD team can begin work. Military police direct the evacuation from the danger area of all personnel not needed for the operation.

(9) *Chaplain services.* Any disaster situation can create a morale problem. Systematic deployment and use of trained chaplain resources responding to proper RAP procedure is therefore desirable. In some instances, the chaplain assigned to a unit occupying an incident site could be a casualty. Outside resources, as determined by the ADC task force commander, would be required. If, by chance, the incident is severe enough to require deployment of a RAP potential battalion sized organization, a unit chaplain may arrive on the scene. However, to rely on chance deployment of adequate chaplain resources is unacceptable. Normal direct support chaplain services are provided by staff and unit chaplains assigned to appropriate operating units and headquarters organizations throughout the echelons of the army in the field. Many of these units contain RAP potential elements. The assigned chaplains represent an RAP potential functionally oriented to restore and maintain morale at incident sites during phase III ADC activities. Flexible systematic planning covering a full range of ADC contingencies is a continuing requirement. A staff chaplain is currently authorized by TOE at each type headquarters to which RAOC's are allocated (para 4–4*d*). The staff chaplains of these respective headquarters must maintain planning and execution liaison with their RAOC. Through a series of contingency plans coordinated between the staff chaplain and the RAOC, chaplains assigned to RAP potential units are designated as RAP potential for a variety of responses. This planning is then appropriately incorporated into unit RAP plans. As in other RAP matters, any potential conflict between the organizations providing and commanding resources is resolved by an echelon senior to both. Once designated as a RAP potential, the chaplain would respond to all phases of training and execution in the same manner as do other RAP potential elements of the unit.

5–19. ADC Employment

a. Initial Step. The ADC task force or ADC party is initially dispatched at the direction of the RAOC commander to establish control, assess damage, and determine what additional assistance may be required. Requests for damage control assistance must indicate the requirement in terms of functional type and magnitude of the operation. ADC teams, provided in response to requests for assistance where damage control tasks involve technical specialists or general labor, report to the incident command post upon their arrival at the site. They are attached for operational control to the headquarters exercising command and control over ADC activities at the site.

b. Command. During the entire period of emergency operations, there must be a single, responsible commander at the disaster site. Commanders of special ADC teams performing highly technical functions act as profiessional advisors to the ADC task force commander. The *area commander* retains general responsibility for supervision and execution of ADC activity and exercises overall operational control through the RAOC for purposes of coordination.

c. Termination. This term identifies the period of transition from emergency operations, concerned with ADC at a disaster area, to recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction operations, concerned with early restoration of capabilities to the stricken installation or unit. When the affected installation commander is capable of resuming control or as soon as control can be effectively established by the ADCOC or other service activities, the ADC task force or party elements are relieved. Augmentation teams and other elements temporarily attached for operational control will also be released.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

A-1. Army Regulations

310-25	Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
310-50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.

A-2. Field Manuals

1-100	Army Aviation Utilization.
6-20-2	Field Artillery Techniques.
6-102	Field Artillery Battalion, Aerial Field Artillery.
7-10	The Rifle Company, Platoons, and Squads.
8-10	Medical Support, Theater of Operations.
9-16	Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance.
19-4	Military Police Support, Theater of Operations.
19-25	Military Police Traffic Control.
19-50	Military Police in Stability Operations.
21-40	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense.
23-65	Browning Machine Gun, Caliber .50 HB, M2.
27-10	The Law of Land Warfare.
30-17	Counterintelligence Operations.
31-16	Counterguerrilla Operations.
31-21	Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine.
31-23	Stability Operations—US Army Doctrine.
31-45	Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
31-81 (Test)	Base Defense.
(C) 32-5	Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U).
(C) 32-20	Electronic Warfare (Ground Based) (U).
41-10	Civil Affairs Operation.
44-30	Visual Aircraft Recognition.
54-2	The Division Support Command and Separate Brigade Support Battalion.
54-3	The Field Army Support Command.
54-4	The Support Brigade.
54-6	The Area Support Command.
54-7	The Theater Army Support Command.
61-100	The Division.
100-5	Operations of Army Forces in the Field.
100-10	Combat Service Support.
100-15	Larger Units Theater Army—Corps.
100-26	The Air Ground Operations System.
101-5	Staff Organization and Procedure.

A-3. Department of the Army Pamphlets

310-1	Index of Administrative Publications.
310-3	Index of Doctrinal, Training, and Organizational Publications.
310-4	Index of Technical Manuals, Technical Bulletins, Supply Manuals (types 7, 8, and 9), Supply Bulletins, and Lubrication Orders.

310–6	Index of Supply Catalogs and Supply Manuals (excluding types 7, 8, and 9).
310–7	US Army Equipment Index of Modification Work Orders.
350–15 series	Operations—Lessons Learned.

A–4. Tables of Organization and Equipment

3–500	Chemical Service Organization.
29–408	Support Center, Rear Area Operations.
33–500	Psychological Operations Organization.
55–117	Transportation Terminal Service Company.
55–118	Transportation Terminal Transfer Company.

A–5. Training Circular

23–15	Engagement of Aerial Targets with Small Arms.

APPENDIX B

STANAG 2079, REAR AREA SECURITY AND REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

CENTO UNCLASSIFIED

CENTO STANAG 2079
SECOND EDITION

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT REAR AREA SECURITY AND REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

AGREEMENT

1. It is agreed that the armed forces of the CENTO nations are to establish a system providing for rear area security and rear area damage control based on the principles and instructions contained herein and annexes A and B.

GENERAL

2. This agreement is intended to provide for such planning as must be done by field armies, communications zone and or sections, and comparable commands, and units and installations within these commands. While rear area damage control covered herein deals only with damage to military installations, it must be realized that damage to any civilian installation will have a repercussion on the military situation. It is emphasized that this agreement does not grant any additional powers to the armed forces of the CENTO nations with respect to civilian authorities and civilian responsibilities. Cooperation with national military and civilian officials is essential at all levels and is to be accomplished through the national military authorities.

