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**FM 90-2**

**BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION**

**OCTOBER 1988**

**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

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HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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## BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION

### Table of Contents

	Page
Preface	iii
Chapter 1 - Battlefield Deception Fundamentals	1-0
Revitalizing the "Lost Art"	1-0
Myths	1-1
Battlefield Deception Definition	1-2
Deception Maxims	1-3
Deception Failures	1-17
AirLand Battle	1-26
Surprise and Security	1-32
Components of Battlefield Deception Operations	1-37
Legal Considerations	1-38
Chapter 2 - Battlefield Deception at the Operational Level of War	2-1
Center of Gravity	2-1
Lines of Operations	2-2
Culminating Points	2-2
Operational Deception Planning and Execution	2-4
Deception Sustainment Planning and Execution	2-6
Offensive Campaigns and Major Operations	2-8
Defensive Campaigns and Major Operations	2-10
Relationship between Strategic and Operational Deception Plans	2-11
Chapter 3 - Battlefield Deception at the Tactical Level of War	3-1
Tactical Deception Planning and Execution	3-1
Relationship between Operational and Tactical Deception Plans	3-3

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	PAGE
Chapter 4 - Deception Planning Considerations	4-1
Techniques	4-1
Sequence	4-2
Process	4-3
Approval of Plans or Orders	4-15
Issuance of Plans or Orders	4-16
Supervision	4-16
Chapter 5 - Deception Means	5-1
Visual	5-1
Olfactory	5-4
Sonic	5-4
Electronic	5-5
Resources	5-9
Techniques	5-12
Chapter 6 - Deception in Operations	6-0
Offensive Operations	6-0
Defensive Operations	6-3
Retrograde and other Tactical Operations	6-6
Chapter 7 - Deception in Joint, Combined, and Contingency Operations	7-1
Joint Operations	7-1
Combined Operations	7-2
Contingency Operations	7-5
Appendix A - Battlefield Deception Elements	A-0
Appendix B - Deception Planning Worksheet	B-1
Appendix C - Sample Deception Implementation Schedule	C-1
Appendix D - Employment of Decoys	D-1
Appendix E - Deception Evaluation Checklist	E-1
Appendix F - Battlefield Deception Activities Chart	F-0
Glossary	Glossary-0
References	References-1
Works Cited	Works Cited-1
Index	Index-0

## Preface

This manual sets forth the principles associated with battlefield deception operations and explains how to plan and execute such operations at the operational and tactical levels of war. It is designed for use by commanders and staffs who plan, direct, and conduct combat operations at echelons above corps (EAC) and echelons corps and below (ECB).

The US Army's initial efforts to revitalize a battlefield deception capability will manifest itself in terms of doctrine, training, force structure, and materiel during fiscal year 1988. The information presented in this manual is evolutionary in nature and is subject to substantial field experimentation and verification during the fiscal year 1988-1990 time period.

Historically, military deception has proven to be of considerable value in the attainment of national security objectives, and a fundamental consideration in the development and implementation of military strategy and tactics. Deception has been used to enhance, exaggerate, minimize, or distort capabilities and intentions; to mask deficiencies; and to otherwise cause desired appreciations where conventional military activities and security measures were unable to achieve the desired result. The development of a deception organization and the exploitation of deception opportunities are considered to be vital to national security. To develop deception capabilities, including procedures and techniques for deception staff components, it is essential that deception receive continuous command emphasis in military exercises, command post exercises, and in training operations.

--JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 116

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

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Brigadier C. J. C. Molony, et al, "The Mediterranean and Middle East," vol. V, The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and The Campaign in Italy 3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966. Reprinted by permission of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London.

## CHAPTER 1

### BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION FUNDAMENTALS

#### REVITALIZING THE "LOST ART"

History has shown that there is a potential payoff to be gained by using battlefield deception. Wise military planners throughout history have used deception. It is a low cost and effective way to cause the enemy to waste his efforts. Imaginative use of deception, coupled with aggressive training, improves combat effectiveness at all levels. Throughout our military history, though, commanders viewed deception only as a war-fighting need.

Today, commanders use little deception in planning, directing, and conducting combat operations. As a result, many deception-related skills that have served our Army well in the past have been forgotten, and where remembered, have not been made part of our war-fighting capabilities Armywide. This is caused by the following factors and the myths discussed later in this chapter.

- ° Advances in technology are perceived to make successful deception more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
- ° Commanders are reluctant to devote scarce resources, including time, to tasks that are considered less essential.
- ° Force modernization, being primarily focused on high-cost force structure and materiel initiatives, has pushed low-cost, perceived intangibles like deception further into the background.

During the early 1980s, both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Army (DA) attempted to revitalize the art of deception as a sustained war-fighting capability. To that end, this manual--

- ° Implements, in part, the Defense Science Board's recommendation to DOD that the services pursue deception as a low-cost, high-payoff methodology to achieve operational advantage.
- ° Supports, in part, the intent of the headquarters DA early tactical deception (TAC-D) action plan.
- ° Applies the Principles of War to the conduct of combat operations.
- ° Applies AirLand Battle doctrinal tenets to the conduct of military operations.

- ° Employs deception within the context of any overall command, control, and communications countermeasures (C<sup>3</sup>CM) strategy adopted by commands to support combat operations.
- ° Optimizes existing and future war-fighting capabilities to plan, direct, and conduct combat operations.

The advantages of deception have been proven in all wars the United States has been involved in. Accounts as far back as the Revolutionary War describe instances where deception was used with great success. General George Washington used deception to great effect before and in support of the Battle of Yorktown. Only 40 years ago World War II General Daniel Noce advised soldiers to study deception during peacetime and be prepared to use it in war. Unfortunately, the US Army has not done so.

#### MYTHS

The following myths contribute to reasons why deception is not more widely used and understood:

- ° Surprise comes from luck. Experience has taught us that surprise can be greatly enhanced by deception. Studies of military encounters since 1914 show deception almost certainly results in surprise. On the other hand, if deception is not used, surprise is achieved only about 50 percent of the time.
- ° Deception plays a trivial part in warfare and is not for real soldiers. This myth is dispelled by the writings of such leaders as General George S. Patton. In 1945 he wrote that he believed deception and cover should be a normal part of the planning for any campaign.
- ° Tremendous growth in intelligence collection capabilities has destroyed the possibility of deceiving a sophisticated opponent. The truth is that the greater the collection capability an opponent has, the greater the opportunity to feed him specifically designed false information. Additionally, historical studies show that tactical warning of attack was provided in about 78 percent of all military encounters studied since 1914. Even so, if deception was successfully used, the enemy ignored the warning and was surprised by the attack.
- ° Deception is only for combatants. In the 1973 Middle East War, the Egyptians brought the Israelis to the brink of defeat in five days. The Egyptian attack was aided by 150 deception ploys in economic, political, and military forms. A team of 40 people began working in February 1973 on the Egyptian plan for the October 6 invasion. Combat operations were preceded by construction projects, false reports, and many other noncombat activities.

### BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION DEFINITION

Battlefield deception consists of those operations conducted at echelons theater (Army component) and below which purposely mislead enemy decision makers by--

- ° Distortion.
- ° Concealment.
- ° Falsification of indicators of friendly intentions, capabilities, or dispositions.

The objective of battlefield deception is to induce enemy decision makers to take operational or tactical actions which are favorable to, and exploitable by, friendly combat operations.

The goals of battlefield deception, when discussed within the context of mission-oriented requirements, depend on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The following goal categories, therefore, are general enough to be applicable to most situations, regardless of echelon or conflict intensity level:

- ° Coordinate operational deceptions to maintain coherency of deception story portrayal at strategic and Army echelons.
- ° Mask an increase in or redeployment of forces and weapon systems which the enemy has spotted.
- ° Block the enemy's perception and identification of new weapons or forces being introduced into combat.
- ° Distract the enemy's attention from other activities.
- ° Overload enemy intelligence collection and analytical capabilities.
- ° Create the illusion of strength where weakness exists.
- ° Create the illusion of weakness where strength exists.
- ° Condition the enemy to particular patterns of friendly behavior that are operationally exploitable at the appropriate time.
- ° Confuse enemy expectations with regard to the size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE), intent or style of mission execution--to effect surprise in these areas.

## DECEPTION MAXIMS

Achievement of the above goals relies on deception maxims or principles that are supported by historical deception-related evidence. Other principles come from social science, decision analysis, and game theory. Still others are anecdotal in nature; although they meet the test of common sense, they are generally untested in the formal sense. Nevertheless, they have served as useful theoretical guidelines on which this doctrine has been built. The 10 maxims are--

- ° Magruder's principles--the exploitation of perceptions.
- ° Limitations to human information processing.
- ° Cry-Wolf.
- ° Jones' dilemma.
- ° A choice among types of deception.
- ° Axelrod's contribution: the husbanding of assets.
- ° A sequencing rule.
- ° The importance of feedback.
- ° The Monkey's Paw.
- ° Care in the design of planned placement of deceptive material.

### MAGRUDER'S PRINCIPLES--THE EXPLOITATION OF PERCEPTIONS

It is generally easier to induce an enemy to maintain a pre-existing belief than to present notional evidence to change that belief. Thus, it may be more useful to examine how an enemy's existing beliefs can be turned to advantage than to attempt to change his beliefs.

Perhaps the most striking application of this principle in military deception is to be found in the selection of the invasion site and cover plan for the D-Day invasion at Normandy. It is well established that Hitler and almost all of his senior military advisors believed that the most likely place for the Allied invasion of Europe would be in the Pas de Calais region. Moreover, the Allies were aware of this belief through ULTRA intercept. Intercept confirmed that Hitler believed that the Allies would invade at Pas de Calais.

This preconception formed the basis of an elaborate deception plan keyed to reinforce this belief. "If deception targets tend to perceive what they expect, then these expectations furnish greater leverage to a deception plan--a form of mental jujitsu."<sup>1</sup> This principle appears to be well appreciated by deception planners and is consistent with numerous studies on the psychology of perception.

There is ample historical evidence to confirm the truth of Magruder's Principles. Figure 1-1 contains entries from a historical data base. These entries (including both strategic and tactical cases) have been placed into the following categories:

- ° Whether or not deception was employed.
- ° Whether or not plans were keyed to enemy preconceptions.
- ° Whether or not surprise was achieved.

Two conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of this information. First, according to the data in 110 out of 131 (84 percent) cases, deception schemes have more often than not been keyed to enemy preconceptions. This supports the perception that historical deception planners believed in the principles. Second, when deception is keyed to enemy preconceptions, the probability of surprise is greater.

#### LIMITATIONS TO HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING

There are two limitations to human information processing that are exploitable in the design of deception schemes:

- ° The law of small numbers.
- ° Susceptability to conditioning.

##### Law of Small Numbers

"The law of small numbers" is the name given to describe one weakness in intuitive inference--best guesses. Figure 1-2 shows three events as examples:

- ° Lack of alertness on the part of German troops on the eve of the Normandy invasion.

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<sup>1</sup> Jervis, Robert, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics (APR 68), p. 455.

WAS DECEPTION EMPLOYED?	WERE PLANS KEYED TO ENEMY PRECONCEPTIONS?	WAS SURPRISE ACHIEVED?			TOTALS OR SUBTOTALS
		YES	NO	UNKN	
YES	YES	106	4	0	110
	NO	17	4	0	21
	UNKNOWN	8	1	0	9
NO	YES	8	0	0	8
	NO	5	1	0	6
	UNKNOWN	12	58	0	70
UNKNOWN	YES	0	0	1	1
	NO	0	0	1	1
	UNKNOWN	0	0	6	6
TOTALS OR SUBTOTALS		156	68	8	232

**Figure 1-1. Relationship between deception, preconception, and surprise**

° Stalin's belief that the Germans would issue an ultimatum before an invasion of Russia.

° The view expressed by some intelligence analysts that Khrushchev would not place offensive missiles in Cuba.

In each example, a critical inference and subsequent decision were drawn on the basis of a very small sample of data.<sup>2</sup>

#### Susceptibility to Conditioning

Another limitation of human information processing relevant to deception planning is the frequent inability of targets to detect small changes in indicators, even if the cumulative change over time is large. This is the basis for the use of conditioning as a deception technique.

Conditioning or desensitizing has an important place in the design of deception schemes. There are numerous instances of its successful

<sup>2</sup> A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "The Belief in the Law of Small Numbers," Psychological Bulletin 76 (1971), pp. 105-110. (Paraphrased.)

TIME PERIOD	EVENT	QUOTE	CITATION	REMARKS
WORLD WAR II	D-Day, the Invasion at Normandy, 1944.	All along the chain of German command the continuing bad weather acted like a tranquilizer. The various headquarters were quite confident that there would be no attack in the immediate future. Their reasoning was based on carefully assessed weather evaluations that had been made of the Allied landings in North Africa, Italy, and Sicily. In each case conditions had varied, but meteorologists like Stobe and his chief in Berlin, Dr. Karl Sonntag, had noted that the Allies had never attempted a landing unless the prospects of favorable weather were almost certain, particularly for covering air operations. To the methodical German mind there was no deviation from this rule; the weather had to be just right or the Allies wouldn't attack. And the weather wasn't just right.	Ryan, C., <u>The Longest Day</u> , Simon and Schuster, New York, 1953, pp. 79-80. See also Stagg, J. M., <u>Forecast For Overlord</u> , (New York, W. M. Norton, 1971), pp. 51, 125.	Though extensive deception operations were employed at Normandy, the timing of the invasion was not included in these plans. To be sure, the Germans did not have access to the data upon which the Allied weather forecast was based (partially as a result of Allied attacks on weather reporting stations) and thus did not have foreknowledge of the possible break at D-Day.
	Operation Barbarossa, the German Invasion of Russia, 1941.	One example of an assumption of strategic possibility is reflected in Stalin's brief that Hitler must issue an ultimatum before war would break out. The fact that prior to April 9, 1941, Germany had made ultimate demands before undertaking military action convinced Stalin that this pattern would continue in the future.	Be-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," <u>World Politics</u> , Vol. 28 No. 3, April 1976, p. 384.	The sample size on which this was based was less than five.
Cuba 1962	The Missile Crisis.	...(a failure of intelligence evaluation) was the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy. Khrushchev had never put medium- or long-range missiles in any satellite country and, therefore, it was reasoned, he certainly would not put them on an island 9,000 miles away from the Soviet Union, and only 90 miles away from the United States, when this was bound to provoke a sharp American reaction.	Wohistetter, Roberta, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," <u>Foreign Affairs</u> , Vol. 43, July 1965, p. 701.	The sample size on which this was based was less than five.
<b>Figure 1-2. Law of small numbers: some historical examples <sup>3</sup></b>				

<sup>3</sup> A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "The Belief in the Law of Small Numbers," Psychological Bulletin 76 (1971), pp. 105-110.

application. One now-classic application of this principle was made in the breakout of the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen from Brest on February 12, 1942. The breakout was facilitated by jamming British radars. Ordinarily this would have been a significant tip-off that something was amiss, but British radar operators dismissed it as being caused by atmospheric disturbance. This error was the result of a carefully orchestrated German ruse directed by General Wolfgang Martini, the head of the Luftwaffe Signals Service. The Germans jammed the British radar sites every day at the same time to build their belief that the atmosphere was interrupting the receipt of any signals. The British became so accustomed to the atmospheric problems that the ships were able to escape.

The Germans did not have a monopoly on this concept. It was frequently employed by the RAF for feints or diversionary operations. One example was prior to the British attack on Peenemunde on August 17, 1943. Over a period of time, the British had routinely sent Mosquitoes along the same route to bomb Berlin. This ensured that all personnel in cities along the route were constantly forced to flee to bomb shelters and that German air assets were repeatedly engaged over Berlin. On the night Peenemunde was attacked, the Germans were deceived into believing that the eight Mosquitoes were the vanguard of another attack on Berlin. The result of this deception was a highly successful ruse. At the cost of one aircraft lost to German fighters, the eight Mosquito bombers used in the diversion lured 203 enemy fighters to Berlin. Of 597 British bombers dispatched to Peenemunde, only 40 were lost and 32 damaged. All but 26 managed to attack the target. If the ruse had not been successful, it is quite possible, as one German postwar account claimed, that an additional 160 bombers would have been shot down.

A final remark about the weaknesses of human information processing is that the reading of the literature suggests that targets tend to dismiss unlikely events as impossible events. Such an idea favors bold and imaginative strategies such as Hannibal crossing the Alps or the landing at Inchon.

#### CRY-WOLF

Figure 1-3 provides a synopsis of several events which show how repeated false alarms (cry-wolf) have historically contributed to surprise. There is no doubt that cry-wolf is an established element in indications and warning intelligence work. As Figure 1-3 shows, this method of desensitizing an enemy before an attack has been very effective.

In a paper entitled "Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore," prepared by the Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1981, the cry-wolf syndrome alone, and false alarms combined with other deception techniques were analyzed to see if they contributed to creating surprise.

TIME PERIOD	EVENT	REMARKS
WORLD WAR II PEARL HARBOR	First, there is the "cry wolf" phenomenon. This phrase was actually used before the attack on Pearl Harbor concerning warnings about the Japanese. An excess of warnings which turn out to be false alarms induces a kind of fatigue, a lessening of sensitivity. The US Navy was tired of checking out Japanese submarine reports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. In the week preceding the attack, they had checked out seven, all of which were false.	There was an extensive cover and deception plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, there is no evidence that desensitization was part of the plan.
AUSTRALIA'S PEARL HARBOR	A naval coast watcher reported what he believed to be naval vessels off the coast of Australia. Previously there had been a series of unconfirmed sightings which had all been checked out and had proved to be false.	A senior intelligence officer at Navy Headquarters, Darwin, explained that warning information which reached him 30 minutes prior to the attack was disregarded because a series of earlier sightings had proven false. The attack on Darwin occurred on 19 Feb 1942, some 10 weeks after Pearl Harbor.
KOREA 1950	Intelligence sources had indicated a North Korean buildup numerous times before the June 1950 attack on South Korea. There was nothing in the intelligence reports that would indicate something was about to happen at that time.	In June 1950, the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of the Army all agreed that the possibility existed for a North Korean attack, but that this attack did not seem imminent.
VIETNAM 1968	Every year, US Headquarters in Saigon predicted a winter-spring offensive that never occurred. As a result, the warnings issued before the TET offensive were ignored.	
ISRAEL 1973	Many times over the period of a year, the same source provided information that the war would break out on a specific date. Each time, that day would come and go without an attack. This happened so often that when the source actually provided the date of the real attack, no one believed him.	Israel had actually mobilized in response to an earlier warning that never happened. The cost of this mobilization in time, resources, manpower, and money was prohibitive. Senior intelligence officers did not want to make such a costly mistake again.
<b>Figure 1-3. Historical example of desensitization by false alerts</b>		

The data showed that when cry-wolf techniques were combined with other deception methods, surprise was achieved 92 percent of the time.<sup>4</sup>

However, when deception techniques were used that did not include false alerts, surprise resulted in only 67 percent of the cases studied. The analyst concluded from this statistical analysis that combining the effects of false alerts with other deception techniques seemed to increase the chances of achieving surprise. In fact, in 23 cases, when wolf was cried and deception was attempted, surprise was achieved 100 percent of the time.

#### JONES' DILEMMA

Deception becomes more difficult as the number of channels of information available to the target increases. However, within limits, the greater the number of controlled channels the greater the likelihood the deception will be believed.

#### A CHOICE AMONG TYPES OF DECEPTION

Where possible, the objective of the deception planner should be to reduce the uncertainty in the mind of the target, to force him to seize upon a notional world view as being correct--not making him less certain of the truth, but more certain of a particular falsehood. However, increasing the range of alternatives and the evidence supporting any of many incorrect alternatives--also known as increasing the noise--may have particular use when the target already has several elements of truth in his possession.

It is convenient to classify deception into two types: A (for ambiguity deception) and M (for misdirection deception). A-deception increases doubt in the target's mind and lowers the probability of a correct perception by taking from or adding to alternatives. M-deception reduces uncertainty in the target's mind by having him become convinced of a particular falsehood. Either form of deception can be accomplished, incidentally, by telling only the truth.

A-deception can function by--

- ° Altering the probabilities attached to various outcomes in the mind of the target.
- ° Diluting or burying useful information in noise.
- ° Altering the perceived range of options and outcomes available to the target.

<sup>4</sup> "Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore," Central Intelligence Agency.

A classic analysis of the Pearl Harbor surprise borrowed the concepts of signal and noise from communications theory. "To understand the fact of surprise, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the noise as well as the signals that after the event are clearly seen to herald the attack."<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, noise can be created by the deception architect to overpower or swamp the signal. "The idea is to give your target a kaleidoscope to play with, and then let him use it as a looking glass."<sup>6</sup>

A simple example of a defense game shows this idea more clearly. Suppose an attacker has a choice between two locations to attack. The defender can choose to defend either location. Given this scenario, the attacker has an even chance of choosing an undefended location to attack. But, what if the attacker could convince the defender that there were three possible locations for the attack? If he could, the success probability then climbs to 2 to 3, and so forth. The probability would reach unity as a mathematical limit when the number of threatened sites grows arbitrarily too large. It is necessary that the options introduced by the attacker be both individually and collectively plausible to the target.