DEFINITIONS

3. These definitions, which will be contained in the CENTO Glossary of Military Terms (CAAP 6) to be published are given here for convenience:

a. Rear Area. Rear area includes—

(1) The land communications zone.

(2) The rear of the land combat zone in which are located the bulk of the logistical installations. (Army service area.)

b. Rear Area Security. Rear area security includes the measures taken prior to, during, and/or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof.

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c. Rear Area Damage Control. Rear area damage control includes the measures taken in military operations prior to, during, and after a mass destruction attack or natural disaster to minimize the immediate effects thereof.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

4. The following general principles concerning the preparation, use, and format of plans and orders are applicable to both rear area security and to rear area damage control.

a. For the field army, communications zone, sections of the communications zone, and comparable commands, it is desirable that responsibility for rear area security and for rear area damage control be combined.

b. An effective system for rear area security, rear area damage control, and administrative support must possess the following characteristics:

(1) A definite fixing of geographic responsibilities for these activities.

(2) A single commander responsible for all three functions in the same geographic area.

(3) An operations center (and alternate operations center) and the necessary communications.

(4) Provision for prompt integration of transit or lodger units into plans.

c. The commander's plan for rear area security and for rear area damage control should be included in appropriate paragraphs of an operations order and/or appropriate annexes. (See CENTO STANAG 2014.)

d. Close coordination of plans for rear area security and rear area damage control is necessary at all levels.

e. Full use should be made of automatic data processing equipment and other electronic and communications equipment to receive, collate, and disseminate intelligence, radiological data including fallout and other data, and to assist in the control of rear area security and rear area damage control operations.

REAR AREA SECURITY

5. In addition to the general principles outlined in paragraph 4, the following principles are applicable in the planning for rear area security:

a. The object of rear area security planning is to—

(1) Protect installations and activities located in the rear area against enemy ground actions.

(2) Prevent or minimize enemy ground forces (both regular and irregular) interference with logistical and administrative operations.

(3) Destroy or neutralize the hostile forces involved.

b. Rear area security depends upon—

(1) Troops assigned the primary mission of rear area security (e.g., national territorial troops, combat troops).

(2) Other combat troops located temporarily within the area.

(3) Service troops assigned within the area.

c. All units are responsible for their local security, but, normally, service troops are not allotted any security task other than that of their own installation.

d. Tasks of other than service troops may include, but are not necessarily limited to—

(1) Relief and rescue of attacked installations and units.

(2) Route patrolling and convoy protection.

(3) Surveillance of possible redoubt areas of guerrillas or infiltrators.

(4) Planning for defense of possible drop and landing zones.

(5) Finding, fixing, and destroying enemy forces operating in rear areas.

6. Annex A outlines, in the operation order format, those items of basic information (other than that which would normally go into the order) that should be included in a typical rear area security operations plan or order. This is not to be construed as a complete order, nor is the information shown to be considered all of the possible additional information that might be required.

REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

7. In addition to the general principles outlined in paragraph 4, the following principles are applicable in the planning for rear area damage control:

a. The army service area and communications zone contains lucrative targets for attack by mass destruction weapons. Detailed plans are therefore required to minimize the damage effects of such an attack.

b. Rear area damage control plans are prepared, based upon an assumed degree of damage, to insure provisions of a means for minimizing personnel casualties and damage to installations resulting from enemy action or natural disaster. They are based upon the existing command organization. The scope of the plans depends on the size of the area, location and size of installations, and communication routes and facilities. Subordinate commanders are to prepare detailed plans based upon the overall plan.

c. Rear area damage control measures provide for, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:

(1) *Prior to an attack.*

(*a*) Clear lines of authority and responsibility down to the lowest level.

(*b*) Adequate communications and warning systems to include fallout warning.

(*c*) Proper dispersion within and between installations, continuously planned and executed.

(*d*) Preparation of necessary plans and SOP, to include reporting of information required for post-strike analysis.

(*e*) Organization, equipping, and training of all personnel in rear area damage control operations.

(*f*) Appropriate use of cover and concealment.

(*g*) Allocation, organization, and full utilization of available transportation net and equipment, to include alternate plans.

(*h*) Deception measures.

(2) *During and after an attack.*

(*a*) Rapid assessment of the damage and its immediate effect on operations.

(*b*) Control of personnel and traffic either in coordination with the local civilian authorities or by the military when essential for continued military operations and the civilian police are inoperative.

(*c*) Fire prevention and firefighting.

(*d*) Fire aid and evacuation of casualties.

(*e*) Protection against chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.
(*f*) Emergency supply of food, clothing, and water.
(*g*) Explosive ordnance reconnaissance and disposal.
(*h*) Initiation of salvage operations.

d. Available service units normally furnish personnel, equipment, and specialized assistance to carry out rear area damage control measures. The number of labor and rescue squads each unit is to furnish is prescribed in the current rear area damage control plan.

e. Fallout from a nuclear detonation poses a serious threat to the safety of personnel and the utilization of material and may be a limiting factor in the planning for and conduct of these operations (e.g., exposure time may be critical).

8. Annex B outlines, in the operation order format, those items of basic information (other than that which would normally go into the order) that should be included in a typical rear area damage control plan or order. This is not to be construed as a complete order, nor is the information shown to be considered all of the possible additional information that might be required.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

9. This agreement will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions putting the system detailed in this agreement into effect have been issued to the forces concerned.

Annexes: A. Rear Area Security Operation Order.
B. Rear Area Damage Control Operation Order.

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ANNEX A TO
CENTO STANAG 2079

REAR AREA SECURITY OPERATION ORDER

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

OPERATION ORDER HEADING
(See CENTO STANAG 2014)

1. SITUATION

In the discussion of enemy capabilities, the following should be emphasized in a rear area security order (this list is not in any way limiting nor exhaustive):

a. Enemy nuclear capability.

b. Other enemy capabilities to—

(1) Assault with airborne elements.

(2) Mount a guerrilla attack.

(3) Execute air or guided missile attacks.

(4) Execute sabotage or subversive missions.

(5) Employ psychological warfare.

(6) Execute a combination of these.

2. MISSION

No special instructions.

3. EXECUTION

In addition to the normal information given in this paragraph, a clear definition of the command and control organization should be given, based on existing facilities. Under the subparagraph dealing with "Coordinating Instructions:"

a. Reference should be made to existing applicable plans; i.e., Anti-Tank Plan, Anti-Airborne Plan, etc.

b. A requirement should be established for subordinate commanders to submit their plans.

c. Necessary coordination to be effected with adjacent commanders, territorial commanders, and civilian authorities (through the appropriate territorial commanders) should be specified.

4. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
No special instructions.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
See paragraph 4b, Details of Agreement.

Acknowledgement Instructions: Signature of Commander

Authentication:

Annexes:

Distribution:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

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ANNEX B TO
CENTO STANAG 2079

REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL OPERATION ORDER

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

OPERATION ORDER HEADING
(See CENTO STANAG 2014)

1. SITUATION

a. In the discussion of enemy capabilities, the following should be emphasized in rear area damage control order (this list is not in any way limiting nor exhaustive):

(1) Enemy capabilities to execute nuclear attacks and conventional air strikes without warning.

(2) Assumption that the enemy may render one or more of the command areas helpless.

b. In the discussion of friendly forces, state what probable assistance (nonspecialized) might be expected from adjacent areas, troop units in the area, and civilian agencies. It is recommended that this be stated even when such information is negative.

2. MISSION

No special instructions.

3. EXECUTION

a. In this paragraph (normally the concept of operations), state the general concept of organizing for rear area damage control, and the employment of troops, facilities, and equipment to render assistance to a damaged area.

b. From this paragraph onwards, by separate paragraphs, annexes, and/or overlay, establish the organization by grouping of units, assignment of boundaries and specific tasks to each of the next subordinate headquarters concerned, to include but not limited to:

(1) Responsibility, in order of priority, for the assumption of control of operations in the event one or more of the headquarters becomes inoperable.

(2) Responsibility for providing troops, equipment, and facilities to support operations of other subdivisions and/or installations. Indicate the number, allocation, and type of control forces (e.g., light rescue, heavy rescue, labor, medical, traffic control, firefighting, decontaminating) that will be trained, equipped, and available.

c. In the final paragraph (normally coordinating instructions), necessary coordination to be effected with adjacent commanders, territorial commanders, and civilian authorities (through the appropriate territorial commanders) should be specified.

4. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

a. In the paragraph dealing with material, include information on the location of supplies especially needed to support this type of operation.

b. In the paragraph dealing with evacuation and hospitalization:

(1) State the current policy pertaining to utilization of civilian medical facilities.

(2) Designate collecting points and/or aid stations (with alternate locations provided for) to receive and classify casualties.

(3) Provide for the extra load to be handled by hospital and evacuation facilities and state provisions required to augment local facilities for an emergency.

c. In the paragraph dealing with personnel, include instructions for providing for mass burials. (See CENTO STANAG 2070.)

d. In the paragraph dealing with civil-military cooperation, it is essential that in occupied enemy territories with civil affairs/military government organizations, coordination be effected to insure support for rear area damage control operations.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

See paragraph 4b, Details of Agreement.

Acknowledgement Instructions: Signature of Commander

Authentication:

Annexes:

Distribution:

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

Date of Promulgation: 5 November 1968.

APPENDIX C

USE OF NONAIR DEFENSE WEAPONS AGAINST AIRCRAFT

C–1. Concept

a. The substantial low altitude air threat faced by units in the combat theater may be partially countered by aggressive use of the large volume of fire which nonair defense weapons; e.g., small arms and automatic weapons, can place against this threat.

b. Exercise of the individual and collective right of self-defense against hostile aircraft must be emphasized.

c. Indiscriminate use of nonair defense weapons must be prevented. Engagement of hostile aircraft in immediate self-defense will be most frequent and training emphasis should reflect this.

C–2. Rules of Engagement

In the absence of orders to the contrary, individual weapon operators will engage attacking aircraft. Engagement of all other hostile aircraft will be on orders (based on SOP) issued through the unit chain of command and will be supervised by unit leaders. Nothing in this rule is to be taken as requiring actions prejudicial to accomplishment of the primary mission of the unit.

C–3. Techniques

a. Engagement of Low Speed Aircraft. In accordance with the rules of engagement, engage low speed enemy aircraft with aimed fire, employing the maximum weapon rate of fire. Aerial gunnery techniques generally applicable to all small arms and automatic weapons are presented in FM 23–65.

b. Engagement of High Speed Aircraft. In accordance with the rules of engagement, engage high speed enemy aircraft with maximum fire aimed well in front of the aircraft and above its flight path in order to force it to fly through a pattern of fire.

c. Use of Tracer Ammunition. Automatic weapons should utilize the highest practical proportion of tracer ammunition to enhance the deterrent or disruptive effect.

d. Massed Fire. Units should employ a massed fire technique when using small arms and automatic weapons in an air defense role; i.e., unit leaders should direct fires so as to mass the available fires against a selected target(s). Engagement of aerial targets will be as specified in TC 23–15.