As a practical matter, the number of threats cannot arbitrarily grow too large. This fact was appreciated by deception planners who worked on the invasion of Sicily: "It was decided, very wisely, that to mount so many threats in the Mediterranean would stretch the Germans' credulity too far. Moreover, the fact that Sicily was almost the only objective not threatened might lead them to guess the truth. To prevent this, the simulated threats to north and west France, Pantelleria, and Lampedusa were abandoned."<sup>7</sup>

The foregoing discussion is purposely oversimplified, but it clearly shows the principle of A-deception.

In contrast to A-deception, M-deception (or misdirection) reduces uncertainty. The strategy of misdirection is clear: to make the enemy very certain, very determined, and completely wrong. In the attack/defense game used earlier, M-deception would require the attacker to convince the defender to defend one site, while attacking the other.

Deception schemes used in practice are usually combinations of A and M types, with one or the other being dominant. Such was the case at Normandy.

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<sup>5</sup> Roberta Wohlstetter, "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision," a synopsis of her ideas.

<sup>6</sup> Eric Ambler, "Send No More Roses," (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson Limited, 1977) p. 62.

<sup>7</sup> C. Cruickshank, "Deception in World War II," (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) p. 52.

The multiple attack location threats in the initial stages are evidence of A-deception. In the end phases, however, Normandy was predominantly an M-deception. Historically, deception professionals seem to have preferred M-deception. For after all, who can resist the ultimate triumph of "the sting?"

#### AXELROD'S CONTRIBUTION: THE HUSBANDING OF ASSETS

There are circumstances where deception assets should be kept in reserve despite the costs of maintenance and risk of waste, awaiting a more fruitful use.

Window, later renamed Chaff by the Americans, was easily the most cost effective electronic countermeasures (ECM) deception device introduced in World War II. However, the British were at first reluctant to use Chaff for two reasons. First, they were afraid that the Germans also had this capability and second, the British had not been able to develop an effective countermeasure. However, after much debate, the British decided to employ Chaff and did so with much success.

It is also interesting to note that concern over whether an asset will become valueless once used, or that upon compromise, an effective countermeasure can and will be developed is often exaggerated. In spite of the concern over the first use of chaff, it is still considered effective in today's sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) environment. Similarly, in the use of double agents, a refusal to believe that the agent is other than genuine has been observed to continue in the face of strong evidence of hostile control.

"Other examples of holding deception assets in reserve until the right moment include--

- ° Employment of ULTRA in World War II.
- ° The Syrian decision to withhold use of its new SAM defense despite heavy losses until the opportune time in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
- ° The use of double agents by Britain in connection with the Normandy deception."<sup>8</sup>

It may pay to wait for high stakes despite risks of compromise and/or costs of maintenance. This maxim is of particular interest since, as Axelrod stated in The Rational Timing of Surprise:

<sup>8</sup> Robert Axelrod, "The Rational Timing of Surprise," World Politics (JAN 79), pp. 228-246.

"One can see that it would be a mistake to evaluate the opponent's resources for surprise by what you have seen when the stakes were low or moderate. He may be rationally waiting for an event with sufficiently large stakes to justify the exploitation of whatever resource for surprise he has."<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, (recall the discussion regarding the law of small numbers) given an assumed constancy in stakes, it is hazardous to draw conclusions from limited data. Also, rational analysis suggests that an enemy's actions may well be different when the stakes are high. In this case, prior experience simply may not be relevant.

#### A SEQUENCING RULE

Deception activities should be sequenced so as to maximize the portrayal of the deception story for as long as possible. In other words, red-handed activities--indicators of true friendly intent--should be deferred to the last possible instant.

"This principle is illustrated by an example from World War II--the Allied surprise at the German attack on Norway. The Allies had detected German ships moving toward Norway but misinterpreted their mission intent because they had expected an attempt to break through the Allied blockade into the Atlantic."<sup>10</sup>

Deferring the riskier portions of deception may also have the advantage that even if the deception plan is compromised, the enemy will have insufficient time to recover and take appropriate action--surprise.

#### IMPORTANCE OF FEEDBACK

A scheme to ensure accurate feedback increases the chance of success in deception. This principle is virtually self-evident.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the role of feedback in wartime deception was the intelligence provided by ULTRA, the top-secret espionage and cryptographic breakthrough that enabled the British to read the German codes. In the view of many, ULTRA information was a key element in the success of the Allied invasion of Normandy. As Lewin pointed out in ULTRA Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents:

<sup>9</sup> Robert Axelrod, "The Rational Timing of Surprise," World Politics (JAN 79), p. 244.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics 20, no. 3 (APR 68), Hypothesis no. 14.

"(Colonel John) Bevan, head of LCS, and (Lt. Col. T.A.) Robertson, head of the BIA section of MI5, have jointly testified that . . . without ULTRA the great web of deception spun round the Germans could never have been devised. Yet without their efforts, OVERLORD might have been a disaster."<sup>11</sup>

Even at the simplest operational level, feedback answers the question, "Is anybody listening?" (Is this channel effective?) It is an interesting footnote to the overall success of the Allied D-Day deception that those directed at Norway were not successful.

Ironically, the Allies knew through ULTRA that German troops remained in Norway, and concluded on the basis of this feedback that the deception was successful. "On Sherlock Holmes' famous observation about the importance of the dog that did not bark in the night, the significant fact for the deceivers in London was that no such major movement of troops from Norway was disclosed on ULTRA up to and beyond the time of D-Day. Here was clinching evidence that the deception plans were working."<sup>12</sup> Yet it was a completely wrong assessment. Hitler did not move his forces because Norway was his "zone of destiny," not because he believed the British deception plan.

#### THE MONKEY'S PAW

Deception efforts may produce subtle and unwanted side effects. Planners should be sensitive to such possibilities and, where prudent, take steps to minimize these counterproductive aspects.

Deception security is one of the causes of such side effects. One of the cardinal principles of deception folklore is that deception security is of highest importance. It is generally acknowledged that the number of knowledgeable people should be minimized, even to the point of misleading your own forces.

A good example of short circuiting an unwanted side effect occurred during World War II. Propagandists needed to convince the Germans that an Allied attack was imminent. They needed to accomplish this without encouraging resistance groups to go into action in support of an attack that would never materialize and without exposing them to German reprisals.

<sup>11</sup> Ronald Lewin, "Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents," (1978), p. 299.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 310.

"In any case, it was bad for morale if hopes of liberation were raised by 'the voice of London' only to be dashed. . . But in France the PWE had already cried "wolf" twice. . . and there was a real danger that French Resistance would cease to believe anything London said."<sup>13</sup>

Fortunately, this problem was anticipated and elegantly countered. Cruickshank wrote in Deception in World War II:

"In connection with the otherwise unsuccessful operation 'STARKEY,' for instance, the BBC broadcast this subtle message: 'Be careful of German provocation. We have learned that the Germans are circulating inspired rumors that we are concentrating armies on our coasts with intentions of invading the continent. Take no notice, as these provocations are intended to create among you manifestations and disorders which the Germans will use as an excuse for repressive measures against you. Be disciplined, use discretion, and maintain order, for when the time comes for action you will be advised in advance.'"<sup>14</sup>

Thus, it was left to the Germans to decide the significance of the message and the possibility it might be a clever ruse, while ensuring that the resistance leaders had no basis for action.

Another example of the Monkey's Paw effect concerns the unanticipated consequences of an otherwise successful German use of decoy V-2 sites. As Jones stated in "Irony as a Phenomenon in Natural Science and Human Affairs," Chemistry and Industry (1968);

"Here the Germans, perhaps following their experience of our bombing of their V-1 sites, sought to decoy us with spoof sites for their V-2 rockets. Actually, we had a very incomplete picture of their rocket organization in France, until we landed on D-Day and afterwards captured a map showing the deployment of the rocket organization west of the Seine. This included not only the actual storage sites with legends bearing their actual capacities, but also the spoof sites as well. These were individually numbered from 15 to 20, running east to west. It was therefore a fair inference that there were 14 spoof sites east of the Seine, and it was reasonable to assume that German

<sup>13</sup> Charles Cruickshank, "Deception in World War II," (1979) p. 56.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 56.

thoroughness would have decided on a fixed ratio of spoof sites per rockets stored on a genuine site. On this assumption, it was possible to estimate the number of rockets stored east of the Seine, and hence to estimate the intended monthly rate of fire. The answer came out at about 800: after the war, we found that the intended rate of fire had been 900 a month. We had, therefore, managed to achieve an 88 percent accuracy in our estimate, which would not have been possible had the Germans not tried to deceive us."<sup>15</sup>

A final example of the Monkey's Paw effect dates from 1940 to 1941 in East Africa. General Wavell wanted the Italians to believe that he was planning to attack them in Abyssinia from the south of a position. In this way, he hoped to divert Italian forces from the point of intended attack in the north. As pointed out by Mure in Master of Deception, however:

"The deception went very well and the Italians fell for the story of the attack in the south, with a result which was exactly the reverse of what Wavell wanted. They drew back in the south, presumably in the expectation that the attack there was bound to succeed and the damage to their forces would be less if a withdrawal was made perhaps to a shorter line and no pitched battle was joined. At the same time, they sent what they could spare to reinforce the Northern Flank where they did not expect an attack but which was the true British objective. The valuable lesson learned was that the deception plan must be based on what you want the enemy to do, never on what you want him to think. Next time, also in Abyssinia, Dudley arranged for the Italians to find out exactly where the British attack was to be made and this ensured that there was no opposition."<sup>16</sup>

The point to be drawn from the foregoing examples is that there may be subtle costs to a deception which should enter into the deceiver's cost or benefit analysis. It is unrealistic to expect that all possible unwanted side effects can be foreseen. However, a sensitivity to such possibilities is desirable.

<sup>15</sup> R. V. Jones, "Irony as a Phenomenon in Natural Science and Human Affairs," *Chemistry and Industry* (1968), p. 473.

<sup>16</sup> David Mure, "Master of Deception" (1980), pp. 81-82.

## CARE IN THE DESIGN OF PLANNED PLACEMENT OF DECEPTIVE MATERIAL

Great care must be exercised in the design of schemes to leak notional plans to the enemy. Apparent windfalls are subject to close scrutiny and often disbelieved. On the other hand, genuine leaks often occur under circumstances thought improbable.

Two incidents serve to illustrate this principle. One occurred when early in World War II, a German aircraft heading for Cologne became lost and made a forced landing near Malines in Belgium. The three passengers, two Wehrmacht officers and a Luftwaffe major, were soon arrested by Belgian authorities. They were taken to the police station and left alone briefly. They made an attempt to burn some documents they were carrying. They were top secret documents containing attack plans for Holland and Belgium. However, the documents failed to burn and fell into the hands of Belgian authorities. The authorities believed that the documents were a part of a deception plan, because the Germans could not be careless enough to allow actual war plans to fall into the hands of the Allies.

A second example occurred in the North African campaigns. Alam el Halfa, a ridge roughly 15 miles behind the Alamein line, was a natural stronghold. It was an excellent defensive position for the British at that stage in the war. It could, however, be outflanked by advancing Germans who might be able to attack on to Alexandria. The British maps of the area were excellent, being based on captured Italian maps corrected by aerial photographs. One type of British map was thought particularly valuable by both British and German armies--the so-called "going map." This map showed color-coded regions denoting how difficult the terrain was, and what speeds could be maintained by various vehicles.

The British decided to print a false going map showing that a flanking movement would present rough going, whereas the route direct to the Alam el Halfa region was easily plausible. The map was secretly printed and placed in an armored car to be captured by the Germans. The plan worked and the Germans came directly to Alam el Halfa (over rough going, incidentally).

These examples show both kinds of misclassification error. In the Belgian case, a real windfall was dismissed as false. In North Africa, a false map was accepted as real.

A common characteristic of successful deceptions is that they were designed to co-opt skepticism by requiring some participation by the target: either a physical effort in obtaining the evidence or an analytic effort in interpreting it. The danger of this is that it is possible to be too subtle, which carries with it the risk that the deception story will not be perceived at all.

There is a delicate balance to be struck between obviousness and subtlety, with the attendant twin risks that the message will be either misunderstood or dismissed as a plant. To the deception professional, this is the essence of the art.

#### DECEPTION FAILURES

There are generally two categories of deception failures:

- ° Those resulting from detection by the intended victim--the target.
- ° Those resulting from inadequate design or implementation by the deceiver.

Most obvious is the case where the potential target sees through the deception and either ignores it or mounts a countereffort (counterdeception) of his own. The deception can also fail to achieve the desired objective for one or more of the following reasons:

- ° Incomplete or misunderstanding of the target's intelligence apparatus.
- ° Incomplete or incorrect modeling of the deception process.
- ° Inadequate or improper channels or means to convey the deception story.
- ° Incomplete or inadequate control over the important variables of the deception process.
- ° Incorrect assessment of the target's reaction.
- ° Deception story falls outside the deception window: too sophisticated to be received, or too simplistic to be believed.
- ° Unreasonable expectations.
- ° Target's inability to react in the intended manner even if deception is considered credible.
- ° Inadequate time for the deception process to run its course.
- ° Plain bad luck can cause detection or inadequacy, or both.

Seven operations provide good examples of deception failures.

## ALBION

The first deception plan was code-named Albion. It was an elaborate deception to cover the mobilization and movement of forces to the East for the attack on Russia. The plan contained two major operational components, SHARK and HARPOON.

SHARK was intended to convey the impression that a large combined force would invade the southeast coast of England at four locations between Folkestone and Worthing. The combined force, to include eight infantry divisions, was to be preceded by an airborne unit to 'secure beachheads and, if possible, to take a number of airfields.' The Luftwaffe was to achieve air superiority, protect the invasion fleet, drop the airborne units, support the ground forces, and airlift additional ground troops. Naval units were also supposed to participate in clearing invasion routes through the British minefields, transport the invasion force, and provide covering fire during the landing.

Originally intended to begin in March and April 1941, directions and planning were slow, probably because of the press of real operations which almost invariably took precedence over deception. Preliminary actual steps included highly visible training exercises, swimming instructions for nonswimmers, paradrops and beach assaults using blank cartridges but real landing craft. This latter activity was a major deficiency in the deception story. Since only 5 landing barges and 10 fishing smacks were available to transport the assault force, the deception activities were not believable.

A cover operation for SHARK, designated HARPOON, was notionally intended to draw British forces away from the 'intended assault' area. This added credibility to the 'attack.' Two operations were planned:

- ° HARPOON NORTH was to be an attack from Norway and Denmark in the area between Tynemouth and Berwick.
- ° HARPOON SOUTH was to be launched from the Brittany Peninsula against the southwest coast of England in the area of Lyme Bay.

In the case of both the SHARK and HARPOON deceptions, two problems contributed to their apparent lack of success:

- ° Hitler's unreasonable expectation that the British were more vulnerable than they actually were.
- ° A lack of physical resources may have been known to the British, who correctly perceived that five landing barges would not be sufficient for any invasion.

One or both of these shortcomings appear to be a common element in operational-level deception failures.<sup>17</sup>

#### ELEPHANTIASIS

The second example is a World War II German tactical deception attempted against the Russians in early 1942 which had a very unpleasant result. Code-named ELEPHANTIASIS, the operation consisted of deceptive radio transmissions. They were intended to convince the Russians that a lightly held sector of the front in the area east of Vyasma, 200 kilometers southwest of Moscow, was actually defended by a heavy force of the Fourth Army. The Russians quickly attacked with a superior force and to quote one participant: "It was a mess."

It is unclear whether the Russians saw through the deception, or simply decided their forces were adequate to overcome the large force the Germans were trying to portray. In either case, the deception was not successful. It probably failed for the following reasons:

- ° It was single channel, relying totally on radio transmission rather than a blend of other means and measures.
- ° It had, to some degree, an unrealistic expectation of success.
- ° There was an intelligence failure to anticipate the possible Russian reaction of deploying a greater force to attack.

#### SOVIET TACTICAL RADIO DECEPTION

The third example occurred during World War II, when Soviet radio deception attempts against the Germans along the Eastern Front were common, but generally unsuccessful. Careful German analyses of other available intelligence (air reconnaissance and agent reporting) revealed the true deceptive nature of the attempts. They were, as in the ELEPHANTIASIS operation, single-channel efforts with no additional means or measures used to support the deception and enhance plausibility.

Probably more significant was the frequency of the attempts. A deception occurred about once every two weeks. It is probable that the Soviet command structure and intelligence apparatus were desensitized to the point of ignoring the ploys. While such repetitive actions are sometimes used to lull an adversary into a false sense of security prior to a genuine attack, the

<sup>17</sup> Dr. Alan F. Wilt, "'SHARK' and 'HARPOON': German Cover Operations against Great Britain in 1941," Military Affairs, vol 38, no. 1, (FEB 74), pp. 1-2 (Discussion).

careless and poorly structured nature of these efforts probably revealed them as deceptions.

#### COCKADE

The fourth example is probably the largest scale deception failure on record. It was the World War II Allied operation code-named COCKADE. Conceived in early 1943, its major objective was to conceal the weaknesses of Allied forces in Britain. COCKADE was intended to discourage the transfer of enemy forces to the Russian front. It had three subelements: STARKEY, TINDALL, and WADHAM.

STARKEY, the major component, was composed of a number of separate but presumably mutually supporting operations, including actual training exercises, air and naval operations, and combined operations (commando) teams.

"The story was to imply a large-scale amphibious attack against the coast of France. Its objective was to lure German aircraft into major air engagements on terms favorable to the Allies, which would result in inflicting heavy losses on the Luftwaffe.

Planning began in April 1943 with a target launch date of September 8. However, the process of cutting back on the scale of the plan began early. This was demanded by Allied leadership, due to the fact that there were fewer resources available than earlier in the war."<sup>18</sup>

Throughout the planning, some of the proposed actions made it clear that much of the Allied leadership was especially naive about deception.

"It was suggested at one point, for example, that when the invasion convoy returned to England without landing in France, the troops would be told that the assault had been cancelled because the German coastal defenses were too strong. Not long after this was disapproved, it was proposed that after the STARKEY operation had been terminated, the press should be permitted to report that the invasion had not failed but was instead a deception, and close-up photographs of the decoy equipment would be made public. While the revelation of the failed deception. . ."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> C. Cruickshank, "Deception in World War II," (1979), pp. 61-84.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

might have produced some benefits. However, good photography of the decoys could only have aided the Germans in showing the quality or lack thereof of Allied mock-ups, and aided future recognition of similar items.

"A series of 14 commando-type raids code-named FORFAR formed a subelement of STARKEY. They were intended to appear as intelligence-gathering missions in preparation for the notionally imminent cross-channel invasion of STARKEY. Some internal deception of friendly forces was also employed. For security reasons, the commandos were told their missions were to capture a German soldier, assigned to coastal defense duties, for interrogation. This ruse had a dual purpose. In the event of capture the raiders could not be forced to reveal the deception if they knew nothing about it. Also, it was recognized that Allied troop morale would probably have suffered if they had known their personal risk was merely to support a deception."<sup>20</sup>

Only eight of the planned 14 raids were actually launched. Some of those are discussed below:

- "° FORFAR BEER made three attempts. The first turned back after sighting a German trawler. The second was aborted due to bad weather and the third terminated when the troops could not scale the cliffs of the French coast.
- ° FORFAR DOG scaled the cliffs but could not penetrate the barbed wire defenses. The raiding party cut out a small sample of barbed wire so as not to return empty handed.
- ° FORFAR EASY landed, but, failing to make contact with the enemy after an hour and a half, also clipped out a section of barbed wire and returned home.
- ° FORFAR HOW could not land due to heavy surf.
- ° FORFAR LOVE, a team of two two-man canoes launched from a motor gunboat, spotted so much enemy activity they too aborted prior to landing."<sup>21</sup>

In total, the FORFAR raids apparently went completely unnoticed by the Germans. They were conceived and executed on too limited a scale. Even if one prisoner had been taken, it is probable the Germans would have viewed it as nothing more than harassment. To be effective, several landings would have

<sup>20</sup> C. Cruickshank, "Deception in World War II," (1979), pp. 61-84.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

been required at significantly separated locations. This would plausibly indicate the covert survey of landing areas for an invasion.

"TINDALL was intended to portray an impending attack in the area of Stavanger, Norway. The objective was to freeze German forces in Scandinavia, rather than permitting their deployment to Europe or the Mediterranean. Again, this required considerable preparation in the display of physical resources needed for such an invasion. Airfield improvement and increased air defenses, along with the display of decoy bombers and troop-carrying gliders and their tow planes, were undertaken at several airfields in Scotland."<sup>22</sup>

In general, TINDALL, too, was scaled down considerably from the initial concept. The required timing for exposure of the decoy aircraft and gliders to German intelligence was inadequate due to logistic problems. The soldiers that trained for the notional assault were so unconvinced themselves of the cover story that their loose talk may well have reached German intelligence.