C–4. SOP Items

Unit SOP should cover, but not be limited to, the following items relevant to engagement of aircraft with nonair defense weapons.

a. Applicability. Operators of designated weapons.

b. Relation to Primary Mission. Primary mission is never prejudiced.

c. Relation to Passive Air Defense. (The necessity for aggressively engaging hostile aircraft is balanced with the requirement to place in proper perspective the tactic of withholding fire to preclude disclosure of position.

d. Authority to Engage. Authority to engage attacking aircraft delegated to individual weapons operators, except when explicitly denied. Authority to engage all other hostile aircraft on orders through unit chain of command, subject to local and theater SOP.

e. Rules of Engagement. Normally self-defense only against all attacking aircraft or as ordered.

f. Rules for Withholding Fire. When ordered. When not positive that aircraft are actually attacking or otherwise hostile. When friendly aircraft or troops are endangered.

g. Position selection. Applicable only to weapons specifically assigned an air defense role; e.g., designated single barrel caliber .50 machineguns.

h. Firing techniques. Lead and superelevation. Massed fire. Maximum rate of fire. Maximum use of tracer ammunition.

i. Unit training requirements. Motivation and discipline. Gunnery. Aircraft recognition. Guidance on visual aircraft recognition is contained in FM 44–30.

APPENDIX D

REAR AREA PROTECTION OPERATION RESOURCES

Section I. CAPABILITIES OF UNITS POSSESSING RAP RESOURCES

D–1. Purpose

This appendix provides a basis of analysis for the determination of the RAP potential of various support units.

D–2. Administrative Elements

The administrative complications inherent in an operational environment such as RAP, which depends on the melding of diverse resources, can be reduced by application of sound management techniques available from adjutant general units. In the early stages of RAP system development, they can provide data and a responsive management system for local requirements. In addition, these units can manage and improve administrative procedures with professional competence not normally found elsewhere.

Type unit	*RAS potential*	*ADC potential*
Personnel Svc Co		Labor Sqd
Admin Svc Det		Labor Sqd
Gen Spt Postal Co		Labor Sqd
Finance Agency (GS)		Labor Sqd
HHC, Personnel Comd		Lt Rescue & Labor Squads
Labor Svc Co		Labor Plat

D–3. Aviation Elements

a. Army aviation elements are ideally suited for RAP operations. Normally, Army aviation is allocated by the G3 or director of plans and operations as a secondary mission to be performed on an on-call basis.

b. Area commanders must make their minimum RAP requirements known to aviation units in their areas, and the aviation unit commander, in turn, informs the area commander whenever he is unable to meet these minimum requirements because of higher priority operational missions.

D–4. Chemical Elements

Chemical units which may be employed in support of RAP operations include CBR Reconnaissance Team LA and Decontamination Team LB in support of ADC operations and chemical smoke generator company in support of tactical operations of RAP forces.

D–5. Civil Affairs Elements

a. Civil affairs units and functional teams operate as small teams capable of providing liaison and coordination functions with civilian agencies. The civil affairs elements contain functional teams, such as civil defense, public safety, and platoon headquarters, to assist the RAOC in planning and coordinating the integration of civilian activities and resources with RAP operations.

b. Civil affairs units provide the area commander with the capability of augmenting the RAOC or task force with a CMO staff section during periods of emergency.

D–6. Engineer Elements

a. Engineer elements are ideally suited for many RAP functions. Their engineer expertise coupled with the necessity of keeping most men combat trained makes these units some of the best groupings to be preprogramed for RAS and ADC purposes.

b. Where feasible, entire units should be used in their normal configurations, particularly for ADC activities.

c. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected engineer units:

Type unit	*RAS potential*	*ADC potential*
Engineer Combat Co, Army	Reaction Plat	Hv Rescue Plat
Engr Lt Equip Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
Engr Panel Bridge Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Engr Float Bridge Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
Engr Equip & Maint Co	Reaction Plat	Hv Rescue Plat
Engr Dump Truck Co		Labor Sqd

Type unit	*RAS potential*	*ADC potential*
Engr Const Co	Reaction Plat	Hv Rescue Sqd
HHC, Engr Combat Bn, Army or Corps	Comd & Con Tm	ADC Party
HHC, Engr Topographic Bn, Army	Comd & Con Tm	
HHC, Engr Const Bn	Comd & Con Tm	ADC Party
Engr Map Repro & Dist Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Engr Photomapping Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
HHC, Engr Combat Gp		ADC Party

D–7. Maintenance Elements

a. The most significant deterrent to the use of maintenance elements in RAP operations is the high percentage of critical specialists found in these units. The use of a small number of maintenance personnel for RAS or ADC purposes may cause an unacceptable degradation of service support.

b. Maintenance units operate from cohesive facilities and can be organized to defend themselves and assist in the defense of these facilities.

c. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected maintenance units:

Type unit	*RAS potential*	*ADC potential*
Lt Equip (GS) Maint Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Plat
HHD, Maint Bn		Labor Sqd
Hv Equip (GS) Maint Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Plat
Collection & Classification Co		Lt Rescue Plat
Ammo (DS/GS) Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
Maint Spt Co, COMMZ		Lt Rescue Sqd
Lt Maint (DS) Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Plat
Guided Missile Maint Co		Lt Rescue Sqd
HHC, Ammo (DS) Bn	Comd & Con Tm	Lt Rescue Sqd
HHC, Ammo Gp		Lt Rescue Sqd
Maint Co Rear (DS)	Comd & Con Tm	Lt Rescue Plat
Special Ammo Co		Lt Rescue Sqd
Tire Repair Co		Labor Sqd
Trans Amph (GS) Co		Lt Rescue Sqd
Floating Cft (GS) Maint Co		Labor Sqd
Trans Aircraft Co (DS)		Labor Sqd
Trans Aircraft Maint Co (GS)		Labor Sqd
HHD, Trans Aircraft Maint Bn (GS)		ADC Party

D–8. Medical Support Elements

Medical support for RAP operations is substantially the same as for normal operation. (See FM 8–10.) In structuring RAP task forces, the RAOC coordinates with area medical facilities for medical support. Medical support should include unit level medical support and appropriate backup support for RAS forces and medical aid teams for ADC operations.

D–9. Military Police Elements

a. The normal employment of military police elements makes them an ideal force for RAP operations. Military police are normally the first elements to investigate an incident or arrive at a disaster site. Their inherent mobility and communications provide the area commander with a capability to rapidly construct a RAP element on the spot.

b. Whenever possible, military police RAS responsibilities are preprogramed to provide reconnaissance and escort platoons which provides an area commander an essential tool for RAS operations.

c. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected military police units:

Type unit	*RAS potential*	*ADC potential*
HHD, MP Bde		ADC Party
HHD, MP Bn	Comd & Con Tm	ADC Party
MP Gd Co		Lt Rescue Sqd
MP ESCRG Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
MP Phys Scty Co	Recon & Escort Plat	
MP Co	Recon & Escort Plat	

D–10. Signal Elements

a. Most signal elements operate in small groups, teams, and detachments and can provide for their own local, close-in security.

b. The specialized nature of signal units coupled with their random disposition dictated by terrain considerations makes their employment in ADC operations extremely difficult. Their primary mission in RAP operations will be the establishment of reliable communication.

c. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected signal units:

Type unit	*RAS potential*	*ADC potential*
HHC, Sig Const Bn	Comd & Con Tm	Labor Sqd
Sig Const Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Cable Const Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
HHC, Army Comd Sig Radio & Cable Bn	Comd & Con Tm	Labor Sqd
Comd Radio Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Comd Cable & Wire Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
HHC, Army Area Sig Bn	Comd & Con Tm	Labor Sqd

Type unit	RAS potential	ADC potential
Army Area Sig Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
HHC, Army Comd Sig Op Bn	Comd & Con Tm	Labor Sqd
Telephone Op Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Comm Cen Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
HHD, Sig Bn	Comd & Con Tm	
HHD, Sig Gp	Comd & Con Tm	
Sig Mdm HQ Op Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Comm Cen Op Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Small HQ Op Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Op Co, Large HQ	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Long Lines Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Trunk Switching Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Messenger Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Radio Relay Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Sig Pictorial Co	Reaction Plat	

D-11. Supply Elements

a. Most supply elements operate from relatively secure facilities and have a considerable pool of personnel for RAP purposes. For this reason, many supply elements possess a capability to provide RAS forces.

b. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected supply units:

Type unit	RAS potential	ADC potential
HHC, Petroleum Op Bn	Comd & Con Tm	
HHD, Sup & Svc Bn	Comd & Con Tm	
QM Air Delivery Co	Reaction Plat	
Airdrop Equip Repair & Sup Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
QM Svc Co	Reaction Plat	
Gen Sup Co (GS), Forward/Army/COMMZ	Reaction Plat	
Fld Svc Co (GS), Army/COMMZ	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
Gen Sup Co		Labor Sqd
Repair Parts Sup Co (GS), Army/COMMZ	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
Property Disposal Co		Lt Rescue Sqd
Hv Material Sup Co (GS), Forward/Army/COMMZ	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
Sup & Svc Co (DS)	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd

D-12. Transportation Elements

a. Selected terminal operation elements and short-haul transportation units possess sufficient numbers of personnel, reasonably "close-by," to permit identification of RAP potentials.

b. A significant contribution transportation elements can make to RAP operations is to emphasize that each vehicle or aircraft represents a reconnaissance potential for the area commander.

c. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected transportation units:

Type unit	RAS potential	ADC potential
Trans Ry Car Rep Co (GS)	Reaction Plat	
Trans Hv Trk Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Trans Lt Trk Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Trans Mdm Trk Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Trans Mdm Trk Co	Reaction Plat	Labor Sqd
Trans Term Trf Co	Reaction Plat	Lt Rescue Sqd
Trans Term Svc Co		Labor Sqd
Trans Lt Amph Co		Lt Rescue Sqd
HHC, Trans Term Bn	Comd & Con Tm	ADC Party
Trans Mdm Amph Co		Lt Rescue Sqd
HHD, Trans Trk Bn	Comd & Con Tm	ADC Party
HHC, Trans Comd		ADC Party
HHD, Trans Motor Trans Gp		ADC Party
Trans Car Co, Army, Log Comd, A/B Corps		Labor Sqd
HHC, Trans Bde		ADC Party
HHC, Trans Term Gp		ADC Party
Trans Ry Engr Co		Lt Rescue Sqd

Section II. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL PARTY

D-13. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of the ADC event.

b. Assesses and reports damage.

c. Controls and provides direction to area damage control operations.

d. Assesses the CBR situation and performs chemical agent detection and radiological monitoring and surveying.

e. Determines requirements for, requests, coordinates, and supervises area damage control teams furnished by other service units.

f. Provides communication capability from scene of ADC event to the RAOC.

D-14. Personnel

Duty position	Rank	Number
Commander	MAJ	1
Op Off	CPT	1
Recon/Assessment Off	CPT	1
Medical/Medical Service Off	CPT	1
CBR Off (CBR Trained)	CPT/LT	1
Op Sgt	E7	1
Recon Sgt	E5	1
CBR Sgt	E5	1
Radio Teletype Team Chief	E5	1
Radio Teletype Op	E4	2

D–15. Equipment

Item	Quantity
Radio Set AN/VRC–46 (or equivalent)	1
Radio Set AN/VRC–47 (or equivalent)	3
Radio Set AN/GRC–142	1
Truck Util ¼-Ton 4x4	3
Truck Cargo 1¼-Ton	1
Radiac Set AN/PDR–27	1
Radiacmeter IM–174/PD	1
Radiacmeter IM–93/UD	2
Charger Radiac Detector PP–1578/PD	2
GAS, BIO, and ATOM Signs	As required
Tape Textile White ¾"	500 feet
Detector Kit Chemical Agent	1
Protective Clothing (if required)	1 set per man
Switchboard SB–22/PT	1
Telephone TA–312/PT	3
Lensatic Compass	3
Wire Dispenser MX–306/G	10
Flashlight	16
Binocular	1
Tool Kit (Wireman) TE–33	3

D–16. Remarks

a. Provided by headquarters elements of battalion or larger size units on the basis of one or more (as required) per support group in the army support brigade and area support group in TASCOM.

b. This team is used when the TOE area damage control task force command section is unavailable for any reason.