WADHAM was intended to portray the story of a large-scale combined air and sea attack on the Brittany peninsula. The objective, again, was to freeze German forces in that area. In this case, American and British forces were involved in an assault planned for September 30, 1943. A prime objective was to capture Brest and implicitly neutralize its U-boat pens and those at Lorient and St. Nazaire.

"A number of passive and active measures were involved. Leaks regarding troop strength, training and readiness, decoy aircraft and assault gliders, "planning leaks," and a short newsreel film titled 'Invasion Preparation at Fever Heat,' were the passive demonstrations of the deception."<sup>23</sup>

Active measures included actual bombing of the submarine pens and a less-than-convincing commando raid, code-named POUND.

"The target was the Isle of Ushant. All this was intended to support the story that an intelligence sortie was attempting to determine the strength of defenses in the area."<sup>24</sup>

The intended German prisoner was not taken and the visibility of the raid was limited to an exchange of gunfire with a German defensive position.

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<sup>22</sup> C. Cruickshank, "Deception in World War II," (1979), pp. 61-84.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

COCKADE and its subelements suffered from some fairly major deficiencies in the resources available for execution. The Germans' disdainful reaction may also be explained in terms other than poorly constructed deception. Two writers have indicated a major German intelligence success branded COCKADE as a hoax, when a July 29 transatlantic telephone call between Roosevelt and Churchill revealed that COCKADE was a trick. Although the call was presumed secured by the A-3 scrambler, the Germans had in fact broken that system by the fall of 1941. They had routinely monitored a broad spectrum of mid- and high-level voice communications.

The major cause of failure, however, was the total implausibility of an invasion of the continent at that stage of the war. The total picture of Allied strength and preparations that the Germans gained was from sources so numerous that they could not all be totally manipulated or controlled. Evidence showed clearly that such an attack was unrealistic in 1943.

#### ACCUMULATOR

The fifth example is a tactical deception which occurred later in World War II in support of OVERLORD, the invasion of France. It, too, can be classified as a technical failure. It failed because of inadequate planning, coordination, preparation, and time, combined with some degree of bad luck. It was code-named Accumulator.

"In June 1944, seven days after D-Day, with the success of the landings still in doubt, it was decided to create a notional diversionary attack."<sup>25</sup>

Previous deception efforts, such as FORTITUDE, had concentrated on the French coast to the east of the Normandy area. However, ACCUMULATOR endeavored to focus attention on the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula.

"The operation, conceived on very short notice, employed two Canadian destroyers, the Haida and the Huron, as platforms for electronic deception. They were to simulate an amphibious assault force to land on June 13, 1944, near the town of Granville. The deception consisted entirely of radio voice broadcasts. The initial transmission was in the clear, reporting to base that the speed of the fleet, located southwest of the Island of Jersey, had been reduced due to engine trouble on one of the ships. A discussion of the revised plan of attack followed, also in the clear. However, an unknowing Allied reconnaissance aircraft reported the two destroyers as 'unidentified warships.' Part way through

<sup>25</sup> C. Cruickshank, "Deception in World War II," (1979), pp. 200-201.

the operation, the Haida abandoned the effort because her radios were not ready. This forced the Huron to continue a solo performance with a hastily-revised transmission scenario. Although British War Office records reported the operation as satisfactory, no German reaction was observed."<sup>26</sup>

This failure was characterized by an apparent absence of the desired German force deployment away from the Normandy beaches, and toward the Cotentin Peninsula. This could have been due to the German intercept operators determining the actual nature of the force, by monitoring reconnaissance aircraft reports. The unscheduled reporting was obviously the result of failed coordination of the operational aspects of the deception.

The failure could also have been caused by the absence of the other aspects of an actual invasion fleet. Missing were the radar signatures of a large group of ships which would undoubtedly have been accompanied by air support and ECM. Deception story portrayals by one means have less credibility than stories portrayed over a number of means.

Also, by June 13 the magnitude of the Normandy force was clear to the German military leadership. Hitler apparently still believed an attack would come in the Pas de Calais area. This, combined with the general disorganization in northern France, probably prevented any serious thought of a major shift of forces in the west.

#### IRONSIDE

The sixth example was code-named IRONSIDE. In early 1944, with the Allied decision made to invade Normandy, the primary objective was to minimize opposition to the attacking force.

"This involved convincing the Germans to freeze their forces in place and, if possible, withdraw some from the Normandy area. An attack of southern France, code-named ANVIL, was intended to accomplish this objective."<sup>27</sup>

Final invasion decisions were to be made at the Cairo and Teheran conferences. By that time, the weight of American resources devoted to the war effort gave us the de facto authority to take charge of the grand strategy. In spite of the wrangling and, at times, overt hostility, it was agreed that ANVIL/DRAGOON would proceed. It would be supported in the western

<sup>26</sup> C. Cruickshank, "Deception in World War II," (1979), pp. 200-201.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p. 159.

Mediterranean by several supporting deception operations: IRONSIDE, VENDETTA, and FERDINAND. All were made more difficult by the requirement to proceed after the actual Normandy landing. While none of the three were great successes, IRONSIDE is generally considered a failure.

"The (Ironsides) scenario included an almost totally notional series of actions:

- ° At D+3 a brigade-sized force would capture the airfields at Medis and Cozes.
- ° A division would establish a position between Le Verdon and Soulac.
- ° A second division would attack at Arcachon to secure the main route to Bordeaux.
- ° At some later time three more divisions would reinforce each beachhead and later advance along the Garonne River.
- ° A large scale naval force, which was to provide transportation, mine sweeping, bombardment, and even aircraft carriers, was to participate."<sup>28</sup>

While the IRONSIDE concept was not unreasonable, it failed because of insufficient real evidence to make it plausible. No naval forces were available and air support was limited to reconnaissance.

#### ANZIO

"(The last example occurred) . . . Following SHINGLE, the successful Allied landing at Anzio, Italy, on January 22, 1944, (when) the Germans launched a strong but ineffective counterattack along the Via Anziate without benefit of deception or surprise. Hitler attached great strategic importance to the Allied landing, which he viewed not only as the 'Battle for Rome' but the beginning of the invasion of Europe. He ordered Field Marshal Kesselring to mount a second counterattack and vetoed the subsequent plan for a thrust between Isola Bella and Ponte della Crocetta as being too close to the previously unsuccessful route of approach. Instead, Hitler ordered the attack to fall between the Astura River and the Mussolini Canal. Kesselring and

<sup>28</sup> C. Cruickshank, "Deception in World War II," (1979), p. 159.

von Mackessen obeyed and scheduled demonstrations to simulate flanking attacks in the areas of Sessano and Ardea/Buonriposo."29

These demonstrations were unsuccessful because British intelligence was able to pierce the German deception attempts.

Figure 1-4 shows the previous deception failures in easy-to-use tabular format. The intent is not to dwell on failure but, rather, to portray the immense scope of deception planning, the fragile nature of deception operations, and the absolute necessity for total integration of the deception effort into the decision-making process.

#### AIRLAND BATTLE

Our ability to fight in accordance with the basic tenets of AirLand Battle Doctrine--agility, synchronization, initiative, and depth--is enhanced by using battlefield deception.

The effective use of deception allows us to take the initiative by doing the unexpected and inducing the target to react to our operations. Deception allows us to--

- ° Capitalize on frustrated, misaligned, and misallocated enemy operations and resources.
- ° Extend our operations deep into enemy rear operations.
- ° Affect the missions of enemy reserve and second-echelon forces.

Synchronization with the combat mission is the critical tenet to successful AirLand Battlefield deception operations.

Battlefield deception operations, by their very nature, imply taking calculated, prudent risks in order to gain the tactical and operational advantage over the enemy. Planned deceptions allow us to sequence the presentation of the battlefield to the enemy in the manner in which we wish him to view it. In the defensive, battlefield deception allows us to portray inaccurate dispositions and capabilities that hide our true weaknesses. This can effectively negate the enemy's choice of the time and place of battle.

In both the offense and defense, battlefield deception enhances the conditions which allow the friendly commander to effectively mass his forces

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<sup>29</sup> C.J.C. Molony et al, "The Mediterranean and Middle East," vol V, The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy 3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944, pp. 724-754.

DATE	NAME/LOCATION/BATTLE	CODE NAME	APPARENT REASON FOR FAILURE
1941	Cover for Hitler's invasion of Russia	ALBION: SHARK HARPOON	Hitler's misperception of British vulnerability. Germany provided inadequate physical resources.
1942	German radio transmission against Russia	ELEPHANTIASIS	Inadequate—deception only single-channel. Failure to anticipate Russian reaction.
1942	Soviet tactical radio deception		Technically inadequate. Too frequent repetition.
1943	Allied plan to threaten cross-channel operations from Britain	COCKADE: STARKEY TINDALL WADHAM	Inadequate allocation of resources. Unreasonable expectations.
1944	Deceptive Allied post D-Day operation in support of OVERLORD	ACCUMULATOR	Technical failure due to inadequate planning, coordination, preparation, and time. Bad luck.
1944	Notional Allied post D-Day operation	IRONSIDE	Inadequate planning, coordination, and allocation of resources.
1944	Anzio		Intelligence success revealed true nature of decoy buildup.

**Figure 1-4. Reported deception failures**

at the decisive time and location on the battlefield. Successfully managed, deception operations give us the element of surprise over the enemy. In the defense, this includes making the enemy attack where he perceives our weaknesses to be or gearing his intelligence activities toward notional rearward activities. We inject notional combat information and intelligence into his decision-making process. This influences the outcome of his decisions and requires him to reconfirm information or dedicate additional intelligence resources toward our deceptive activity.

In the offense, battlefield deception assists our offensive spirit by giving our commanders freedom to develop a greater number of alternative courses of action. Deception operations induce the enemy to view the battlefield the way we want him to. This causes him to take actions favorable to and exploitable by friendly operations. Because of induced misperceptions of the battlefield, the enemy in the defense is not given time to identify the composition of our forces and mass his forces or supporting fires against the attack. Successfully planned and executed battlefield deceptions give our commanders the ability to act faster than the enemy can make decisions. Battlefield deception keeps the enemy reacting to false friendly dispositions, intentions, or capabilities.

As with other imperatives for success on the AirLand Battlefield, deceptions must be an integral part of the planning process. In order to optimize the desired effect upon the enemy, they must be synchronized with the true combat mission. These effects induce inappropriate focusing or diffusing of enemy combat power. They may cause the enemy to misperceive friendly capabilities and intentions in a manner which results in enemy actions that can be exploited. The former effect can create friendly advantages in terms of time, distance, location, force ratios, or mission mismatches. The latter creates friendly advantage primarily in terms of ensuring that inadequate time exists for enemy reaction to true operations, regardless of if or when they are discovered. Functional activities (such as EW, fire support, intelligence, and engineering), which have embedded deceptive intent within the operational plan, should synchronize their supporting plan tasks to achieve both operational and deception objectives. The operational plan is identified in the deception annex.

Battlefield deception, as with other operations, must be flexible and continuously synchronized with the changing friendly and enemy situations. Synchronizing deception activities, with ground truths or with the desired enemy perception, provides our commander the maximum economy of force of total combat resources.

#### COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

Battlefield deception is an important foundation to the C<sup>3</sup>CM strategy for AirLand Battle. Our potential adversary's ability to perceive and manage

the battlefield with clarity and certainty accents the importance of planning and integrating a C<sup>3</sup>CM strategy into our combat operations. Battlefield deception is employed in concert with the three other components of C<sup>3</sup>CM:

- ° Jamming.
- ° Operations security (OPSEC).
- ° Physical destruction.

This combination is designed to influence, degrade, or destroy enemy C<sup>3</sup> capabilities while protecting friendly C<sup>3</sup> from similar enemy efforts. The successful attack of adversary command and control systems requires an integrated application of all available assets.

Battlefield deception complements the other three components of C<sup>3</sup>CM in both counter-C<sup>3</sup> and C<sup>3</sup>-protect roles. In countering enemy C<sup>3</sup> capabilities, battlefield deception can be used to inject false truths into the enemy's decision-making process. These false truths will distort his ability to respond to the true current situation. This is accomplished by many means including portraying false friendly intentions, capabilities, and dispositions, which can cause the enemy to--

- ° Mass or disperse.
- ° Hold in place or commit, or commit prematurely or too late.
- ° Adopt inappropriate force configurations.
- ° Adopt a style of maneuver inappropriate to friendly operations.


Furthermore, electronic and obscurant-based means of battlefield deception can result in false target and situation data being developed by the enemy. In both of these examples, we can effectively--

- ° Degrade the enemy's C<sup>3</sup> capabilities.
- ° Make him question his intelligence collection and analysis apparatus.
- ° Induce incorrect maneuver, force allocation, and sustainment decisions.

Battlefield deception can also assist in a C<sup>3</sup>-protection role. For example, deception operations can nullify or degrade the enemy's target acquisition and offensive capabilities by causing him to diffuse his firepower or to commit maneuver assets at inappropriate times and locations. Deception also assists the operational security posture of the operation by masking indicators of true intent. (See AR 525-20.)

## CORNERSTONES OF BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION

There are several important cornerstones for the development of successful battlefield deception operations that all commanders must thoroughly understand and apply. (See Figure 1-5.) These considerations fall into three broad areas: intelligence support, integration and synchronization, and OPSEC.



### Intelligence Support

The threat to successful AirLand Battle operations from enemy intelligence and combat operations accents the importance of using our intelligence estimates in developing operational and tactical plans. Battlefield deception operations rely extensively on the same level of timely and accurate intelligence as do combat operations. To ensure that friendly operations are viewed by the enemy as plausible, and subsequently authentic, we need to know--

- ° How the enemy decision and intelligence cycles operate.
- ° What type of deceptive information he is likely to accept.
- ° What source he relies on to get his intelligence.
- ° What he needs to confirm this information.
- ° What latitude he has in modifying or changing an on-going or planned operation.

To answer these questions, battlefield deception planners require extensive intelligence support during the planning, execution, and evaluation stages of an operation. Furthermore, we need constant feedback on the enemy's acceptance of our deception in order to maintain flexibility and economy of forces. (See FM 34-1 for more information on feedback.)

#### Integration and Synchronization

Once we have determined where the enemy is susceptible to battlefield deception and what the objective of our deception will be, we must begin to integrate and synchronize deception operations and events into our true combat operation.

This underlines the importance of planning and executing deceptions as part of the planning and execution of our true operations. There should be no such thing as a deception planned separately from the true operation.

History has shown that the deceptions that stand the greatest chance of being accepted as our true capabilities, intentions, or dispositions are deceptions that are--

- ° Flexible.
- ° Doctrinally consistent with our actual capabilities and intentions.
- ° Credible as to current battlefield situations.
- ° Simple enough not to get confused during the heat of battle.

Synchronization must include the centralized control over the timing, scheduling, and execution of deception operations with true operations. Successful battlefield deception operations will require, in many cases, the commitment of actual combat, combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), and leadership resources. Deceptions are an operational responsibility. The G3 must be willing to task the appropriate assets to make the deception plan work. The more realistic and doctrinally consistent

combined arms deception operations are, the greater the probability of the enemy perceiving them as plausible.

### Operations Security

OPSEC is equally important for deception since it is an integral aspect of overall combat operations. OPSEC and deception are mutually supporting activities. OPSEC supports deception by eliminating or reducing the indicators which give away our true intentions or display our deceptive intent. Deception can produce signatures behind which our true operations may hide. In general, given that the primary aim of deception is to influence the enemy commander, OPSEC establishes the base of secrecy that is necessary for battlefield deceptions to be successful. OPSEC gives us the capability to look at ourselves in order to identify our vulnerabilities and the profiles that we present to the enemy. It is essential that if battlefield deceptions are to be used to gain surprise over the enemy, then our unit's true intentions, dispositions, and capabilities must be concealed, manipulated, and distorted as well as falsified. OPSEC is essential to all successful deception.

OPSEC is not an administrative security program. OPSEC is used to influence enemy decisions by concealing specific, operationally significant information from his intelligence collection assets and decision processes. OPSEC is a concealment aspect for all deceptions, affecting both the plan and how it is executed. (See AR 530-1 for additional information.)

### SURPRISE AND SECURITY

Deception, employed properly, can help create surprise, thereby significantly enhancing the commander's opportunity for success.

Battlefield deception can be used during prehostilities, periods of hostilities, and open warfare. The military commander is confronted with achieving surprise over the enemy by maintaining security. It is not essential that the enemy be taken totally unaware, but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively.

The key to successful deception is security. It is possible to hide the real and portray the false, but without good indicator security, the real operation and the supporting deception operation are at risk.

### DOCTRINE

We must assume that any potential adversary is well versed in US Army doctrine--the way we conduct our operations. He will expect our units to behave in certain ways, and if we stray too far, his intelligence analysts will question our conduct. Deceptions must be consistent with doctrinal norms and how units apply those norms in combat.

If the enemy's perception of our doctrine and the doctrine itself are different, we want to play on his perception of the doctrine. The successful deception planner is the one who approaches the problem by putting himself in the enemy's shoes and developing a story believable from this vantage point.

## PATTERNS

Patterns are procedural indicators that give a unit an operational profile--how units execute doctrine. Enemy analysts use these patterns to identify the unit and predict its intentions. Once the enemy notes a pattern in the unit's activities, he expects to continue seeing that pattern. Changes in the pattern lead the enemy to question friendly activity, so it is important to use established friendly patterns in the deception.

Since often we are unaware of the patterns we have established, it is difficult to ensure that the required profile detail is present. OPSEC surveys are specifically designed to provide such information. We can achieve the desired operational plausibility by ensuring that deception planners develop deceptions as if they were genuine operations.

A commander who really plans to feint left and conduct the main attack on the right might initially direct his units to plan for a simultaneous attack. During the attack preparations, subordinate unit staffs would execute their normal patterns for this action. When appropriate, the commander could change his order to the appropriate unit and direct the conduct of a feint only. An imaginative planner might find other ways to display established patterns to the enemy. It is important that the enemy sees what he expects to see.

A second consideration is the possibility of deliberately creating patterns in our deception plans. Repeated employment of a particular deception technique or measure will certainly establish a tell-tale pattern. This could signal a deception that in itself is exploitable through subsequent deceptions. Variety and creativity are vital to continued success. Battlefield deception planners must ensure that neither they nor their plans become too predictable.

## FACTORS

The following factors of deception are taken from previous operations. They should be carefully considered in planning deception activities. They are as valuable today as they were when the Greeks placed the wooden horse before the walls of Troy.

- ° Policy. Deception is never conducted as an end in itself. It must support real plans, operations, and objectives.

- ° Objective. A specific, realistic, clearly defined objective is an absolute necessity. All deception actions must contribute to the accomplishment of the objective.
- ° Planning. Deception should be addressed in the commander's initial guidance to his staff. Deception planners must have full and continuous access to, and participate in, staff deliberations in order to fully understand and support ongoing planning. Deception planners should be knowledgeable about the operational planning process and current operations. Possibilities for achieving deception should be considered in the estimate process during formulation of the alternative courses of action. Nondeception planners should be consulted for their expertise as well.
- ° Coordination. There must be close coordination between the deception plan and the corresponding operations plan. Deception activities must be coordinated with other agencies and commands that support the operation and/or may be impacted by the deception. Any unit which could inadvertently compromise an operation through normal actions must also be contacted or controlled.
- ° Timing. Sufficient time must be allowed to--
  - Complete deception planning in an orderly manner.
  - Effect necessary coordination.
  - Promulgate tasks to involved units.
  - Present the deception story to the enemy decision-maker through his intelligence system.
  - Permit the enemy decision-maker to react in the desired way--to pursue a desired course of action.
- ° Security. Stringent security is mandatory. The true situation or plan must not be revealed to the enemy--OPSEC. Friendly forces not involved or concerned must not be aware of the deception. The specifics of a deception operation must be protected by limited access and other appropriate measures. While the need for strict security must be maintained, security restrictions should not impede timely planning, coordination, and the execution of operations.
- ° Realism. All deceptive information provided to the enemy must be realistic.
- ° Flexibility. The ability to react rapidly to changes in the situation and to modify deceptive action is mandatory.

- ° Intelligence. Deception must be based on the best estimates of the enemy's intelligence collection resources, his decision-making process, and probable intentions and reactions.
- ° Enemy Capabilities. The enemy decision-maker must be able to execute the action desired.
- ° Friendly Force Capabilities. Capabilities of friendly forces as depicted in the deception operation must match the enemy's estimates. The deception must be conducted without unacceptable degradation of friendly capabilities.
- ° Forces and Personnel. Real forces and personnel required to implement the deception plan must be identified. Notional forces must be realistically portrayed.
- ° Means. Deception must be conveyed through all feasible and available means.
- ° Supervision. Planning and execution of a deception operation must be continually supervised by the deception planner. (See Appendix A.) All actions must be correlated with the objective and implemented at the proper time.
- ° Liaison. Constant liaison must be maintained with plans, operations, intelligence, communications, and other appropriate staff personnel to ensure they are aware of the advantage of deception and available to assist in planning and executing such operations.
- ° Feedback. A reliable method of feedback should exist to gauge enemy reaction to the deception. Accurate feedback increases the chances for success in deception operations. Timely intelligence support is critical to obtaining feedback. Feedback may not be direct or immediate, especially in complex situations. However, the advantages to be gained certainly require that deception planners strive for good feedback.