Section III. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL LIGHT RESCUE TEAM (SQUAD OR PLATOON)

D–17. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.

b. Provides limited first aid to injured personnel.

c. Extracts trapped and injured personnel from wreckage and debris.

d. Assists in firefighting operations when required.

e. Assists CBR decontamination teams.

D–18. Personnel

TYPE A SQUAD

Duty position	Rank	Number
Squad Leader	E5/E6	1
Rescue Workers		6
Rescue Workers (First Aid)		2
Truck Driver		1
Wrecker Op/Driver		1

D–19. Equipment

Item	Quantity
Truck Dump or Cgo 2½-Ton W/Wn or 5-Ton W/Wn	1
Trailer 1½-Ton 2-Wheel	1
Wrecker 5-Ton	1
Shovel	6
Mattock Pick	2
Hammer Sledge 8 Lb	1
Cutter Bolt	1
Axe Single Edge	2
Bar Pry	1
Rope ½"	150 feet
Rope 1"	150 feet
Carpenter Kit Common	1
Bucket 2½-Gal	2
Medical Supplies	As required
Goggles M1944	10
Hacksaw w/Blades	1
Jack Hydraulic 5-Ton Cap (min)	1
Protective Clothing (if required)	1 set per man
Radio Set AN/PRC–25 or Equivalent (if available)	1
(Fork lift from TOE 55–118 or other unit, if available)	

D–20. Remarks

a. Normal squad or section used as a basis for this organization.

b. May be expanded to a type B (platoon size) unit by using basic platoon structure of unit or by combining three or four type A teams.

Section IV. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL LABOR TEAM (SQUAD OR PLATOON)

D–21. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.

b. Assists in the rescue of trapped and injured personnel.

c. Provides limited first aid to injured personnel.

d. Provides hand labor for augmenting firefighting teams, light and heavy rescue teams, EOD detachments, and CBR teams.

e. Provides other hand labor as required by an ADC event.

D–22. Personnel

TYPE A SQUAD

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*
Squad Leader	E5/E6	1
Asst Squad Leader	E5/E4	1
Lt Vehicle Driver	E3	1
Workers	E3	7

D–23. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Truck Dump or Cgo 2½-Ton or 5-Ton	1
Trailer 1½-Ton 2-Wheel (Organic squad vehicles where available)	1
Shovel Hand	8
Mattock Pick	2
Axe Chopping Single Bit	2
Bucket 5 Gal	2
Rope 1"	300 feet
Rope ½"	150 feet
Carpenter Kit Common	1
Medical Supplies	As required
Goggles M1944	10
Hacksaw w/Blades	1
Cutter Bolt	1
Bar Pry	1
Jack Hydraulic 5-Ton Cap (Min)	1

D–24. Remarks

a. Normal squad or section used as a basis for this organization.

b. May be expanded to a type B (platoon size) unit by using basic platoon structure of unit or by combining three or four type A teams.

Section V. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL HEAVY RESCUE TEAM (SQUAD OR PLATOON)

D–25. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.

b. Moves wreckage, debris, and heavy loads; clears communication routes of rubble and debris; fights fires; and assists in the rescue of trapped and injured personnel.

c. Provides limited first aid to injured personnel.

D–26. Personnel

TYPE A SQUAD

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*
Squad Leader	E5/E6	1
Tractor-Dozer Op	E4	2
Wrecker Op (or Crane Shovel Op)	E4	1
Scooploader Op		1
Asst Drivers		4
Welder		1

D–27. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Tractor-Dozer	2
Wrecker or Crane Shovel (20-Ton Crawler Crane from TOE 55–117).	1
Scooploader	1
Torch Cutting	1
Truck Dump or Cgo 2½-Ton W/Wn or 5-Ton W/Wn	1
Trailer 1½-Ton 2-Wheel (Organic squad vehicles where available).	1
Saw Chain Driven	1
Shovel	2
Mattock Pick	2
Bar Pry	2
Axe Chopping Single Bit	1
Cutter Bolt	1
Generator 1.5 KW	1
Rope 1"	300 feet
Cable	As needed
Tool Kit Carpenters	1
Hacksaw w/Blades	1
Jack Hydraulic 5-Ton Cap (Min)	1
Radio Set AN/PRC–25 or equivalent (if available)	1

D–28. Remarks

a. Best employed when using organic squad or section as a base.

b. May be expanded to a type B (platoon size) unit by using basic platoon structure of unit or by forming three or four similar type A squads.

c. Equipment based on TOE of unit and requirements at scene of destruction.

Section VI. STRUCTURE FOR AVIATION AREA DAMAGE CONTROL TEAMS

D–29. Capabilities

a. Proceeds to scene of destruction rapidly by air.

b. Provides limited aerial reconnaissance capability.

c. Provides limited rescue worker operation when required to use air transport.

d. Provides radio relay to scene of destruction when required.

D–30. Personnel

Duty position	*Number*	*Remarks*
Team A Reconnaissance Team		
Pilot	1	1 Obs Helicopter
Observer	1	
Team B Airmobile Light Rescue Team		
Pilot	1	UH–1 Helicopter
Copilot	1	
Crew Chief	1	
Workers	5	Handtools
Team C Airmobile Heavy Rescue Team		
Pilot	2	2 CH–47 Helicopters
Copilot	2	
Crew Chief	1	
Flight Engineers	1	
Workers	10	Handtools

Section VII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL MEDICAL AID TEAMS

D–31. Capabilities

a. Perform triage and emergency medical treatment at scene of destruction.

b. Processes approximately 50 patients per hour.

c. Provides limited ground and air evacuation of patients from sorting stations to treatment facilities.