## TRAINING

Training in battlefield deception offers added benefits to commanders. The brainstorming associated with developing a workable deception plan causes a greater appreciation for enemy tactics, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. This process also encourages more thoughtful and imaginative approaches to friendly doctrine and habits. Deception training contributes to our understanding of--

- ° What we look like to the human eye, the camera, and electronic devices.

- ° What we look like under specific conditions.
- ° How long it takes us to undertake specific tasks.
- ° The type of indicators the enemy looks for to determine our capabilities and intentions.

Training is a way to master the techniques of deception for the time when those techniques will be needed to support a deception plan in battle. In applying deception to field training exercises, the following elements are necessary:

- ° The unit must train for an operation within a scenario that allows the commander to elect deception or the superior tactical headquarters to direct it.
- ° There must be sufficient maneuver room and training time to permit several options to be analyzed as possible deception stories.
- ° There must be an opposing surveillance system available to gage the proficiency achieved.

The projection of the measures (false indicators) and the countersurveillance actions to conceal movements and dispositions need to be analyzed to determine the success of the training exercise.

Wars are fought with skills learned through schooling, exercises, operational experience, and self-study. Because of various necessary artificialities, peacetime schooling and exercises tend to lose sight of some of the harsh lessons of war. The essential need for secrecy and information control in war are among the lessons often forgotten.

Deception will work on the battlefield only if it has been practiced in training. The Vietnam War illustrates--

- ° The loss of operational effectiveness.
- ° The increase in cost to achieve objectives that result from forgetting this lesson.
- ° The difficulty and time required to alter peacetime practices.

In future wars, it is unlikely there will be time to relearn history's lessons after fighting begins. The initial engagements may decide the outcome of the war. Developing Army training programs will help ensure those lessons are learned during peacetime.

## COMPONENTS OF BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION OPERATIONS

Battlefield deceptions are planned in a manner similar to the planning of standard combat operations. Each component of deception is applicable at operational and tactical levels, but varies in scope. The components of battlefield deception are objectives, target, story, plan, and events.

### OBJECTIVES

The deception objective is the ultimate purpose of the deception operation. It is presented as a mission statement. The objective specifies what action or lack of action the enemy must be made to take at a specific place or time on the battlefield as a direct result of the friendly deception operation. Deception objectives relate directly to inappropriate actions and responses that we want the enemy to take. These actions can then be exploited by friendly operations.

### TARGET

The target of battlefield deception operations is the enemy decision-maker. He has the authority to make the decision that will execute the deception objective desired by the friendly commander.

Battlefield deception targeting can occur in two ways:

- ° The enemy decision-maker may be personally targeted with deception operations if his behavior patterns are known and predictable.
- ° The enemy commander may be doctrinally targeted if the deceiver does not know the enemy decision-maker's behavior patterns.

The deceiver will then focus on the intelligence collection and decision cycle processes. These provide the information on which prejudgment and decisions are made.

### STORY

The deception story is the friendly intention, capability, or disposition which the enemy is to be made to believe.

### PLAN

The deception plan outlines which specific operations, displays, or secrets must be used to convey the deception story to the target. It takes the form of a standard operation plan (OPLAN). It is included in the deception annex. Some deception tasks contained in the deception annex should be moved to paragraph three of the OPLAN or operation order (OPORD) or other supporting functional annexes.

## EVENTS

Deception events are friendly indicators and actions that present specific parts of the total deception story to the enemy's intelligence sensors. Some deception events, given the enemy and friendly situation, can be described as nonaction or delayed-action in nature. An example would be delaying the movement forward of logistic bases or artillery support until shortly before a deliberate attack.

Figure 1-6 shows the difference in scope of the deception components at various levels of deception employment.

## LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Deception operations are constrained, but not forbidden, by international agreements. Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered permissible. The following excerpts are taken from FM 27-10.

Absolute good faith with the enemy must be observed as a rule of conduct; but this does not prevent measures such as using spies and secret agents, encouraging defection or insurrection among the enemy civilian population, corrupting enemy civilians or soldiers by bribes, or inducing enemy soldiers to desert, surrender, or rebel. In general, a belligerent may resort to those measures for mystifying or misleading the enemy against which the enemy ought to take measures to protect himself.

Ruses of war are legitimate so long as they do not involve treachery or perfidy on the part of the belligerent resorting to them. They are, however, forbidden if they contravene any generally accepted rule.

## ILLEGITIMATE RUSES

The line of demarcation between legitimate ruses and forbidden acts or perfidy is sometimes indistinct, but the following examples illustrate gaining an advantage over the enemy by deliberate lying or misleading conduct which involves a breach of faith or when there is a moral obligation to speak the truth. For example, it is improper to feign surrender so as to secure an advantage over an opposing force. Similarly, to broadcast to the enemy that an armistice had been agreed upon when such is not the case would be treacherous. On the other hand it is a perfectly proper ruse to summon a force to surrender on the ground that it is surrounded and thereby induce such surrender with a small force.

DECEPTION/LEVEL	THEATER	CORPS	DIVISION
<b>OBJECTIVE</b> (Cause inappropriate enemy response to friendly:)	Actions in communications zone Orientation/disposition of major forces Far deep intent Behind enemy line activity Special weapons	Actions in corps near area (CS, CSS) Maneuver of subordinate div Special weapons Corps' deep intent	Division's intent Maneuver of front troops Close, rear, and deep operations
<b>TARGET</b> The enemy commander controlling:	Strategic level controlled weapons Front/strategic reserves Assets OMGs Special troops	Front/CAA operations Army/front reserves OMGs Army second-echelon forces	Division, Army regiment operations Division second-echelon forces Division, Army reserves
<b>STORY</b>	Longer period to be processed by enemy Present theater capabilities, doctrine, and intentions Joint/combined operations Strategic intent	Formulated in operational mission planning May be received from theater Enhance capability to perform mission in corps area of operations	Normally received from corps Portray division capabilities/augmentation Not normally independent operations
<b>EVENT</b>	Broad in scope Use of national, theater, joint, and combined assets Planned by theater deception element/joint/combined deception staff element	Executed by corps combat, CS, CSS assets Planned and limited, execution by deception specific units	Executed by organic, attached, OPCON CS, CSS assets Portray division capabilities/augmentation Not normally independent operations Planned and limited execution by deception and specific units
<b>PLAN</b>	Developed by theater deception element Executed by corps and their subordinate assets Incorporates national, theater, joint, and combined assets	Developed by corps deception element May be integrated into tasks given to supporting and subordinate units. No reference to deceptive intent. (Deceptive intent provided in deception annex only)	Developed by division deception element May be tasked to supporting or subordinate units without reference to deceptive intent (Deceptive intent provided in deception annex only)

**Figure 1-6. Deception component purpose by echelon**

Treacherous or perfidious conduct in war is forbidden because it destroys the basis for a restoration of peace short of the complete annihilation of one belligerent by the other.

It is especially forbidden to make improper use of a flag of truce, the national flag, the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, or the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.

Flags of truce must not be used surreptitiously to obtain military information or merely to obtain time to effect a retreat or secure reinforcements, or to feign a surrender in order to surprise an enemy. In practice, it has been authorized to make use of national flags, insignia, and uniforms as a ruse. The foregoing rule (Hague Regulation (HR), Article 23, paragraph F of Treaty Series 539 (sic)) does not prohibit such employment but does prohibit their improper use. It is certainly forbidden to employ them during combat, but their use at other times is not forbidden.

The use of the emblem of the Red Cross and other equivalent insignia must be limited to indication or protection of medical units and establishments and the personnel and material protected by GWS and other similar conventions. The following are examples of the improper use of the emblem:

- ° Using a hospital or other building accorded such protection as an observation post or military office or depot.
- ° Firing from a building or tent displaying the emblem of the Red Cross.
- ° Using a hospital train or airplane to facilitate the escape of combatants.
- ° Displaying the emblem on vehicles containing ammunition or other nonmedical stores.
- ° In general using it for cloaking acts of hostility.

#### LEGITIMATE RUSES

Among legitimate ruses may be counted surprises, ambushes, feigning attacks, retreats or flights, simulating quiet

and inactivity, use of small forces to simulate large unit (sic), transmitting false or misleading radio or telephone messages, deception of the enemy by bogus orders purporting to have been issued by the enemy commander, making use of the enemy's signals and passwords, pretending to communicate with troops or reinforcement which have no existence, deceptive supply movements, deliberate planting of false information, use of spies and secret agents, moving landmarks, putting up dummy guns and vehicles or laying dummy mines, erecting dummy installations and airfields, removing unit identifications from uniforms, use of signal deceptive measures, and psychological warfare activities.



## CHAPTER 2

### BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

An integral part of any campaign or major operation is the deception plan. -- FM 100-5

Operational-level deceptions are within the purview of Theater Army component, Army group, field Army, and in some cases, corps commanders. The objective of deception operations at the operational level of war is to influence the decisions of enemy commanders before battle occurs. This is done so that the tactical outcome of battles and engagements is favorable and, subsequently, operationally exploitable. The goal is to maintain operational fluidity. For this reason operational deceptions have a much larger potential payoff than those at the tactical level.

These echelons of command may have operational or logistic sustainment or a combination of both types of mission responsibilities.

During peacetime, the unit's true and deceptive efforts concerning how the force is organized, equipped, trained, and maintained directly contribute to--

- ° The strategic aim of deterring war.
- ° If deterrence fails, the operational requirement to win campaigns and major operations.

During peacetime and wartime transition periods, the unit's true and deceptive efforts concerning how the force is allocated and sustained directly contribute to--

- ° Delaying final enemy war-waging decisions so political intervention or war-avoidance processes can be engaged.
- ° If political intervention fails, the operational requirement to induce the enemy to revisit his already-made force allocation and sustainment decisions.

### CENTER OF GRAVITY

The essence of operational art is the identification of the enemy's center of gravity and the design of campaigns which expose it to attack and destruction.

Enemy operational centers of gravity can be a function of the political, economic, military, sociological, ideological, or psychological context (or combinations thereof) which give rise to the presence of the enemy. Operational centers of gravity have been characterized as--

- ° The mass of the enemy force.
- ° The boundaries between two major enemy combat formations.

- ° Vital command and control centers.
- ° Vital logistic bases.
- ° Cohesion among enemy alliances.
- ° Mental or psychological balance of a key commander.

A center of gravity is a fundamental source of enemy power and strength, and, in most cases, it will have to be attacked in phases over time.

A campaign plan's ultimate objective should be the destruction of the enemy's center of gravity. Deceptions supporting the campaign plan should be consciously designed to expose the enemy's center of gravity to increasingly higher levels of risk.

Deceptions that are developed around branches and sequels to campaigns and major operations plans weaken the robustness with which the enemy can preserve his center of gravity.

#### LINES OF OPERATION


Lines of operation define the direction of a force in relation to the enemy. Multiple lines of operation in a campaign are not uncommon, although often there is usually only one per campaign or major operation. This line, or lines, connect the friendly operational base or bases geographically with the operational objective. By manipulating these lines, it is possible to mislead the enemy and cause him to adopt inappropriate courses of action (see figure 2-1).

#### CULMINATING POINTS

All offensive operations reach a point--the culminating point--when the strength of the attacker no longer decisively exceeds that of the defender. Continuing to operate beyond that point risks overextension, counterattack, and defeat. The aim of attack is to achieve decisive objectives before reaching the culminating point.

While on the attack, deception operations make it easier to move supplies forward and to preserve--

- ° Available stocks.
- ° Numerical advantage of the attacking force.
- ° Reserve forces.
- ° Local air superiority.



**Figure 2-1. Operational base: objective relationships**

Offensive deception operations can take the form of displays, feints, or demonstrations (which reduce enemy maneuver or fire-induced force attrition), or a combination of displays, feints, and demonstrations. All contribute to delaying premature achievement of friendly culminating points.

Operational commanders who are attacking can manipulate the indicators which the enemy commander uses to perceive friendly culminating points. This can induce the enemy to--

- ° Miscalculate which major operation is the main effort (where the decisive battle is sought).
- ° Miscalculate which branch of the major operation is then assuming main effort emphasis.
- ° Miscalculate postbattle disposition, objectives, and missions.
- ° Prematurely shift to the offensive.
- ° Prematurely commit reserves.
- ° Hold forces in reserve too long.
- ° Adopt hasty defensive postures.

- ° Be logistically underprepared for the impending battle.
- ° Inappropriately over-weight a sector logistically, or with fire support, where a decision is not sought.
- ° Inappropriately exhaust or withhold enemy close air support or battlefield interdiction sorties.

Defense hastens culmination of the enemy attack, and then exploits it offensively. While on the defensive, deception operations are employed to--

- ° Induce the allocation of numerically inferior forces to the offensive (feign or demonstrate weakness).
- ° Dilute the enemy's ability to concentrate his main effort with fires and maneuver (notionally threaten his flanks and rear areas).
- ° Through notional means, canalize enemy movement into special or conventional (air and ground) weapon kill zones.

#### OPERATIONAL DECEPTION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Operational commanders plan and execute campaigns and major operations that extend from ports and support areas far to the rear of the line of contact to similarly distant sources of enemy support. They concentrate superior strength against enemy vulnerabilities at decisive times and places. These commanders set the terms of battle, which will be fought by subordinate units, by synchronizing--

- ° Ground force movement of corps, field armies, and Army groups.
- ° Air force close air support, counterair, and battlefield interdiction efforts.
- ° Logistic sustainment activities.
- ° Where appropriate, naval activities.

For these reasons, rear, close, and deep operations truly become one AirLand Battle, whether offensive or defensive in nature.

The operational commander is the catalyst who converts strategic ends into operational means--campaigns and major operations--to accomplish the ends. He focuses on executing the campaign plan by staging, conducting, and exploiting the outcome of major operations. Campaign plans set long-term goals that are accomplished in phases in most cases. Depending on what the enemy center of gravity is, they can be designed to defeat the enemy in a number of different ways, such as--

- ° Physically destroying enemy forces.
- ° Defeating or depriving the enemy of his allies.
- ° Separating his armies in the field for piecemeal defeat.
- ° Preventing enemy deployment.
- ° Destroying enemy logistic support.
- ° Occupying decisive terrain, which forces battle on terrain unfavorable to the enemy.
- ° Carrying the war into the enemy homeland.

#### CAMPAIGN PLANS

The plan for the first phase of the campaign depicts the commanders intent, allocates forces to major subordinate units, disposes the force for operations, and coordinates air and naval support for ground maneuver.


Employing deception during the first phase of a campaign affords operational commanders ample opportunities to--

- ° Influence enemy perception of friendly operational intent (objectives), and by extension, strategic ends.
- ° Induce incorrect enemy conclusions and decisions about friendly forces being allocated to fight the battle.
- ° Induce incorrect enemy conclusions about force dispositions.
- ° Induce incorrect enemy conclusions about the nature and extent of air and naval support to the ground maneuver.

All this is done to predispose the enemy to adopt a posture that is operationally exploitable in the first as well as coming battles.

Preplanned branches to the campaign plan--options for changing dispositions, orientation, direction of movement, and decisions to accept or decline battle--are the fertile soil into which the seeds of deception can be sown.

Sequels establish dispositions, objectives, and missions for subordinate units after battle. Preplanned sequels allow effective transit to exploitations, counteroffensives, withdrawals, retreats, or reorientations of the main effort. Deceptions can be as effectively woven around preplanned sequel variants as branch variants (see Figure 2-2).



#### MAJOR OPERATIONS PLANS

Major operations planning begins prior to war (as long as a campaign plan is in place) or can begin as branches or sequels to campaign plans. Major operations are coordinated elements of campaigns, and their outcomes impact on different phases of a campaign plan.

#### DECEPTION SUSTAINMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Operational sustainment provides support by--

- ° Manning the force with leaders and soldiers.
- ° Arming the force with weapon systems and munitions.
- ° Fueling the force with supplies.
- ° Fixing or replacing damaged or destroyed materiel.
- ° Transporting the supported force.
- ° Protecting the sustainment system from degradation or destruction.

The following sustainment imperatives facilitate the sustainment function:

- ° Anticipation.
- ° Integration.
- ° Continuity.
- ° Responsiveness.
- ° Improvisation.
- ° Lines of Support

#### ANTICIPATION

Operational sustainment planners must ensure that base facilities, priorities of support, lines of communication (LOC), and troop movements support the main lines of operation. They must also be robust enough to postpone attainment of the culminating point until after the friendly decision point is reached, in anticipation of attacks by enemy--

- ° Agents and sympathizers.
- ° Special purpose forces.
- ° Point and area deep attack systems (air and/or ground).
- ° Airborne forces.
- ° Airmobile forces.
- ° Ground maneuver (exploitation) forces.

Operational sustainment planners should create notional base facilities and establish and use notional LOC.

#### INTEGRATION

Integration of operational and sustainment deception plans will result in the anticipatory sustainment requirements, mentioned earlier, being satisfied within the context of preplanned branches and sequels to campaign and major operations plans.

#### CONTINUITY

By satisfying the integration requirement mentioned earlier, operational continuity (in terms of lines of operations and culminating points) will be enhanced.

#### RESPONSIVENESS

Deceptive dilution of the sustainment system, through the use of notional logistic bases and LOC, preserve the robustness of the system during surge periods needed to reconstitute the defense or exploit offensive successes.

## IMPROVISATION

The key imperative to sustaining the force is the imagination of everyone involved in the sustainment system to improvise, using organic and, where possible, host nation resources. For example, notional sustainment nodes can be created from discarded empty containers or materiel.

## LINES OF SUPPORT

Creation and manipulation of both central and multiple bases of support, in conjunction with interior and exterior lines of support, are the means with which the sustainment system is deceptively enhanced. Reference to lines of support can be found in FM 100-5.

## OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

The key to success in offensive campaigns is to defeat the enemy before reaching your culminating point--the point where the offense becomes exhausted.

Unfortunately, for one or more of the following reasons, culminating points are often reached before the decisive objective has been achieved:

- ° Successive battles and engagements result in attrition of the force.
- ° Forces are allocated to the flanks, reducing numerical advantage at the forward line of own troops (FLOT).
- ° Supply lines become more extended and thus more fragile to interdiction, physically taking longer to get supplies and ammunition to the front.
- ° Significant rear area threats require the commitment of forces away from the main effort.
- ° Enemy defenses may stiffen, as outer defensive belts are breached, causing further attrited forces and the use of more supplies and ammunition.
- ° The natural friction of war and the sheer physical effort necessary to move and sustain forces work against maintenance of offensive momentum.

To prevent reaching the culminating point at the wrong time--before the objective is secured--the attacker must cause the enemy defense to collapse as rapidly as possible. He must simultaneously protect his forces and sustainment system. Operational commanders should employ deception in offensive campaigns to--

- ° Mask the intentions of operational and sustainment forces.
- ° Put the defender into positions of decisive disadvantage before battles and engagements are joined by subordinate units.

- ° Put the defender into positions of disadvantage so that the outcomes of battle--success, stalemate, defeat--can be exploited by operational reserves.

The reasons for employing deception go to the heart of maintaining operational fluidity. Deception is employed to--

- ° Preserve the initiative.
- ° Induce and strike enemy weaknesses.
- ° Induce the enemy to expose his formations indepth to facilitate deep attack.
- ° Prevent the enemy from establishing a coherent defense.

Offensive campaigns may be fought against concentrated or dispersed enemy forces. Against concentrated enemy forces, operational deception should induce the enemy to abandon his positions and fight at a positional disadvantage. This means--

- ° Directing operations against enemy flanks or rear, while demonstrating or feigning a frontal main effort.
- ° Penetrating weak areas of the defense, while demonstrating or feigning against flanks and rear.
- ° Operating on converging exterior lines of operation, while demonstrating or feigning the use of interior lines.

Against dispersed enemy forces, operational deception should induce the enemy to remain dispersed for piecemeal defeat. This means--

- ° Deceptively manipulating the sequencing of campaign branches and sequels so that enemy reserves do not decisively influence current battle outcomes.
- ° Deceptively manipulating LOC and lines of operations so that notional convergence occurs at multiple objectives at the same time.
- ° Feigning or demonstrating forms of maneuver that facilitate penetration of the attacking force into enemy rear areas of operations.

General Grant's Vicksburg Campaign during the Civil War graphically depicts the use of deception against both concentrated (Vicksburg) and dispersed (Vicksburg-Jackson) forces.

Grant used demonstrations and feints north of Vicksburg to mask his maneuver south around Roundaway and Vidal bayous, and up the Big Black River. This phase of the campaign turned the southern flank of the Vicksburg defenses and exposed the rear (the town of Jackson) to attack.