D–32. Personnel

Duty position	*Number*
Team A Sorting Team	
MC Officer	1
DC Officer	1
Senior Med Aid Men	2
Med Aid Men	6
Ambulance Orderly	1
Ambulance Driver	1
Radio Operator	1
Team B Ground Evacuation Team	
Med Aid Men	1
Ambulance Driver	1
Team C Air Evacuation Team	
MSC Officer (Pilot)	1
Copilot	1
Helicopter Crew Chief	1
Senior Med Aid Men	1
Team D Litter Bearer Team	
Litter Bearer	2

D–33. Equipment

Communications equipment (Radio AN/VRC–47) and other equipment as designated by the senior medical officer.

Section VIII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL TRAFFIC CONTROL TEAM

D–34. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.

b. Provides traffic control posts in and around the area to restrict movement of personnel and vehicles in accordance with plans.

c. Provides any one of the following or combination thereof:

10—one-man posts
5—two-man posts
3—vehicle patrols

d. Provides additional communication capability at the scene of destruction to the RAOC.

e. Provides limited first aid to injured.

f. Assists in chemical agent detection and radiological monitoring and survey missions as directed by ADC task force commander.

D–35. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Quantity*
Squad Leader	E6	1
Asst Squad Leader	E5	1
Senior MP	E4	5
Military Policeman	E3	4

D–36. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Radio Set AN/VRC–46	3
Truck Util ¼-Ton 4x4	3
Radiacmeter IM–174A/PD	3 (1 per veh patrol)
Radiacmeter IM–93/UD	3 (1 per veh patrol)
Protective Clothing (if required)	1 set per man
Chemical Agent Detector Kit	1

Section IX. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL CBR DECONTAMINATION TEAM

D–37. Capabilities

a. Provides CBR support decontamination of terrain and materiel.

b. Provides CBR support decontamination for approximately 70 individuals, and approximately 100 individuals per hour if the decontamination apparatus is located at a water site.

c. Adaptable for firefighting and mobile shower service.

D–38. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*	*MOS*	*Remarks*
Decon Appar Crew Chief	E5	1	54B40	NC
Decon Equip Op	E4	1	54B20	
Decon Equip Helper	E3	1	54A10	
Sprayman Loader	E3	2	54A10	

D–39. Equipment

Power driven decontaminating apparatus and other items needed for mission accomplishment; one set of protective clothing per individual.

D–40. Remarks

a. Organized by all units authorized above equipment.

b. As required in a theater of operations.

Section X. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL AUGMENTATION PROVISIONAL FIREFIGHTING TEAM (CLASS "A" FIRES)

D–41. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to scene of fire (Class "A" Fires).

b. Augments capabilities of the FB fire truck team to isolate, gain control of, and extinguish class "A" fires.

c. Supports rescue and relief operations as required, using 1000-gallon water distribution, truck mounted, with 55 GPM pumping capacity.

D–42. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*
Heavy Truck Driver	E4	1
Firefighter	E3	2

D–43. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Water Distributor 1000-Gal Trk Mtd	1
Mattock Pick	2
Axe	2
Shovel	2
Flashlight	2

Section XI. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL MUNITIONS SAFETY CONTROL (MSC) TEAM

D–44. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.

b. Assesses damage to munitions and their potential hazard of fires, explosions, or contamination. (Support is required for those munitions which are determined to be beyond the capability of the MSC team to neutralize.)

c. Enforces safety measures.

d. Escorts damaged hazardous munitions to disposal areas.

e. Disposes of ammunition as required.

D–45. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*
Team Chief	Off or WO	1
EOD Sgt	E6	2
Senior EOD Sp	E5	2

D–46. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Calculator Downwind Toxic Vapor Hazard Line Source	1
Calculator Downwind Toxic Vapor Hazard Point Source	1
Demolition Set Expl: Elec and Semi-Elec	1
Detector Kit Chemical Agent	1
Extinguisher Fire Foam Hand 2½-Gal	1
Extinguisher Fire Water Hand Pump Action	1
Mask Protective Field, M9A1	5
Panel Marker: Aerial Liaison Type VS 17/6VX	1
Radiac Instruments and Calibrators	As required
Suit, Toxicological Agent Protective	5
Trailer, Cargo, ¾ Ton	2
Wind Measuring Set AN/PMQ–3D	1
Tool Kit Chemical Safety Control Field Maintenance	1

Section XII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL RECOVERY TEAM CONVENTIONAL/SPECIAL AMMUNITION

D–47. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.

b. Inspects and reports damage of conventional ammunition.

c. Performs limited evacuation. (That required to meet emergency requirements and not requiring special EOD skills and equipment.)

d. Recovers, as directed, items of conventional ammunition.

e. Same as *b*, *c*, and *d* for special ammunition when supervised by MSC/EOD team.

D–48. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*
Team Leader	E6	1
A Team Leader	E5	2
Members	E4/E3	10
Decon Appar PD Team		1 as required

D–49. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Wrecker	1
Radio	1
Truck	2

Section XIII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL RECOVERY TEAM HEAVY EQUIPMENT GENERAL

D–50. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.

b. Inspects and reports damage of heavy equipment, general.

c. Performs limited evacuation. (That required to meet emergency requirements.)

d. Recovers, as directed, major items of equipment and/or components.

D–51. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*
Team Leader	E6	1
A Team Leader	E5	2
Members	E4	8

D–52. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Wrecker	1
Recovery Vehicle	1
Truck	1
Lt Weight Gen Mech Tool Set	8

Section XIV. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL RECOVERY TEAM LIGHT EQUIPMENT GENERAL

D–53. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.

b. Inspects and reports damage of light equipment, general.

c. Performs limited evacuation. (That required to meet emergency requirements.)

d. Recovers, as directed, major items of equipment and/or components.

D–54. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*
Team Leader	E6	1
A Team Leader	E5	2
Members	E4	8

D–55. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Wrecker	1
Lt Weight Gen Mech Tool Set	8

Section XV. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET TEAM (LIGHT MOBILE)

D–56. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly by vehicle to scene of ADC event.

b. Conducts live or taped broadcasts to selected groups with loudspeaker.

c. Produces and distributes printed matter to selected groups with organic printing capability.

d. Provides internal command and control of PSYOP teams, responsive to RAOC direction.

D-57. Elements

Type team	Number	Composition
Team HA, Light Mobile (Op)	1	Para 10, TOE 33-500
Team HB, Light Mobile (Loudspeaker Operations)	3*	Para 11, TOE 33-500
Team HC, Light Mobile (Printing and Processing)	1	Para 12, TOE 33-500
Team HD, Propaganda (Light Mobile Operations)	1	Para 13, TOE 33-500
Team HE, Propaganda (Audio and Visual)	1**	Para 14, TOE 33-500

D-58. Equipment

Current TOE series.

D-59. Remarks

*3 Teams—TASCOM; 2 Teams—FASCOM.

**Delete Team HE in TASCOM.

Section XVI. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL MOBILE RADIO TEAM

D-60. Capabilities

a. Supports ADC operation from present location when scene of destruction is within radio broadcast range.

b. Moves rapidly by vehicle to scene of ADC event.

c. Provides internal command and control, responsive to RAOC direction.

d. Prepares, produces, and conducts limited original raido broadcasts in support of ADC operations.

e. Provides news from scene of destruction as directed.

f. Receives news from teletype sources and broadcasts as directed.

D-61. Elements

Type team	Number	Composition
Team IA, Mobile Radio (Op)	1	Para 15, TOE 33-500
Team IB, Mobile Radio (Radio News)	1	Para 16, TOE 33-500
Team IC, Mobile Radio (Engineering)	1	Para 17, TOE 33-500
Team ID, Mobile Radio (Production)	1	Para 18, TOE 33-500

D-62. Equipment

Current TOE series.

D-63. Remarks

Available in TASCOM; none in FASCOM.

Section XVII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL PSYOP CONTROL TEAM

D-64. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.

b. Provides administrative control and operational supervision of PSYOP operational teams.

c. Assesses requirement for employment of PSYOP teams in ADC operation.

d. Advises commander, RAOC, on utilization of PSYOP teams.

D-65. Elements

Type team	Number	Composition
Team AA, Command & Control	1	Para 01, TOE 33-500

D-66. Equipment

Current TOE series.

D-67. Remarks

Available in TASCOM; none in FASCOM.

Section XVIII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL AUGMENTATION AREA FLOODLIGHTING TEAM

D-68. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.

b. Provides emergency lighting to assist rescue and area damage control operations at night and under conditions of darkness or low visibility.

D–69. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*
Generator Operator	E4	1
Light Truck Driver	E3	1

D–70. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Truck Cargo 2½-Ton	1
Trailer Cargo 1½-Ton	1
Floodlight Set Mast Mounted 5 KW	1
Generator Set 5 KW AC	1

Section XIX. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL CBR RECONNAISSANCE TEAM

D–71. Capabilities

Can perform chemical and radiological reconnaissance at the site of a chemical or nuclear attack. The team is capable of preliminary evaluation of collected information. The team will function most effectively when receiving instructions and reporting findings to the CBR element of the RAOC.

D–72. Personnel

Duty position	*Rank*	*Branch*	*MOS*	*Remarks*
CBR Recon Officer	CPT	CM	57318	
CBR Recon SGT	E7		54E40	NC
CBR Ident Kit Op	E7		92D40	NC
Recon SGT	E6		12B40	NC
CBR Recon Sp	E5		54E20	

D–73. Equipment

Item	*Quantity*
Radiac Set AN/PDR–27( )	1
Radiacmeter IM–92/UD	5
Radiacmeter IM–174A/PD	1
Detector Kit Chemical Agent M18A2	2
Sampling and Analyzing Kit CBR Agent M19 LIN S29577	1
Truck ¾-Ton with AN/VRC–46 Mtd	1

D–74. Remarks

a. This is Team LA, TOE 3–500.

b. As required in theater of operations.

Section XX. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY TEAMS

D–75. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.

b. Conducts ground radiological survey of an area of 15 to 40 square kilometers per hour.

c. Conducts aerial radiological survey of an area of 130 to 450 square kilometers per hour.

D–76. Personnel

a. Team A—Ground Radiological Survey Team.

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*	*Remarks*
Rad Survey Equip Op		1	Trained for ground rad survey.
Data Recorder/Radio Op		1	Trained for ground rad survey.
Vehicle Driver		1	

b. Team B—Aerial Radiological Survey Team.

Duty position	*Rank*	*Number*	*Remarks*
Rotary Wing Pilot		1	Trained for aerial rad survey.
Rad Survey Equipment Op		1	Trained for aerial rad survey.

D–77. Equipment

a. Team A—Ground Radiological Survey Team.

Item	*Quantity*
Truck ¼-Ton APC or Equivalent Vehicle	1
Radiacmeter IM–174A/PD	1
Radiacmeter IM–93/UD	1
Radio Set AN/VRC–46 or Equivalent	1
DA Form 1971–R	10

b. Team B—Aerial Radiological Survey Team.

Item	*Quantity*
Rotary Wing Aircraft	1
Radiacmeter IM–174A/PD	1
Radiacmeter IM–93/UD	1
DA Form 1971–R	1

D–78. Remarks

a. These teams can be organized by any unit authorized the appropriate equipment. TA 50–914 authorizes one IM–174A/PD for each survey party.

b. There is no requirement that both members of team B come from the same unit. One unit may provide the aircraft (with pilot) and another unit may provide the radiological survey equipment operator.

c. As required in a theater of operations.

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