By demonstrating and feigning south of the Vicksburg defenses, extending east from Warrenton toward the Big Black River, rebel forces at Vicksburg were effectively held in place. By demonstrating east to Jackson, rebel forces there were held in place as well. This tactic allowed Grant to--

- ° Maneuver (interdict) against the Vicksburg defender's supply LOC in the general vicinity of Champion Hill.
- ° Keep the Vicksburg and Jackson forces from massing.
- ° Subsequently defeat by piecemeal the Vicksburg and Jackson defenders.

#### DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

The key to success in defensive campaigns is to destroy the enemy's capability to sustain forward movement--to hasten his culminating point. Defensive campaigns are undertaken--

- ° When the military situation does not allow for offensive operations.
- ° When commanders must economize to support attacks elsewhere.

Defensive campaigns must control the enemy's attack, while simultaneously preserving the defending force's ability to defend and to assume offensive operations. Commanders mix defensive and offensive battles and engagements. They contest the initiative at every opportune time and place, within the area of operations, to exhaust the enemy attack.

Operational commanders should employ deception in defensive campaigns to--

- ° Exploit enemy prebattle force allocation and sustainment decisions.
- ° Exploit the potential for favorable outcomes of protracted minor battles fought by subordinate units.
- ° Lure the enemy into friendly territory, exposing his flanks and rear to attacks.
- ° Mask the aggressiveness of the sustaining and operational forces committed to the defense.

The reasons for employing deception go to the heart of maintaining a coherent defense. Those reasons are to--

- ° Defeat a large attacking force.
- ° Retain territory.
- ° Gain time.

Defensive campaigns, like offensive campaigns, contain branches and sequels that give the commander preplanned opportunities to exploit the

military situation. It is around these branches and sequels that deception potentials exist.

Specific deceptive actions that the operational commander can take to hasten exhaustion of the enemy offensive include, but are not limited to--

- ° Manipulating the SALUTE factors associated with defensive dispositions.
- ° Creating notional obstacles.
- ° Masking the conditions under which he will accept decisive battle.
- ° Manipulating the SALUTE factors associated with operational reserves, particularly their mission intent.
- ° Luring the enemy into a decisive battle, the outcome of which will precondition branching or sequencing to an offensive campaign.
- ° Inducing enemy operational reserves to remain uncommitted at the decisive time or place.

#### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL DECEPTION PLANS


Strategic deception plans are designed to facilitate war fighting, escalation control and war winning at theater level and higher. Operational deception plans facilitate the successful conduct of in-theater campaigns at Army EAC. Although EAC organizations are not precluded from developing operational-level deceptions independent of the strategic context, they usually will be land component-specific, derivative slices of strategic deception plans.

Campaign plans and operational deception plans must not be developed in strategic plan vacuums for the following reasons:

- ° Strategic deception plans are designed to have long-term effects on the enemy's ability to prosecute the war. They directly influence those enemy factors from which Army campaign plans are designed to set the terms of battle. Therefore, operational deceptions should be constantly maintained to respond to strategically induced evolutions in fundamental enemy battlefield capabilities.
- ° Strategic deception plans must contain deception event taskings for one or more service components operating in the same theater. Strategic and Army operational deception plans must, therefore, be coordinated at the strategic level to ensure they are not working at cross purposes with one another.
- ° Strategic deception plans might call for one service component to provide support to another component, to satisfy the latter's strategic deception-related taskings. Army operational deception plans must, therefore, be coordinated to ensure they are not working at cross purposes with one another.

- ° Strategic deception plans may require that some deception event taskings be subordinated for execution through Army operational echelons down to Army tactical echelons.
- ° Other-theater deception plans may directly or indirectly influence Army EAC organizations to set the terms of battle their tactical formations may have to deal with. Army EAC organizations do not normally know about potential other-theater impacts on their ability to wage campaigns. Army operational commanders, therefore, must look to the commander in chief to ensure that intertheater coordination occurs.

Strategic deception may influence the enemy's total capability to wage war in-theater. Operational deceptions, taking the enemy's induced war-waging capability into account, set the terms of battle for tactical formations (see Figure 2-3).



## Chapter 3

### BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

Deception is common sense soldiering.

-- General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff

Tactical commanders plan and prepare for upcoming battles and engagements according to the terms of battle set by campaign and major operation plans developed at the operational level. Battles are fought by corps and divisions. Engagements are fought by brigades and smaller units. Tactical operations require unity of effort between corps and divisions throughout the depth of operations--rear, close, and deep. The task of tactical commanders is to--

- ° Coordinate attacks on the enemy indepth with attacks on his forward units.
- ° Use indirect approaches and flank positions to achieve tactical surprise.
- ° Assure the uninterrupted support of field artillery, air defense, air support, engineer, military intelligence (MI), and logistic units.
- ° Avoid creating lucrative targets.
- ° Avoid positions that can become isolated as a result of enemy maneuver or fires.
- ° Remain informed in order to execute adjustments to the plan and retain the means to react to opportunities or threats.

The tactical commander is the catalyst who executes the means for tactical success--battles and engagements--to satisfy operational ends.

The terms of battle set at higher echelons should be exploited tactically to the maximum extent possible. Successful tactical exploitation of the enemy involves, among other things, using indirect approaches and deception.

#### TACTICAL DECEPTION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

The key to successful tactical planning is anticipation of future battle events and being prepared for contingencies. Deception operations are essential in the tactical planning process so that friendly anticipatory processes can be conducted with more certainty and to mask maneuver options. In practice, deceptions can play a significant role in--

- ° Masking the movement of tactical formations.
- ° Inducing the enemy to miscalculate friendly objectives or areas to be retained.

- ° Inducing the enemy to miscalculate friendly zones, sectors, and areas of responsibility.
- ° Creating notional tactical formations and force dispositions.
- ° Facilitating the execution of maneuver options which may develop during battles and engagements.

Tactical commanders exploit operational-level terms of battle by avoiding the enemy's strengths, striking at his weaknesses, and gaining surprise. To gain surprise--

- ° Feign and demonstrate the use of direct approaches to the objective, while actually using indirect approaches; or vice versa, if the situation so dictates.
- ° Feign, demonstrate, and display frontal dispositions, while using flank positions to attack command and control (C2) and logistic facilities.
- ° Feign, demonstrate, and display notional axes, routes, and battle positions to preserve combat, CS, and CSS forces, while simultaneously and harmlessly depleting enemy ground and air attack.
- ° Feign the air axes of attack helicopter, air cavalry, and air assault units.
- ° Demonstrate and display notional field artillery, air defense, engineer, and logistic units to enhance real-unit survivability.
- ° When changes to the tactical plan are required by the military situation, mask those changes with deception operations.

#### CLOSE OPERATIONS

Close operations involve the fight between the committed forces and the readily available tactical reserves of both combatants. Deceptions employed in close operations--

- ° Can be preplanned or ad hoc.
- ° Should center around facilitating the tactical scheme of maneuver and fire support plan.
- ° Should have localized, immediate effects during battle.

Commanders generally weight their main efforts with every available asset. Main efforts are usually complemented with feints--supporting attacks. If the main effort fails or an opportunity is presented during combat to exploit the feint as the main effort, commanders must be able to shift the effort rapidly.

Proper positioning of reserves to follow up either the main or supporting effort serves two purposes:

- ° To impede enemy assessments of where the main effort will actually occur by evaluating frontline--reserve positional--relationships. Both threats cannot be ignored.
- ° To induce the enemy to position his reserve force at a location from which it can generally respond to both the main and supporting attack, but cannot decisively influence either.

#### DEEP OPERATIONS

Deep operations are employed to attack those enemy forces that can influence close operations, but are not yet in contact. Successful attack on them--

- ° Isolates the close fight.
- ° Alters the tempo of battle.
- ° Preserves freedom of action.

Deceptions in support of deep operations should either--

- ° Facilitate exposing enemy rear forces to attack.
- ° Facilitate their commitment at a time and place that is tactically irrelevant to the close fight.
- ° Delay, disrupt, or divert them.

#### REAR OPERATIONS

Rear area operations preserve the commander's freedom of action and assure uninterrupted support to the battle. Rear area units, whose assistance to the main effort is vital receive the highest priority for protection, thus enhancing survivability.


Deception in support of rear operations may show either the buildup of area logistic bases, notional fire and air defense sites, or the increase of survivability of the units. The use of decoys for survivability will not be reported as a deception operation.

#### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL DECEPTION PLANS

Operational deception plans facilitate the conduct of campaigns and major operations by setting the terms of battle before battles and engagements occur. Tactical deception plans exploit the tactical situation being immediately confronted by the tactical commander. Although tactical organizations are not precluded from developing tactical-level deceptions independent of the operational context, they usually will be derivative slices of operational deception plans.

Tactical deception plans should not be developed in operational plan vacuums for the following reasons:

- ° Operational deception plans set the terms of battle in which tactical commanders fight: the size of the enemy force; its composition and dispositions; the enemy and friendly mission; where and when the battle will be fought; and tactical objectives; in other words, the factors of METT-T. These operationally induced factors directly influence the nature of the enemy intelligence collection, decision cycle, and troop control procedures tactical commanders will be deceptively manipulating to favorably influence tactical battle outcomes.
- ° Operational deception plans should contain deception event taskings for one or more tactical commands subordinate to the operational commander. Operational deception plans must, therefore, ensure that tactical-level plans are not working at cross-purposes with one another.
- ° Operational deception plans might call for one subordinate tactical command to provide support to another subordinate tactical command to satisfy the latter's operational deception-related taskings. Tactical deception plans must, therefore, be coordinated at the operational level to ensure they are not working at cross-purposes with one another. Figure 3-1 depicts the relationship between operational and tactical deception plans.



**Figure 3-1. Relationships between operational and tactical deception plans**

## CHAPTER 4

### DECEPTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

. . . since World War II, stratagem has come to be treated as the modern invention and arcane province of intelligence services. Its original and most effective place is at the central . . . levels of the military planning process. --Barton Whaley, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War

Deceptions are not ends in and of themselves. One does not conduct deceptions merely to deceive. Deception is used to support the operational or tactical mission.

The operations officer (G3/S3) is the primary staff officer responsible for deception planning within the command. This duty falls to him, as the executor for operations, for the following reasons:

- ° Deceptions are as much a function of operations as real plans. They are part of the operational scheme chosen to accomplish the mission.
- ° Alternative courses of action are developed by him and given to the commander for selection.
- ° Other staff section estimates and annex development processes that result in fusing OPLANs and OPORDs and deception plans together are driven by him.
- ° Fragmentary order (FRAGO) adjustments to OPLANs and OPORDs require similar adjustments to deception plans.

### TECHNIQUES

A unit will use its normal staff organization and mission planning techniques to plan for and supervise the execution of deception operations. The battlefield deception elements are activated within corps and divisions. They are critical elements in accomplishing the deception mission of the unit. They reinforce the G3 with the necessary expertise to perform the planning, target selection, and coordination needed for deception success. The deception elements deploy and operate as integral parts of the G3 staff. However, when security is essential, other organizational techniques may be considered. Three other techniques used in conducting deception planning are--

- ° Commander only.
- ° Close hold.
- ° Ad hoc staff.

Planning techniques can be different each time, depending on existing conditions. For example, if the battlefield is fluid and fast moving, the control required will be less than in a stable situation where opponents can continuously observe one another. Time available, location of the unit, security posture, the nature of the true operation, and the action selected as the primary deception vehicle will also affect the selection of the technique. Each organizational technique has different advantages.

In the commander only technique, a commander elects to conduct deception, issues direct orders, and reserves to himself (alone) all details of the plan. The deception may be his own concept or may be directed by his superior. None of his staff is fully aware of his true intentions. The advantage of this technique is a high degree of secrecy. However, its potential dangers are obvious. In this technique, the commander's deceptive intent is not made known to the staff or subordinate units; and by not employing the expertise of the staff, a serious error might occur that normal staff planning would have identified. Also, errors could possibly be made by subordinates trying to follow the commander's intent.

In the close-hold technique, officers from staff sections and units are detailed to the operations element to assist in the planning effort. When the plan is completed, it is coordinated with those staff office chiefs and supporting units represented. It then goes to the chief of staff or directly to the commander for approval. The advantages of this method are expediency and OPSEC. This technique can be used to maintain secrecy when a unit is in an assembly or marshalling area, since a group of planners can be isolated from their sections or units for several hours to conduct rapid deception planning under secure conditions. The danger is that other staff actions may be neglected.

In planning deception for small-scale (brigade and battalion) operations, the organization usually chosen is the ad hoc staff, and the operations officer exercises staff supervision over the ad hoc staff.

### SEQUENCE

The sequence of actions in making and executing decisions involves a series of separate actions or steps performed concurrently by the commander and his staff. Knowing this process will help to understand the function of the estimates, their relationship within the decision-making process, and the coordination that occurs between a commander and his staff before a decision is reached.

The commander decides how elements of his command will accomplish missions. He issues timely orders to control the operations of his forces. The staff assists the commander in arriving at and executing decisions. Operational decisions are usually of such fundamental importance that the commander personally influences the preparation of orders directing their execution.

The sequence of actions followed by the commander and his staff upon receipt of a mission describes a logical and systematic process for solving major problems and arriving at properly considered decisions. Keep in mind, however, that this sequence is flexible and that the actions of individual staff members will overlap, be accomplished concurrently, or even omitted. The important point to remember is that the actions within the process will produce the best results when followed logically and sequentially whenever faced with a mission-oriented decision.

### PROCESS

Figure 4-1 outlines the tactical deception planning process. Figure 4-2 and Appendix F show how this process fits into the military decision-making process. (See Appendix B for a deception planning worksheet and FM 101-5 for more details.) A discussion of the inter-relationship between the two processes follows.

Though estimating and planning are continuous, they are put more into focus upon receipt of a mission. Normally, higher headquarters assigns the mission but the commander may develop or deduce it. The mission or task to be accomplished initiates the decision-making process. The commander may initiate his mission analysis at this point.

Based on knowledge of the latest facts and current situation, the staff provides the commander with all information available.

Using this information, the commander completes his mission analysis, restates the mission, and issues his planning guidance.

Mission analysis ensures that the commander fully understands his mission, its purpose, and any constraints to its accomplishment and allows him to develop those tasks that are essential for its success. The commander, assisted by his staff, performs mission analysis to identify the specified and implied tasks essential to mission accomplishment.

The restated mission and planning guidance are the results of mission analysis. To guide the staff along common lines of investigation in the search for the best possible way to accomplish the mission, the commander restates the mission and issues planning guidance. This provides the necessary staff direction for concurrent planning by providing a framework for making studies and estimates. The amount of planning guidance given varies with each mission, the volume and validity of information available, the situation, and the experience of the commander and staff. Planning guidance does not occur at one specific time in the planning process. However, initial guidance should precede the preparation of the staff estimates. In order for the staff to properly include deception planning in their staff estimates, the commander needs to consider the following when developing his initial guidance:

- ° Should deception be considered in support of the main objective?
- ° Is the enemy susceptible to deception?

#### **STEP 1 - SITUATION ANALYSIS**

- Current and projected friendly situation.
- Current and projected enemy situation.
- Target analysis.
- Analysis of friendly and enemy projected situation.
- Stated desired situation.

#### **STEP 2 - DECEPTION OBJECTIVE FORMULATION**

- Deception objective: enemy action or nonaction which causes desired situation.
- Mission objective: what friendly forces must accomplish.

#### **STEP 3 - DESIRED PERCEPTION**

- What the enemy must think to make him act.
- Deriving suitable perception:
  - (1) Estimate enemy's current perception.
  - (2) Determine what enemy should perceive.


#### **STEP 4 - DECEPTION STORY**

- Information conveyed to the target which will cause him to form a desired perception.
- Develop options.
- Analyze options.

#### **STEP 5 - DECEPTION PLAN**

How we plan to convey the story.

**Figure 4-1. Deception planning process**



- ° What percentage of friendly forces can be used to support deception?
- ° Should deception be used in support of supplementary missions?
- ° Are units used to support the deception effort needed for the success of the main objective?
- ° If yes to above, what is the maximum time allowed for the units to stop their deception efforts and redeploy to the main objective area?
- ° Does the success of the operation depend on the success of the deception?

Having received the commander's planning guidance, staff members are prepared to focus their individual efforts on the problem to be solved. This involves a consideration of all circumstances affecting the situation and a systematic analysis and evaluation of possible ways to accomplish the task or mission. Staff officers furnish information, conclusions, and recommendations through preparation of an estimate. The development of individual estimates requires staff officers to consult with each other to ensure coordination of all factors affecting the situation. The operations officer's estimate is the key staff estimate and incorporates the conclusions of the other staff estimates. When completed, it then becomes the coordinated staff recommendation. The operations officer is responsible for the preparation of the deception estimate.

The following is a sample of a commander's planning guidance for deception: "I want the staff to consider the use of deception to support our mission. I want at least one deception course of action for each actual course of action. For planning purposes, we can commit one armor task force to support deception, with the normal artillery and logistic support slice. I want them to be able to stop deception operations and support the main attack within four hours of the order to do so."

Deception should be considered in each course of action. Deception estimates need to be integrated into each course of action. For each course of action, a separate deception staff estimate needs to be prepared. In analyzing the courses of action for presentation to the commander, the course of action which presents the greatest opportunity for success will be chosen. Deception operations have a greater potential for success if they are planned in depth as an integral part of the decision-making process. By understanding from the start the potential of deception, in addition to understanding the costs involved, the deception mission has a greater possibility of successfully supporting the actual mission.

#### STEP 1 - SITUATION ANALYSIS

Using the deception process, the planner needs to do a situation analysis and tentative deception objective formulation at this time. It is important to remember that this process is in support of an actual course of action. Following is a discussion of the five steps in the deception planning process.

## Current and Projected Friendly Situation

Write down the military objective the deception plan is intended to support. Look at available forces and operational plans of the basic plan. List friendly assumptions.

NOTE: To facilitate data gathering, the battlefield deception element officer in charge (OIC) or planner should be an integrated element of the planning staff.

## Current and Projected Enemy Situation

The following intelligence data must be gathered and provided by the intelligence officer:

- ° Objective data:

- How forces are deployed.
- Command and control procedures.
- Intelligence processing times.
- Order of battle.

- ° Subjective data:

- Doctrine
- Historical precedents.
- Basic beliefs.

- ° Assumptions about the enemy:

- Who the target is (decision maker).
- What the target expects us to do.
- The Target's current perceptions, based on what the target knows: open source information, compromised material, existing political and military environment, and basic beliefs and values.
- The target's current perceptions, based on what target does not know: uncompromised classified information, what your exact plans are, and third party reaction to situation.

- ° Based on the target's perceptions, a prediction of future enemy actions.

- ° A comparison of future friendly and enemy courses of action.

- ° A statement of the desired situation.

A typical example of a desired situation statement is: "To have outnumbered friendly forces cross one of two red controlled bridges while encountering minimal enemy defenses."

In formulating the deception objective, it is critical to know the time involved in running a deception operation. Figure 4-3 illustrates the deception time cycle. If after using this objective formulation checklist you determine that you don't have enough time, planning of this deception concept must stop. You must begin formulating an alternate deception objective.

## STEP 2 - DECEPTION OBJECTIVE FORMULATION

This is the most important element of the deception planning process. In developing the deception objective statement, it is important to understand the fundamental difference between it and a mission objective statement. A mission objective statement states what friendly forces are tasked to accomplish. A deception objective statement states the action or nonaction that the target must take to bring about the desired situation.

### Elements

The following are elements of a deception objective statement:

- ° Who will perform the act (a threat commander with the power to bring about our desired situation)?
- ° What act is to be performed?
- ° When will it be performed (when is the target to act or nonact? How long does this need to be maintained)?
- ° Where will it be performed (the geography of the deception)?
- ° Whom is the target to affect (not friendly forces)?

### Qualities

The following are qualities of a deception objective statement:

- ° Simple and concise.
- ° Requires considerable thought and effort to develop.
- ° Critical. If incorrectly identified, desired situation may not be attained.

### Example

A typical example of a deception objective statement is: "I want the enemy regimental commander to move his reserve forces from Hill 456 to Hill 123 NLT H-2."

### **TIME OF MAXIMUM DISADVANTAGE**

When should this occur: tomorrow, next week, or next month? Obviously the scope of the deception operation will be limited by the amount of time available for its planning and execution.

### **ENEMY FORCE EXECUTION**

How long will the enemy tactical forces need to perform the desired action? For example, if the deception objective is movement of an enemy squadron to some distant point, time must be allowed for appropriate enemy commanders to issue orders and for enemy forces to execute them.

### **ENEMY COMMANDER'S DECISION**

Is the enemy commander cautious or bold? Will he react to initial indicators, or will he demand extensive confirmation through other intelligence sources before reaching a decision? Once the decision is made, how long will he need to formulate and issue orders? Be sure to include an estimate of the time required by the enemy communications system to move the order to subordinate commanders.

### **THE ENEMY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM**

How much time should be allowed for the enemy to produce intelligence as a result of the deception efforts? How long will it take to convey this intelligence to the enemy commander? The key is the level at which the decision will be made. Certain types of information (such as, photographic intelligence) is frequently more readily available to senior headquarters. We must estimate the time required to move the information we are presenting to that particular enemy level we want to affect.

**Figure 4-3. Deception time cycle**

### **EXECUTION OF THE DECEPTION TASKS**

When should displays, demonstrations, or feints begin to be observed by the enemy intelligence system? How long should each last? Which unit or units will do what? Where will it be done? When and possibly how will it be done? Since you have not yet planned all your tasks (story and plan) at this point, you may have to estimate this now and adjust it later when those details are firm.

### **DISSEMINATION OF THE DECEPTION PLAN**

How long will it take to publish the deception plan? Usually of necessity, the details of a deception plan are close hold, and therefore, distributed to a limited number of people. This might imply the use of couriers, instead of electrical means to disseminate the plan. Consequently the planner should expect dissemination of the deception plan to be more time consuming than dissemination of a standard operations order and must allocate time accordingly.

### **PLANNING**

Having worked backwards to this point, anytime left between the time at which the plan must be disseminated and the present is available for planning. Prior deception training and contingency planning allow a unit to use this time for preparation of the deception plan.

**Figure 4-3. Deception time cycle ( continued)**

## Evaluation Criteria

The following are the evaluation criteria of a deception objective:

- ° Does the target action stated in the deception objective compare favorably to past target actions in similar circumstances?
- ° Does the stated target action correlate with the target's doctrine, tactics, and military goals?
- ° Does the target know enough, have enough time, and have the authority to take the action required in the objective?
- ° How closely does the stated target action match his prioritized goals? Again, the intelligence officer will have to help provide this assessment. Consider cost benefit to target in terms of his assets versus the military risk.
- ° Subjective judgment as to how closely the stated objective action correlates to real actions the target is likely to take based on the actual situation.
- ° Singleness of purpose: any action taken by the target will have more than one consequence for the deceiver. The more the consequences conform to the desired situation, the better the objective.

As the operations officer determines the possible courses of action, he passes them to the other staff officers. The intelligence officer refines the intelligence estimate in light of the courses of action and plans for support of deception operations.

Using information received from other staff members, personnel and logistic officers complete their estimates. They determine what major problems exist in providing the required support. They decide which of the proposed courses of action can be supported from a personnel and logistic viewpoint. The conduct of deception activities by logistic units can greatly increase the burden placed on CSS assets and personnel. Those planning the deceptions must know the limits of the CSS assets available, as well as the personnel and maintenance factors which might affect participation in the deception.

Meanwhile, the operations officer completes his operations estimate. The result will determine that course of action which offers the greatest probability of success. The operations officer coordinates with other staff members and considers any advantages or limitations developed as a result of their estimates. Then the recommendation developed in the operation estimate becomes the coordinated staff recommendation.

The operations officer normally presents the coordinated staff recommendation to the commander as a statement of the general scheme of maneuver to be adopted. The operations officer should comment on any significant problems and elaborate on the recommendation to ensure that the commander is fully informed.

#### Commander's Estimate

While staff members are completing their estimates, the commander is concurrently making his own. His estimate prepares him to receive and evaluate the staff recommendation and to make a decision.

When he receives the staff recommendation, the commander completes his estimate and states his decision. Even if the effectiveness of deception is beyond question, the cost of applying it should not be underestimated. Every attempt at deception costs in terms of manpower, time, equipment, training for specific skills required, and the logistic effort needed to support it. As the commander comes to a decision, he must realize the support required for the success of the deception effort, as well as the potential payoff.

#### Preparation of plans and orders

With the commander's decision for employment of the unit, the staff plans can be finalized. The staff must finalize all of the operational details by continuing to plan and prepare the orders necessary to implement the commander's decision.

At this point in the deception planning process, the deception objective can be finalized. Using the situation analysis for the particular course of action chosen, the desired deception perception can be completed. In conjunction with the mission order, the deception story and the deception plan can be completed.

#### STEP 3 - DESIRED PERCEPTION

In general, perceptions are based on an individual view of reality and the current situation, as well as a lifetime of experiences. One's perceptions of the world drive one's actions. However, truths consistent with one theory may also be consistent with other theories.

Desired perceptions are the view the target must hold to execute the action stated in the deception objective. A desired perception should present a threat or opportunity to the target. Desired perception statements have three elements:

- ° Who must hold the perception (usually the target)? In this regard, the target's view of reality or his perception is influenced by multiple sources of information.
- ° What is the perception about (normally a threat or an opportunity)?

- When must the deception be held, and for how long (normally driven by the deception objective)?

The following methods are used to generate desired perceptions:

- Historical precedents -- past enemy actions.
- Intelligence studies -- formal and informal studies of the target.
- Brainstorming -- the "know your enemy" approach.

The following questions must be considered when evaluating desired perception choices:

- Is it believable to the target?
  - Is it consistent with his military experience about the deceiver?  
Would our unit really do what the story portrays?
  - Is it consistent with his political ideology? Are we forcing him to act contrary to his political training?
  - Is it consistent with his cultural values? Are we leading him to an action that his basic culture will not allow?
- Does it present an opportunity for the target?
- Does it reduce or increase the threat to the enemy (perception)?
- Can we maintain the perception for the required amount of time?
- Will other operations compromise the deception, or support it?

A typical example of a deception perception is: "The enemy regimental commander must believe that when blue forces attack, they will mass and use bridge A to secure their primary objective--hill 123. He must believe this not later than 72 hours prior to commencement of blue offensive and must retain this belief until commencement of blue offensive."

#### STEP 4 - THE DECEPTION STORY

The deception story is that information conveyed to the target which will cause him to form a desired perception. It is coordinated between the operations officer and the intelligence officer. Points of coordination include--

- Current blue force profile.
- Enemy's current perception of our true operation.
- Which enemy level of command will take action on deception operations.

- ° Personalities of enemy commanders and intelligence officers.
- ° Determination of the deception story for both feasibility and believability.

Operations officer (G3/S3) plans the deception tasks. With assistance from the OPSEC staff element, he must--

- ° Maintain and update friendly force profiles.
- ° Identify friendly indicators that should be considered in deception planning.
- ° Recommend essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
- ° Recommend the deception story.

The intelligence officers (G2/S2)--

- ° Identifies enemy peculiarities or weaknesses that might make him susceptible to a deception operation.
- ° Identifies the enemy's likely reaction to the deception operation.
- ° Recommends to the operations officer which information needs to be fed to the enemy to make him believe the deception story.
- ° Recommends information requirements (IR) and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to verify whether the deception plan is working.

#### STEP 5 - DECEPTION PLAN

The deception plan will--

- ° Outline the methods selected for conveying the deception story to the enemy.
- ° Ensure all means are considered.
- ° Conform to normal SOPs.

Operations officer (G3/S3)--

- ° Decides and tasks those units which will accomplish the deception tasks.
- ° Develops an implementation plan to sequence the tasks (see Appendix C schedule for a sample plan).

- ° With assistance from the EW officer, develops electronic deception measures for the deception operation.
- ° Coordinates electronic deception measures with the C3 officer.
- ° Prepares the deception annex to plans and orders.
- ° Monitors and ensures execution of the deception plan.
- ° With assistance from the OPSEC staff element, develops OPSEC measures for the deception plan and the real plan.

Intelligence officer (G2/S2)--

- ° Recommends the means to project the story.
- ° In coordination with the CI analysis section and the all-source production section (ASPS), develops and maintains an enemy collection data base. The data base can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses in the enemy's collection capabilities. It can also be used to determine which means should be used.
- ° Recommends IR and PIR to check on and verify whether or not the deception story is working.

Logistic officer (G4/S4) --

- ° Prepares a logistic estimate for the commander analyzing logistic factors affecting the accomplishment of the overall operation and the deception operation.
- ° Provides the operations officer with advice concerning the feasibility of various friendly courses of action dealing with deception operations, as well as the burden that will be placed on logistic personnel and equipment.

Personnel officer (G1/S1)--

- ° Advises the operations officer on the availability of personnel resources to augment a chosen deception operation.
- ° Provides a personnel estimate with conclusions and recommendations based on mission tasking within the force.

APPROVAL OF PLANS OR ORDERS

After the OPLAN or OPORD is prepared in final form, it is presented to the commander for approval. This is omitted if the urgency of the situation so warrants, and if the commander has previously delegated the authority to have it prepared and issued without his personal approval.

## ISSUANCE OF PLANS OR ORDERS

After approval, the operations officer supervises the final preparation of the plan or order, authenticates copies, and ensures proper distribution if issued in written form. After the plan has been published, he will assist subordinate units in completing their plan and in rehearsing the plan. Instructions to subordinate units to execute the deception plan are contained in paragraph 3 of the basic OPLAN or OPORD and the appropriate functional annexes supporting it. As many deception instructions as practical should be included in functional annexes to the OPLAN or OPORD. This could ensure that deception is fully integrated into the planning for the actual operation. During deception operations, the operations officer must coordinate the functions of the subordinate units to ensure integrity of the deception story projection.

## SUPERVISION

It is important for the operations officer to supervise and look for flaws in the deception. Remembering that the desired result is for the enemy to see the deception and take action, he must ensure that the deception operation is implemented on schedule. He must make adjustments or changes as needed during the operation.

The intelligence officer monitors the execution of the deception plan. He ensures that the deception plan is working and that the enemy is not conducting a counterdeception operation. He must determine which enemy collection assets can or cannot collect the deception story. He recommends whether or not the deception operation should be continued, modified, or terminated.

Once a deception operation has been terminated, the results must be evaluated (see Appendix E for an evaluation checklist). Analyzing the success or failure of a deception operation will assist in the planning and execution of future operations. This also provides a further analysis of the friendly OPSEC posture.

In terminating a deception operation, care must be taken not to end it too soon, or unrealistically. Just as care and timing went into the buildup of the deception plan, all deception operations must have a plausible ending. They must terminate in a manner similar to the way it would in an actual operation.

## CHAPTER 5

### DECEPTION MEANS

To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds.

-- Mao Tse-Tung,  
1893-1976 on Distracted War

Deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques used to convey or deny information to the enemy (see JCS Pub 1). Deception requires providing false indicators to the enemy. If the supporting attack is to be portrayed as a main attack (a feint), the unit conducting the feint must give the enemy evidence that it is the main attack. The enemy collects his battlefield information through visual, olfactory, sonic, and electronic methods.

### VISUAL

Much of the enemy's intelligence is based on what is observed on the ground or seen in aerial photographs. Hence, effective visual deception is critical to the projection of the deception story. Visual evidence alone, however, will not deceive the enemy. It must be integrated with the projection of olfactory, sonic, and electronic deception, including the movement of units. The enemy's collection capability determines the necessary combination. Since the enemy cannot see the entire battlefield continuously, visual deception efforts must be targeted for specific collector's known to be used in that particular area. The enemy's collection activities should lead him to accept the deception action as our true intention.

### DUMMIES AND DECOYS

Two items commonly used in visual deception are dummies and decoys. A dummy is an imitation of something on the battlefield. A decoy is used to draw the enemy's attention away from a more important area. When a dummy is used to draw the enemy's attention away from some other area, it is also termed a decoy. It is not necessary to have specially manufactured equipment for use as dummies. If not extensively damaged, unserviceable or combat-loss items can be used. Also, dummies may be available from supply stocks, or they may be constructed locally using salvage. The distance from which the enemy observes friendly items or actions dictates what degree of realism is required.

Visual deception activity must present a realistic and complete picture. If you are simulating a fortification, an installation, or another activity, you must show significant items the enemy expects to see. For example, the deception activity must present personnel and vehicular movement. The enemy will expect to see tanks with gun tubes, certain types of silhouettes, and tracks on the ground. If dummy vehicles and equipment are used, then the type and number of tracks for the size unit we want to portray are necessary. It

is best to make them with real equipment. Evidence of troop occupancy must also be present. Trash and other debris should be scattered in the area if it is, in fact, characteristic of the unit portrayed. By comparing photographs taken at different times, the enemy can readily detect a lack of movement. Logical activity should be accomplished by movement of dummies or decoys, by operation of equipment, and if possible, by activity of some real troops to show evidence of occupancy. These activities must continue during both darkness and inclement weather.


### CAMOUFLAGE

Camouflage is an important element in deception operations. If we are going to project visual evidence of a deception story, the enemy must not observe evidence of our true operation. We hide, blend, or disguise to prevent the enemy from observing our real activities. However, when employing visual deception, we may camouflage all or part of a real or false military object to project the desired effect. We may intentionally camouflage something poorly so that he will observe what we want him to observe, or we may completely conceal a unit we do not want observed. In any type or size of deception, it is important that projection of visual evidence be consistent. When portraying a particular unit, the use of camouflage must be consistent with that unit's prior camouflage signature (see FM 5-20).

### SMOKE

Smoke always attracts attention, so the enemy will probably be watching when it is deployed. Smoke helps confuse the enemy, creating an element of surprise which the friendly commander can use to his advantage (see FM 3-50). (Figure 5-1 illustrates smoke deception.) Smoke supports deception operations in the following ways:

- ° Screening the site of an activity. When attacking, smoke could be used to conceal friendly units and individual weapon systems. This would enable the commander to maneuver behind a screen and deceive the enemy about his strength and position.
- ° Using smoke with decoys to simulate installations or situations and units or activities that normally employ military smoke. Using smoke decoys can be moved with less hazard to troops and less likelihood of the enemy identifying them. For example, factories and power plants normally produce smoke. Therefore, smoke must be used with decoy factories and power plants to add realism.
- ° Blinding enemy observers and reducing the effectiveness of enemy target acquisition means.
- ° Simulating damage. Bomb and fire damage are the types usually simulated. Simulated damage may cause the enemy to stop or lessen the number and force of his attacks on what he believes is a crippled installation. Smoke used in simulated damage may be effective on oil refineries, power plants, bridges, railroads, warehouses, and other large installations.



NOTE Smoke enhances the appearance of a deception. In this case, two tanks take on the visual appearance of a much larger force.

**Figure 5-1. Smoke deception**

- ° Simulating activity by screening a site where there is no actual activity.
- ° Simulating ground haze to make a small unit appear to be much larger, or simulating mist when visibility and the battlefield situation could unmask decoys.

### PEOPLE AND THINGS

Using previously prepared positions increases the realism of visual deception. Switching dummy and real items in and out of these positions may calm suspicion that the activity portrayed is a deception. It is especially important to switch real and false items if the deception must be projected for long periods of time.

### FALSE VERSUS REAL

If the enemy is to believe a deception activity is real, he must be able to see it. However, care must be taken to make sure that visibility of the deception activity is not too obvious, otherwise the enemy will not accept the projected deception as a real activity. While a deception activity is being projected, it is critical that real activities are concealed from the enemy's view.

### OLFACTORY

Olfactory deception is the projection of odor. The smells projected during a deception must be consistent with the visual, sonic, and electronic methods used. One factor affecting the use of olfactory measures is proximity to the enemy. The enemy must be close enough to friendly units to smell our simulated battlefield odors if the olfactory measure is to be useful. Planners must calculate how the weather will influence the effectiveness of methods. The olfactory methods used must complement the deception story. Some smells common to every military force are food, explosives, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL). Cooking smells can be used by an individual, a small patrol, or a larger unit to assist in adding credence to deception. Certain smells might suggest the size of a unit by indicating whether or not a dining facility is in operation. Smells can also assist in simulating small arms and artillery fire. Smells associated with vehicles such as diesel, gasoline, and oil may also be used to enhance the deception story.

### SONIC

Sonic deception is the projection of sounds to produce battlefield noises. It is directed against the enemy's sound-ranging gear and the human ear. What the enemy sees must be reinforced by what he hears. If a unit is being displayed to enemy surveillance, vehicle sounds and equipment noises should match those the enemy knows are used by the unit being projected. Devices used to portray the sonic picture may be real items or simulators. Real sounds should be blended with those reproduced artificially since a false

sound by itself will seldom be successful on the battlefield. Additionally, sounds used should originate from logical places the enemy will accept as occupied by the unit. Sounds must be compatible with their purported origins. For example, the enemy will doubt the sound of tanks in a dense swamp. Sonic methods must also coincide with visual measures being presented. In projecting the sound of a vehicle convoy, the sound must seem to come from the convoy depicted through visual methods. Obviously, the less effective the enemy's visual observation, the more effective the projection of sonic methods. The effectiveness of sonic methods is increased at night or when the point of origin is obscured by artificial means such as smoke. The range of sound signals depends on climatic conditions, vegetation, topography, temperature, and humidity. Although distances cannot be predicted; cool, humid, still atmosphere, and water surfaces carry sound best.

Sonic methods are also used to confuse and mislead the enemy. An individual with normal hearing can recognize several separate sounds that arrive simultaneously. However, an estimate of the distance from the source is usually unreliable. It is usually perceived that a sound rising in frequency is coming towards one and a sound lowering in frequency is moving away. Prepared recordings which manipulate frequency can mislead or confuse an enemy listening from a fixed location. In any case, sonic methods to be employed should be tested in surroundings similar to the deception area whenever possible. Deception must also attempt to prevent sounds that will give away the true operation. At night, strict enforcement of basic light and noise discipline is necessary. Padding may be used when the primary interest is concealment. The operations area may also be saturated with indicators. These can obscure the sounds of preparation of movement associated with the true operational intent.


### ELECTRONIC

Electronic deception materials and equipment are used to manipulate, falsify, and distort enemy sensors. Several highly useful techniques can help the tactical commander portray the false. These include--

- ° Manipulative electronic deception (MED).
- ° Simulative electronic deception (SED).
- ° Imitative electronic deception (IED).

Electronic deception operations must be conducted in such a manner that realistic signatures are replicated. Electronic deception operations are often conducted as part of a larger operation. Personnel conducting electronic deception should be specially trained and skilled to ensure that all electronic signatures are orchestrated with other deception events to provide overall fidelity (see Figure 5-2). Deception planners must remember that what the enemy collects electronically must agree with what he has seen, heard, and smelled.

When electronic deception is employed, it is crucial that these deception efforts are specifically targeted to the threat. This ensures that what is



NOTE. This deception scenario depicts the use of electronic, physical, and sonic deception techniques. The feint suggests a frontal attack north of the road. A tank and an APC portray a small physical signature. However, when coupled with loudspeakers and recording equipment to broadcast recorded tank and APC noise, the tree line to hide in, and MED equipment, the tank and the APC indicate a much larger force. Thus, the enemy is fed false intelligence.

**Figure 5-2. Deception scenario**

being portrayed by specific electronic means can be gathered by enemy collection efforts. For example, all electronic deception should be targeted against the known capabilities of the enemy collection threat.

Electronic deception involves actions associated with friendly electromagnetic radiations, MED, SED, and IED (in accordance with AR 525-25).

#### MANIPULATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

MED involves changing the electromagnetic profile of friendly forces.  
MED--

- Combats enemy EW and signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities.
- Manipulates friendly forces electromagnetic emissions by modifying technical characteristics and profiles.
- Denies or deceives the enemy as to friendly intentions.

MED is performed in two basic forms: manipulative communications deception (MCD) and manipulative noncommunications deception (MNCD).

#### Manipulative Communications Deception

MCD requires a thorough knowledge of the friendly forces' communications signature over extended times and in various combat operations and conditions. MCD techniques include--

- False traffic levels.
- False peaks in communications.
- Traffic padding.
- Routing.
- Electronic cover.
- Controlled breaches of security.

#### Manipulative Noncommunications Deception

MNCD is applied by using the same principles as MCD, but differs from MCD by the equipment used. Noncommunications emitters, versus communications emitters, are used. Activity of the noncommunications emitter is increased or decreased to indicate a difference in the activity of a unit.

#### SIMULATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

SED is used to mislead the enemy as to actual composition, deployment, and capabilities of friendly forces. SED--

- ° Simulates nonexistent units or capabilities at false locations.
- ° Simulates communications and noncommunications emitters.
- ° Is used for unit, new or different equipment, and false location simulation.

### IMITATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

IED is conducted against both communications and noncommunications collection efforts. This is accomplished through imitative communications deception (ICD) and imitative noncommunications deception (INCD).

#### Imitative Communications Deception

ICD injects false and misleading information directly into enemy communications networks by gaining admission as a bonafide station within the enemy communications system. ICD--

- ° Must not create its own unique signature.
- ° Is based on the sensitivity of intelligence and the sophistication of techniques and equipment used. It includes nuisance, planned message and cryptographic intrusion, and deception jamming.

#### Imitative Noncommunications Deception

INCD is conducted for the same purpose as ICD but involves the introduction of radiations into the enemy's electronic noncommunications systems to imitate their emissions and to confuse and deceive. It is primarily directed toward target acquisition, surveillance, and electronic reconnaissance systems. INCD--

- ° Produces specific signatures for each class of system.
- ° Requires knowledge of enemy noncommunications systems characteristics.
- ° Can provide false target generation or spoofing.

During the planning phase of electronic deception the following must be considered. Personnel trained for various types of electronic deception must be identified and available. Enemy vulnerability to electronic deception and electronic signature portrayal must be realistic and must include--

- ° Proper output per type of equipment portrayal.
- ° Realistic net structure portrayal.
- ° Traffic volumes that match norms for the type of operation being portrayed.
- ° Unique characteristics of unit.

- ° Portrayal of secure and unsecure communications.
- ° Representations of proper echelons of command and control.

Electronic deception is discussed indepth in FM 90-2A.

### RESOURCES

The resources available for deception operations are limited only by operational need and the imagination of the deception planner. Actual equipment and units, field expedient use of raw materials, salvaged or unserviceable equipment, and specialized deception devices can and should all be used by deception planners to achieve an effective product.

Both corps and division have battlefield deception elements operating under the staff supervision of the G3. The elements are comprised of school trained battlefield deception specialists in the areas of plans and operations, communications signature, physical signature, and electronic signature sections or teams. These sections or teams are responsible for the planning and execution of deception tasks and events in support of the commander's deception objective.

### TIME

The required duration of deception efforts is an important planning consideration. Sufficient time must be available for the enemy to act or react in a desired manner to the deception story. It is undesirable to devise an elaborate deception plan if the enemy does not have sufficient time to read it and take actions which complement friendly intentions. If the period during which the deception must be maintained is shorter than the period of sensor reaction--that is, the time required for the sensor to provide data to the enemy tactical decision maker--then that specific sensor or channel of information need not be deceived. In addition, certain threat systems can be deceived for only short durations. However, the longer the required deception effort, the greater the chances of exposure. The timing of your plan should prevent the enemy from effectively shifting his center of gravity to counter your main effort once your deception is finally uncovered.

### DEVICES

Specialized deception devices include--

- ° SED devices which are used to electronically simulate radio frequency (RF) output or net configuration of a simulated unit.
- ° Multispectral close combat decoy (MCCD) and multispectral decoy (MSD) devices which simulate both physical and infrared signatures of selected modified table of equipment (MTOE) vehicles.
- ° Fixed target indicators (FTI) and moving target indicators (MTI) which provide the radar signature of a stationary or moving vehicle.

These devices will significantly enhance the believability of deception operations. They can provide deceptive signatures without sacrificing the equipment necessary to conduct support operations.

#### PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

The degree of success achieved by a decoy unit or facility depends on small, seemingly unimportant details typically associated with the portrayed unit or activity. These are difficult, or even impossible, to duplicate by deception personnel and devices alone.

In order for the majority of deception operations to succeed, augmentation of equipment and personnel will be required to--

- ° Provide a complete signature (that is, physical activity and movement around the deception activity).
- ° Assist in erecting display equipment.
- ° Provide indications of normal support activities that would be associated with the deception activity (such as, ration runs, vehicular movement, or ground activity).

While equipment decoys are realistic from certain distances and angles, their quality can never completely substitute for signatures produced by the real thing. Additionally, the quantity of deception equipment may not be sufficient to provide a realistic display. The use of real equipment, even if it is not operational, should be considered for use in support of every deception operation.

#### MATERIEL

Materiel assets for the deception operation may be divided into two parts: those that help us hide the real, and those that help us portray the false.

##### Hiding the Real

At the core of any successful deception is OPSEC--hiding the real situation from enemy sensors. These sensors range from a reconnaissance patrol leader with binoculars to space platforms. The most commonly used techniques and materials to prevent threat detection are--

- ° Camouflage.
- ° Suppressive and absorptive screens.
- ° Smoke.
- ° Shielding and/or masking various types of emitters.
- ° Using terrain to mask units and movements.

- ° Signal security (SIGSEC) procedures.
- ° Electronic warfare.

The enemy's sensor capabilities and our exposure time determine the level of OPSEC necessary to successfully hide our real situation and portray the false with deception. For example, tactical deception against a Third World army would be far simpler than against the Soviet Union which is capable of fielding a significant array of sensors. Soviet sensor technology is certain to expose off-the-cuff deception efforts for what they are. Today's tactical deception must be capable of fooling such high-tech intelligence as--

- ° High resolution photo satellites.
- ° Unmanned air vehicles (UAV).
- ° MTI stand-off radars.
- ° Tactical air reconnaissance.
- ° Radar and radio locators.
- ° Magnetic, sonic, and heat sensors.
- ° Imaging radars.
- ° Infrared.

#### Portraying the False

The most common methods of portraying the false for tactical units may be divided into two categories: visual and electronic.

Time of exposure will have a great effect on how we plan visual deception. A low level air attack has little time to determine if a tank decoy is real or false. Nevertheless, that same tank decoy would not likely fool infrared photo interpreters, unless it contained an infrared generator to fool that sensor system. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Israelis found that simple visual decoys were sufficient to draw the fire of attacking enemy fighter aircraft. US air defense, radar, and artillery assets are priority enemy targets and are vulnerable to air attack. For these reasons, these systems represent an excellent use of decoys. Decoys of various vehicles and equipment have been designed and used in the past. Designs have ranged from fold-ups, inflatables, and bolt-ons; materials have included plastic, styrofoam, and fiberglass.

It should be apparent that the level of sophistication of deception equipment and techniques have far surpassed the canvas and baling wire approach of decoys and dummies that were used in World War II. Ad hoc efforts to deceive the enemy simply won't work on today's battlefield. Our deception devices and techniques must be able to fool an array of sophisticated enemy sensor technology. Our deception efforts must be believable. They must be

afforded the same secrecy and security as real items. After World War II, Allied pilots enjoyed telling the story of a decoy airstrip that the Germans were painstakingly constructing entirely of wood. They made wooden aircraft, hangers, fuel points, and gun emplacements. The Germans, however, were lax in their security and camouflage during construction and Allied photo experts were able to identify the ruse. On the day after the construction was finally completed, a lone RAF bomber swung in low, circled the airfield once, and dropped one large wooden bomb.

### TECHNIQUES

Four types of deception techniques are used to present the deception story: feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays.

#### FEINTS


The most familiar deception ploy is the feint. Feints are offensive in nature and require engagement with the enemy in order to give the appearance of a realistic main attack (see Figure 5-3).

The feint is a limited-objective attack, varying in size from a raid to a supporting attack. It should contribute to the overall accomplishment of the mission and mislead the enemy. A supporting attack is a feint when it is presented to the enemy as a main effort. A supporting attack is usually conducted during an offensive operation. When a supported attack is projected to the enemy as part of a deception story, it is also a feint.

Feints have been used successfully for several purposes, including causing the enemy decision maker to--

- ° Employ his second-echelon forces improperly. A feint may cause these forces to move away from the main attack toward the feint, or a feint may be used to hold the enemy's second echelon force where it is.
- ° Shift his supporting fires from the main attack. A feint conducted within range of the enemy weapons supporting the defensive position where a friendly main attack will be directed may cause dilution of fire support.
- ° Reveal his defensive fires. A feint may cause premature firing, revealing enemy defensive weapons. The enemy may be forced into defending against aggressive action taken by forces conducting the feint. The attacker may cause enemy weapons to fire by making a feint before and during a main attack and within range of the enemy's weapons.

A feint might not always be the principal deception. A series of recurring feints, rather than a single event, might be used. For example, frequent raids may harass the enemy to the extent that he becomes confused and, to some degree, careless. He may become so accustomed to a certain pattern of activity that he will take little or no action when the friendly main attack actually occurs. He may consider it merely another harassing action.



**Figure 5-3. A feint**

Where does a feint take place? Obviously, the feint must fit the deception story. Looking at the terrain and battlefield dispositions, the commander or staff planner considers--

- ° That the area of interest to the enemy, since he may not react as desired to the threat, is of little value to him.
- ° That the enemy may displace his force if the threatened area is beyond the range of his currently emplaced weapons.
- ° That the area of the feint should be at sufficient distance to preclude interference with the true operation.
- ° Areas proposed during the initial analysis for a main attack, but later rejected, are often suitable for a feint.

When does a feint take place? Feints may be conducted before or during the true operation. Therefore, the true operation must be considered in determining the time for the feint. Of course, timing is also influenced by the estimated time necessary for the enemy commander to react in the desired manner.

A feint before a main attack usually requires carefully determined lead time. The feint may be intended to--

- ° Induce the enemy to move his second-echelon forces from the area of the main attack.

- ° Maintain his current troop posture.
- ° Attack his supporting fires so that supporting weapons may be located.
- ° Confuse him by frequent harassment.

The precise time a feint takes place will vary depending on the commander's intent. For example, moving additional forces will require more time than shifting fires. Therefore, when the intent is to move the second echelon forces, the feint has to be initiated well ahead of the main effort.

A feint conducted simultaneously with the main attack may cause the enemy to divert his attention and possibly a portion of his forces and supporting fires.

A feint conducted after the main attack is launched can hold the enemy's uncommitted forces in its present location. Faced with a new threat, the enemy becomes uncertain about the location of the main effort.

The commander or staff planner also considers the pattern of previous operations. If, for example, friendly forces have been in the habit of making attacks 2 hours before daylight, it may be desirable to conduct a feint at this time.

Although the timing of a feint is influenced by these factors, the time a true operation would most likely succeed is the main consideration.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE:** A feint before the main attack took place in the first of two major battles which stopped Rommel's Afrika Korps in the fall of 1942. During the battle of Alam Halfa, General Montgomery ordered XIII Corps to attack to close the gaps through which the Germans entered the British positions in the southern portion of the battle area. The tactical purpose of XIII Corps' feint was to cause the enemy forces, especially the German 21st Panzer Division and the Italian Ariete Division, to remain in the south since Montgomery's master plan for El Alemein directed that the British main attack be made in the north.

#### DEMONSTRATIONS

Another deception task is the demonstration. This is a show of force on the battlefield where a decision is not sought. It is similar to a feint with one exception: No contact with the enemy is intended. A demonstration may be conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding him into an unfavorable course of action.

While the demonstration has certain advantages over the feint, it lacks the realism of the feint attack.

The advantages of a demonstration are--

- ° Absence of physical contact with the enemy facilitates subsequent employment of the demonstration force elsewhere.

- ° A full force is not always necessary because no contact is made with the enemy.
- ° It permits the use of simulation devices, when available, in place of real items to deceive the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities.

The disadvantages of a demonstration are--

- ° It is more difficult to portray the deception story convincingly without contact with the enemy.
- ° It is more likely that a demonstration will be identified as a deception earlier in the operation than a feint would be.


A demonstration can be used successfully when, during the projection of the deception story, there is a time and distance to the terrain factor that makes the lack of contact realistic. In essence, a demonstration attempts to gain enemy response in an area where a friendly force is exhibited; but as the enemy reacts, the friendly force withdraws without engagement.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE:** A demonstration is illustrated by the amphibious attack on Okinawa in April 1945 (see Figure 5-4). The operation plan called for 10th Army to make a two-corps attack on the west side of the island with the III Marine Amphibious Corps (two divisions) and the XXIV Army Corps (two divisions). To cause the Japanese commander to withdraw some of his forces from the area of the real attack, a demonstration was staged on the southeast coast of the island. The 2d Marine Division embarked on ships and loaded into landing craft offshore from the town of Minetoga, as if preparing to land. The demonstration was repeated the following day. Upon completion of the demonstration, the division reembarked and returned to the area of the landing beaches where they reverted to Army reserve. Eventually, the division was landed in the area of fighting. The Japanese commander's estimate is not known; however, the true operation reached initial objectives 8 to 10 days earlier than expected.

## RUSES

Ruses are tricks designed to deceive the enemy to obtain an advantage. They are characterized by deliberately exposing false information to enemy collection means. Ruses range from simple tactical tricks employed by individual soldiers to strategic actions employed by nations. The following examples may evoke new methods of employing old tricks:

A ruse practiced by the Soviets in World War II was to travel parallel to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) when moving into the attack position. During this movement, if they were observed, they would reverse their direction. This made it difficult for the defender to determine where the attack was to come or where the actual concentration of forces was taking place.



**Figure 5-4. Demonstration example**

To distort the enemy's estimate of our capabilities, we can look to Rommel for devising a successful ruse. He disguised Volkswagens to look like tanks and intermixed them with real armored units. This led the British to think he was stronger in tanks than he was.

A simple but sometimes effective ruse used by the Japanese during World War II was to learn the names of US platoon leaders. Then, when attacking US positions they would call out the name of the platoon leader in perfect English, telling him to withdraw his platoon because the remainder of the unit was withdrawing.

#### DISPLAYS

A unit can be tasked to conduct a display as a projection of the deception story. To do this, the unit presents a static production to the enemy surveillance system. In the course of a display, the unit may use simulations, disguises, portrayals, or any combination thereof.

#### Simulations

In a simulation, objects or systems that actually do not exist are projected onto the battlefield. These projections have varying requirements for authenticity, depending on the proximity of anticipated enemy observation, detection equipment employed by the enemy, and the amount of camouflage used.

Ammunition and supply dumps, motor pools, airfields, air defense and field artillery emplacement, missile locations, bridges, and field fortifications have been simulated successfully.

Simulations are also useful when the deception objective calls for enemy fire. The simulation may deliberately violate one or more of the principles of camouflage, revealing the object to enemy engagement. The real object, if there is one, remains concealed.

In other instances, it may be useful to set up salvaged or fabricated decoy equipment and prepare weapons positions, deliberately exposing their phoniness. Once these positions have been dismissed as decoys by the enemy, they can be occupied as real positions (see Figure 5-5).

### Disguises

A disguise involves altering an object to make it look like something else. Since many military objects or installations are extremely difficult to conceal completely, it may be easier and more desirable to disguise their appearance.

Disguise can also make high value targets (HVTs) appear to be of little or no value. For example, tanks, artillery, missile transporters, and gasoline trucks may be disguised to appear as large cargo trucks; railroad tank cars may be disguised as empty boxcars or coal cars.


### Portrayals

A portrayal presents to the enemy a unit which does not exist or is a different type than actually does exist. For example, elements of a cavalry unit might be used to portray an armor unit. Units associated with a particular activity or echelon can be used to enhance a deception operation designed to portray false friendly order of battle to enemy analysts. For example, the presence of elements of a combat support unit that doctrinally support an armor unit can lend credibility to a deception story that portrays an armor unit in a particular area. While a portrayal is considered an act in itself, it usually includes the use of disguises and simulations.


The following situation shows the relationship between the deception, objective, story, and techniques. The objective is to cause the enemy to move part of his reserve from the zone of the brigade making the main attack. The story is that the main attack will be made by the brigade in the south.

The commander, using knowledge developed during analysis, selects the technique on which his deception will be built. He then adds additional tasks to complete and support the presentation of the story.

In the case of our sketch map situation (see Figure 5-6), the phony attack in the south is a feint. There will be displays to provide the enemy with indicators of logistic buildup and MCD to indicate increased communication activity in the zone (such as ruses and demonstrations in the form of increased combat reconnaissance).



**Figure 5-5. Simulation through the use of decoys**



Instructions include steps to hide the preparation for the initial actions of the unit's true operation. In other words, the information denial requirements depend heavily on the commander's ability to visualize the battlefield and select those activities that would provide indications of the true operation.

Remember that there are many things going on in the battle area that do not appreciably change, regardless of the tactical course of action being followed. Therefore, those specific activities that can reveal the true operation must be identified as critical by the commander and staff. The commander must task participating units to those critical activities. So, in effect there are two aspects of deception that must be brought together in instructions or orders: that which we want the enemy to perceive and that which we must hide.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLE:** In September 1944, the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Reinforced) occupied a 23-mile front on the left flank of XX (US) Corps on the Metz Front. This squadron portrayed an armored division for a period of several weeks, and was so successful that the German order of battle maps showed the 14th (US) Armored Division to be in the area. At the time, however, the 14th Armored Division was not in Europe.

## CHAPTER 6

### DECEPTION IN OPERATIONS

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.

-- Sun Tzu

Deception should be used selectively. It is unwise to attempt a deception with every operation. The opportunity for success must exist for deception to work. This opportunity will not be manifested in every situation. The opportunity must justify the resources that are expended in a detailed deception effort. Further, blanket use of deception may degrade deception emphasis among friendly forces. This may lead to stereotyped planning and execution. Still, the opportunity for a successful deception operation can appear during the conduct of virtually all types of military operations. This chapter presents techniques and considerations to confuse and mislead an enemy force. These deception techniques are grouped under specific operations (offense, defense, and so forth). However, the groupings are not restrictive. Imaginative planners can and should adapt these techniques to other operational postures.

### OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

In the offense, the commander must mobilize and deploy his forces while retaining security. Thus, he can avoid sacrificing surprise or drawing a pre-emptive attack. Tightened security is usually maintained while planning a surprise attack. However, OPSEC alone cannot conceal large-scale operations.

Specific warning signals almost inevitably filter through the security screen. As the attacker's preparations unfold, drawing more people into planning or movement, material indicators increase in frequency and specificity. The more technologically sophisticated the forces, the more susceptible they are to detection.

Deception is used in the offense to help achieve the element of surprise and by doing so, greatly enhance your offensive capability.

An important consideration in battlefield deception is that you must be able to exercise some influence over the battlefield. You need to influence through some offensive action the development of the battle and not merely react to the enemy's offensive initiative. Showing the enemy physical evidence of a particular intention is the most convincing way to sell the deception story. The ability to exercise some offensive initiative significantly increases your deception options. Offensive operations, then, are ideally suited for the planning and execution of a wide variety of deception operations.

To be most effective, your deception should be employed in an environment in which you have more options available to you than the enemy has forces to cover in strength. If he can effectively defend against all avenues of approach, then deceiving him as to your choice becomes much less significant. As your influence over the battlefield begins to increase, your options and, therefore, your opportunity for deception begin to increase. As the enemy's influence begins to diminish, his intelligence collection capability becomes more and more degraded by your increasing control of the battlefield. Consequently, his ability to assess your capabilities and probable intentions shifts to an environment of relative uncertainty. The opportunities for deception continue to increase. The enemy is required to make more and more tactical decisions based on the remaining, often uncorroborated, intelligence.

Conversely, as the enemy begins to lose his active intelligence collection capability, his ability to detect your deception story becomes progressively more difficult.

Established procedures make combat operations easier to conduct. But they also enable the enemy to anticipate our moves. These procedures result in distinct patterns, and our offensive patterns are well known. Many commanders have greatly enhanced their offensive capabilities by applying deceptive variations to these patterns.

NOTE: If in studying your unit's battlefield history, you find a stereotyped pattern, use it for deception. Feed the stereotype to the enemy's collections effort while you do something else, somewhere else.

The following are examples of deception techniques for offensive operations; but they also apply to other maneuvers.

#### NIGHT MOVEMENT

Prior to the attack, forces must be concealed. Prior to the arrival of the main force in any offensive situation, consider--

- ° Night movements.
- ° Closely controlled traffic.
- ° Preparation of all positions, including camouflage.

#### DECOYS

Planning should include the provision of something for the enemy intelligence system to find (such as a decoy force). Planning should allow for visual and sonic detection. In addition, sufficient electromagnetic and inflated emitters should be used. This provides indicators of the size force being simulated. (For a detailed discussion of the use of decoys, see Appendix D).

## BOMBARDMENT

When preparing for an attack, place preparation fires and aerial bombardments at the usual or higher degree of intensity at those avenues parallel to the main route of advance. This will confuse and deceive the enemy as to the true intent of your attacking force.

## DUMMY REPLACEMENTS

Moving artillery into supporting positions and purposely revealing other signs of preparing for an operation can deceive the enemy into believing we are planning an operation in an area where we are not. The enemy's attention is drawn to this area and his activity indicates his interest or concern. We can, under cover of darkness or reduced visibility, reposition the majority of our artillery pieces. The units move directly into preselected and camouflaged positions. Our repositioning actions must not alert the enemy to our true intentions; therefore, activity at the deception site remains as previously displayed and witnessed by the enemy. Decoys replace withdrawn equipment. By using flash simulators or explosive charges along with some real pieces left in position, the enemy continues to believe we are preparing for an attack in the area.

## NORMAL PROCEDURES

Intensifying patrol and reconnaissance activities in areas other than those of the main attack will also confuse the enemy. However, your activities should not vary with normal procedures to the extent that you reveal that you are engaged in deception.

Frequent raids or strong feints may harass the enemy to the extent that he becomes confused and, possibly, careless. He may become accustomed to our pattern of activity and not detect the main attack launch. He may think it is another harassing action.

Building on the enemy's preconceptions, Allenby did exactly this at the Battle of Megiddo in 1918. He reasoned that his name had become linked by the Germans and Turks with a cavalry thrust against their desert flank. Accordingly, his deception operations were designed to reinforce this notion. But, of course, he attacked elsewhere.

For most offensive situations, such as an attack on a river line, we have set procedures on how to conduct the operation. For example, we will--

- ° Secure the river line.
- ° Rehearse the troops.
- ° Bring up river crossing equipment.
- ° Conduct reconnaissance of the enemy's side.
- ° Begin artillery operations and air strikes.

If the attacker effectively portrays these kinds of activity at one or more plausible locations away from the intended crossing sites, he will have greatly increased his potential for surprise and success.

A method successfully used by commanders has been to attack over an avenue of approach other than what is considered to be the most plausible or best. The Soviets in World War II would prepare for an attack in a position that was on a plausible (if not best) avenue of approach. This would focus attention away from the real position. They would then move great distances under cover of darkness to arrive at the actual area of offensive operations.

Commanders often disregard the possibility of conducting operations along what they believe to be the unacceptable avenue of attack. Some commanders however, have demonstrated they could overcome a superior force by doing what is believed to be unsound. As Napoleon said: "An army can always pass in any season wherever two men can plant their feet." General MacArthur demonstrated the soundness of using the unacceptable avenue of approach when he made the Inchon Landing in September of 1950.

### DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Deception is used in defense to conceal the true locations of our forces in the battle area and to mislead the enemy. By concealing our real location we minimize losses. We cause the enemy to expend fire power and intelligence efforts unprofitably. By misleading the enemy, we can cause him to attack or deploy unwisely.

The deception plan for the defense ranges from decentralized efforts by each unit to a carefully coordinated master plan designed to cause the enemy large-unit commander to attack or deploy in an unfavorable manner.

Regardless of how targets are first detected, the enemy will normally confirm them by photographs or direct observation. Also, most air strikes and artillery registrations will be based on final visual adjustments. Creating false targets to cause the enemy to waste reconnaissance efforts and firepower is a concurrent, coordinated activity during all phases of the defense.

In the defense, inertia is truly the ally of deception. If, for instance, the enemy has decided on one course of action, it is easier to convince him to continue that course rather than alter his plans or tactics. Offensive operations are characterized by deliberate planning and speed of execution. A successful deception operation conducted by a defender can result in the inappropriate deployment of attacking enemy forces. The far easier task of maintaining that deception can result in the continued commitment of enemy forces at a time and location least advantageous to them.

### AVOID PATTERNS

As in the offense, our defensive patterns are also well known. Beginning with reconnaissance, we take a look at the entire area and then concentrate on

those locales selected for occupation and use. Activity becomes more and more concentrated. It culminates with troops arriving, digging in, clearing fields of fire, and finally, camouflaging positions.

If we intend to deceive the enemy or to deny him information about our activities, we must alter this pattern. We should follow our established procedures in those areas not intended for actual defense. We should avoid them to the extent possible in the real battle position. This way we can mislead the enemy into expending his efforts needlessly.

#### DECEPTIVE POSITIONING OF FORCES

Using a map, the normal distribution of command posts (CP), logistic installations, and unit positions in a defense can be plotted with reasonable accuracy.

An enemy intelligence analyst can do the same. In a conflict where the enemy has effective support and uses artillery and missiles extensively, placing forces in logical or ideal positions will probably negate even the best camouflage efforts. You should consider placing installations in unsuspected areas and troops on less obvious terrain. You must determine if you can do so and still accomplish your mission. After forces are positioned and preparations for the defense have begun, other logical, unoccupied positions should be selected which will allow detection. Leaving some soil scattered about indicates continuous use. Some troops should be present to provide visible activity in the area.

At the true defensive position, the opposite approach is taken. Units must dig in and camouflage positions to protect against ground and air observation. This should be done even if their location is behind the line of contact. High-level air photography does not respect distance. An attacking enemy is interested in the preparation of defensive positions in depth on the battlefield.

Totally effective camouflage serves no purpose if the enemy has photographed earlier careless actions. The detection of just one pile of fresh earth can draw detailed attention. Conversely, those areas where there are no troops should be considered for the intentional display of such attention-getters. This is especially true if the unit has a poor history of maintaining OPSEC disciplines.

#### CONCEALED ARTILLERY POSITIONS

The skillful concealment of artillery can add greatly to the element of surprise; thus, to the success of the defense. Enemy observers are trained to search for indications of artillery and missile units. These include--

- ° Imperfectly camouflaged weapon positions.
- ° Blast areas.

- ° Litter.
- ° Foot paths or wheel tracks.
- ° Large scraped or cleared areas (in the case of missile sites).

Artillery positions should be prepared prior to unit arrival. They should be occupied during periods of reduced visibility. Concealment can be enhanced by moving artillery into positions, not as a unit, but by weapon echelon. In battery positions, guns should be dispersed at irregular intervals. To avoid making tracks, consider setting weapons next to a road. Surveillance equipment and fire control centers should also be camouflaged. The electromagnetic signatures of artillery units are extensive; therefore, efforts must be made to reduce them while those signatures are replicated elsewhere.

### DECEPTIVE POSITIONS

Decoys are extremely important in deception planning. Two dimensional or three dimensional decoys may be available. If not, the commander can use such locally available items as telephone and fence poles, posts, logs, ammunition cylinders, or other objects to fabricate decoy devices. A log sticking out of a pile of brush can draw a lot of attention and artillery fire. The use of detonation cord and smoke simulators may be helpful. Placing a section of weapons in a display area can distort the enemy's picture of our dispositions. This can lead to the fruitless expenditure of his resources. The simulation of missile sites, with their associated electronic equipment, is difficult. However, dividends can be great.

One of the most effective decoys for deceptive artillery, air defense, or missile activity is a damaged or salvaged item. For added realism, use real weapons with the decoys. When a real piece is fired, activate a flash device by the decoy. Periodically rotate the real equipment and the decoys to further enhance the deception. A substantial portion of the enemy's available air strikes and artillery or missile fire might be directed unprofitably by using weapon firing or activity simulation.

Another method of adding realism to an artillery decoy is using the decoy position as an offset registration position or as a roving gun position.

### TRACKS

Vehicle tracks are a special concern when using deception in defensive operations. From reconnaissance activities through troop arrival, detailed consideration must be given to the tracks typically created by personnel and vehicles. A track plan should be developed to take advantage of existing roads and overhead cover. It should include paralleling hedge rows and fence lines to conceal movement. Enemy air photos compared on consecutive days will pinpoint unit locations if tracks are not concealed. Where tracks are unavoidable, they should continue past the true destination to a logical but unused termination area.

Areas that are not actually occupied by defensive forces or installations should display appropriate vehicular tracks. A careful selection of these areas, accompanied by the display of decoys, may draw a substantial number of air strikes and artillery rounds. Using troops during daylight hours and adding new tracks and other observable signs can reveal the display.

The following ideas are offered with defense in mind, but variations may be adapted to other tactical postures:

- ° The size of the force in any area can be concealed by having all units use the same shoulder patch, bumper markings, and CP signs.
- ° Dummy haystacks over CPs or weapon positions; dummy peasant huts or grass shacks hiding bunkers; ammunition stacked up to represent the general mass of a masonry wall. All can be effective under the proper circumstances.
- ° The number of troops occupying a position could be notionally increased by using helmets, dummy positions, and dummy weapons.
- ° In decoy areas, exaggerate the effect of enemy artillery or air strikes with gasoline, smoke bombs, fires, and explosions.
- ° Change all traffic signs in the defensive area to confuse rapidly moving attack forces. (Of course, your own personnel must be able to read a map.)
- ° Tape record conversations between supporting aircraft pilots and ground personnel. Then, during the enemy's preparation for the attack, if air support is not available to you, play a tape over the radio indicating air support is on the way.

#### RETROGRADE AND OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Deception is necessary to reduce the inherent vulnerability of a unit during movement to the rear. Deception should be used to help maintain secrecy during the movement and to aid in achieving surprise in unit redistribution.

#### RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

A retrograding force can inflict heavy punishment and cause considerable delay to the enemy through the proper use of deception. The commander should take maximum advantage of darkness and other conditions of reduced visibility. Any daylight activities that might disclose the intention to withdraw, such as abnormal vehicular movement to the rear, are prohibited. Necessary daylight motor movements, including reconnaissance, are made by infiltration. Also, units must ensure that noise does not betray the withdrawal. Delay operations, enhanced through the use of deception, can provide maximum loss of enemy personnel and equipment with the minimum use of friendly resources.

Dummy minefields can be used very effectively in the retrograde to slow and canalize the enemy attack or cause the enemy to mass his forces. Dummy minefields might consist only of mine field markings and a few mines along the edges to add realism. Another possibility is to establish fake minefields, but to plant real mines in possible bypasses. Dummy minefields are most effective when mixed with real ones throughout the battlefield.

CAUTION: The emplacement of dummy minefields requires the same authorization, recording, and reporting procedures as the type minefield it is designed to replicate.

Delaying positions can be established on other than the most likely defensive position. When the enemy attacks the anticipated positions, he can be taken under fire from elsewhere. This deception can be greatly improved by establishing decoys in the notional area and camouflaging real positions.

Planning for retrograde includes coordination of EW activities to assist in the deception aspects. For example, prior to the retrograde, the unit could establish a pattern of countersurveillance jamming by time periods. Use daily times when electronically detectable equipment is to be withdrawn on D-day (for example, tanks and heavy vehicles). The pattern should be established far enough in advance of D-Day so the enemy does not place special significance on activation of the jammers at the time of withdrawal. The pattern of friendly electronic surveillance devices should establish that only a portion of the total friendly capability operates at one time. Thus, the absence of the surveillance positions withdrawn initially will not reveal the overall retrograde.

Consideration may be given to having some of the forward area personnel possess fake operation orders or maps. If an opportunity arises, they may be able to leave them for the enemy to find. Remember, it will be the circumstances surrounding the discovery of planted orders or maps that, ultimately, will determine the degree of success of this type of ruse.

Consideration may also be given to the initiation of preparations for an attack when a unit is actually performing a retrograde operation. Allow movement forward to the initial delay positions only during daylight hours. Permit daylight movement to the rear only through infiltration on resupply convoys, in helicopters, or on foot. Employ communication deception, sonic deception, and decoys.

A deception story of an attack, while a unit is actually in retrograde, requires a situation where a deception story of attack is appropriate and plausible. Also, it must be within the enemy's estimate of our capability.

#### RELIEF IN PLACE

Security is the key to a successful relief in place. A properly executed deception will enhance the opportunity for success. Usually the deception story will portray the occupying unit remaining in place.

The appearance of normal activity in the area of operations is maintained during the relief. The incoming unit assumes the normal patterns of harassing and interdicting fires, patrols, communications, traffic, and movement from the outgoing unit.

Several days before the new unit occupies positions, radio operators and equipment should be incorporated into the outgoing communications system. This provides a continuity of communications signatures when the old unit departs.

The operation should be so well coordinated that units moving in or out of the position need not use their radios until the move is complete. Operators in defensive positions should maintain normal communications at all times. If radio communications are necessary, the radio frequencies and call signs of the outgoing unit should be used initially by the incoming unit. This could reduce the effectiveness of enemy SIGINT.

Items of equipment that are moved to the rear and not replaced in kind should be replaced with decoys. If enemy agents or sympathizers are in the area, ensure that changing unit markings, shoulder patches, and so forth, do not give away the movements of the units.

#### PASSAGE OF LINES

A passage of lines is one of the most difficult military operations to execute. Since two or more units are temporarily occupying the same terrain, they are extremely vulnerable and lucrative targets. Deception techniques applicable to both offense and defense can and should be used to prevent the enemy from exploiting the potential confusion surrounding this kind of maneuver. Remember, the deception plans of the units involved must be coordinated to avoid unexpected and unwanted results.

The following are provocative ideas for you to expand, adjust, and envision on the battlefield; but most of all, these ideas should trigger your imagination:

- ° Consider the simulation of unit movement. Convoys, reserves, or an armor unit can be simulated by jeeps dragging branches behind them raising clouds of dust. This movement should terminate in a logical area.
- ° Such a deception can be enhanced by using a loudspeaker system and a tape of noises normally accompanying such a move. If the physical aspects of the notional location are suitable, you will have created a fictitious unit with minimum assets.
- ° Adding antennas to other vehicles in a formation will tend to deceive enemy gunners and observers as to which is your true command and control element.

- ° If there are waterways in your area, fake and regular bridges should be augmented by the construction of underwater or rapidly emplaceable bridges as an alternate secret means of crossing.
- ° Consider using planned communication security leaks. Perhaps while flying over an area you could chew out the commander for his poor use of camouflage in one of the decoy areas. Accompanied by a corrective action in the decoy area, this provides strong confirmation of the realism of that installation.
- ° When a unit must secretly withdraw from an area to prepare for an operation, have the troops remaining in the area and/or the replacing unit assume the identity, patches, bumper markings, call signs, and frequencies of the replaced unit.
- ° Changing aircraft markings may result in the assumption by the enemy that a new aviation unit has been introduced into the area.
- ° If conditions permit, consider causing confusion in enemy rear areas. Dropping empty parachutes behind enemy lines at night or conducting fake helicopter insertions can divert enemy resources from their primary mission.
- ° To further confuse the enemy in his rear area, consider counterfeit posters placed where he can see them as he advances. Such posters might warn against movement into radioactive area. Others might warn that while certain colors of US flares are not radioactive, some are.
- ° Rumors can be circulated deliberately by allowing civilian personnel or indiscreet military personnel to see and hear what is desired, or by making demands on civilian resources to supply mythical forces.

#### REAR OPERATIONS

To understand the relationship of deception to rear operations, the following areas must be analyzed:

- ° The threat to the rear area.
- ° Intelligence activities which support deception in the rear area.

The enemy is expected to strike deep into our rear area, causing confusion, panic, total disruption of support, and a rapid degradation of military and civilian activity and the desire to fight. This would be done by dedicated, highly trained individuals or groups. They would conduct assassinations, kidnappings, and the destruction of HVTs such as airfields, nuclear capabilities, and other critical targets in US or Allied rear areas.

Deception planning and preparation must be done in the rear area. Not only must the multidisciplined collection threat be deceived, but enemy and host-nation persons must be denied access to deception activities and objects.

We have developed sophisticated methods for deceiving the enemy. However, an enemy agent will easily discover the deception if allowed physical access to deception sites.

Counterintelligence (CI) assists in developing indications and warning information regarding the threat from enemy special operations forces and terrorist activities. The enemy may rely on human intelligence (HUMINT) to confirm indicators of the deception picked up by his SIGINT and imagery intelligence (IMINT) systems. In such cases, CI must assist in developing indicators that will deceive enemy HUMINT as well as SIGINT and IMINT. It is critical that ongoing CI operations and CI special operations do not conflict with deception efforts directed against enemy HUMINT. Additionally, deception efforts directed against enemy HUMINT must be coordinated with and support deception efforts directed against enemy SIGINT and IMINT. This will ensure that the enemy, from a multidisciplinary point of view, receives information that is consistent.

Intelligence personnel must conduct a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of the rear area to identify HVTs. Deception can be used in the rear area to--

- ° Help conceal critical nodes and HVTs.
- ° Provide decoy HVTs for enemy observation and exploitation.
- ° Draw enemy fire on decoy positions.
- ° Cause the enemy to commit dedicated strike forces into positions where they can be ambushed and destroyed by friendly forces.

The objective of deception in support of rear operations is to deny the enemy factual information about rear area posture while causing him to lose the element of surprise, critical to effective penetration of our rear area.

The problem facing the commander is to prevent the enemy from detecting the location of those forces that are massing for the attack. This includes the forces further to the rear that are being positioned to reinforce or exploit the developed situation. It is dangerous to depend only on concealment to hide this buildup. If the enemy locates nothing, he will intensify his effort or will make educated guesses and seek to confirm them.

#### LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

The threat of friendly operation and activities in low intensity conflict (LIC) is similar to those encountered in normal rear operations. In LIC, enemy HUMINT is the primary concern. But still, detailed analysis must be made to determine what the enemy SIGINT and IMINT threat will be. As in rear operations, enemy sabotage, espionage, subversive agents, and terrorist activities are major threats to deception. In LIC, the local civilian population is important because of the difficulty identifying insurgents and guerrilla forces interspersed throughout the local population. In order for deception to be used successfully in LIC, the specific HUMINT and insurgent threat must be identified and exploited. CI personnel are specifically trained to develop the threat data base and counter or exploit the enemy

insurgent HUMINT and unconventional forces. Coercion, brutal force, and extortion are all used by the insurgents to gain the cooperation of local citizens. Aggressive CI must be combined with appropriate activities by host-nation police, intelligence, and government agencies. This is used to neutralize the factors responsible for the LIC. For more information on LIC, see FM 100-20.

Deception in LIC may be designed as a subtle disinformation or propaganda campaign designed to enhance secrecy. It may be an active operation designed to cause the enemy to attack a decoy position or move into a position where our fire and maneuver can destroy him. For example, when on search-and-clear operations, the contrast between the noise of armored vehicles and the stealth of dismounted infantry can be used to great advantage. While moving into an area, mechanized forces can drop off ambush patrols along likely trails or routes of enemy movement and then continue their mission, circumventing the suspected area. In the process of sweeping the area, the APCs double back toward the dismounted ambush forces who lie in wait for enemy fleeing from the tracks.

Another variation of teaming armor and dismounted infantry to take advantage of noise and confusion created by vehicles can be used in search-and-clear operations. Many times the enemy hides rather than fleeing the area. After vehicles pass, he is free to slip out behind them. The deception technique deploys additional dismounted infantry at some distance behind the armor and conducts the sweep in two echelons.


A possible ruse to induce the enemy into attacking a position is the baited attack. If it is suspected that the enemy is closely observing unit movements and waiting for an opening to attack, the commander fragments his forces to make it appear that the perimeter will be poorly defended. Then, lucrative targets, such as a decoy CP or logistic base, are displayed in a relatively obvious position that appears marginally defended. At dusk, the remainder of the unit is infiltrated into the area. If the enemy has been observing, he may well attack the perimeter originally established in the hope of overrunning the position. The following is a description of Operation El Paso in 1966 (see Figure 6-1).

This deception operation was conducted by the 1st Infantry Division in July 1966. It took place along Route 13 (Minh Thanh Road) in Binh Long Province against the 272d Regiment.

A plan was developed to lure the Vietcong (VC) into attacking US forces. Consequently, information on scheduled US resupply plans was intentionally leaked.

The leaked plan (deception story) was a move of engineer equipment and supply vehicles between Minh Thanh and An Loc on July 9. The convoy was to be escorted by a minimum security force.

Allowing time for the VC to gain the information and react to it, the division estimated possible VC reaction. Five likely ambush sites were selected. The site selected as the most probable was the one the VC used.



**Figure 6-1. Deception in LIC -Operation El Paso**

The true force consisted of two armored cavalry troops and one infantry company (on a reconnaissance-in-force mission) moving between An Loc and Minh Thanh. Infantry battalions were positioned as rapid reaction forces at An Loc, Minh Thanh, and Chon Thanh. Supporting artillery units were positioned and laid on the predicted ambush site. Close-air-support flights were kept on station during the movement of the task force.

At 0700 on July 9, 1966, the force departed AN LOC and started moving along Route 245 toward Minh Thanh. Upon arriving at the most probable ambush site at 1100, the column was heavily engaged by elements of the 272d VC Regiment. They fired from the well-fortified ambush positions along the road. The combined effects of the .50 caliber and 90 millimeter fire from the tanks and personnel carriers, concentrated artillery fire, and the pounding from tactical air overwhelmed the VC regiment. By 1300 the regiment was in disorganized retreat. The pre-positioned infantry battalions were airlifted behind the regiment and engaged retreating VC elements. Air and artillery were used against withdrawal routes.

On July 10, elements of the VC regiment continued to be engaged by infantry battalions. By dusk, all elements of the 272d Regiment had withdrawn from the battle area. The regiment suffered severe losses during the engagement and was probably reduced to less than 50 percent strength.

The operation achieved the intended results: The 272d VC Regiment attacked the 1st Infantry Division and suffered losses which considerably reduced its fighting strength.

Some methods of disseminating deception information in LIC are uniquely suited to CI operations and CI special operations directed against enemy HUMINT. These methods include--

- ° Using local newspapers and periodicals to give appropriate information.
- ° Leaking information to the media.
- ° Using double agents.
- ° Deliberately leaking information to known sympathizers or agents.
- ° Deliberately leaking information to local workers who wittingly or unwittingly further disseminate the information.

We must not overlook the possibility that major hostile powers may be supporting the insurgents with sophisticated SIGINT and IMINT systems. If this is the case, each specific threat must be identified and exploited in conjunction with HUMINT-directed efforts. As in conventional conflict situations, a detailed IPB of the area is essential. A complete understanding of enemy intelligence capabilities is a must for successful use of deception in a LIC. Unique to LIC is the fact that CI directed against enemy HUMINT gains additional importance in deception planning and execution phases due to the nature of the threat in LIC.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Battlefield deception and psychological operations (PSYOP) are both directed toward the enemy. However, they target different audiences and use different channels to reach these audiences.

Battlefield deception is directed toward the enemy commander and his staff. It is primarily intended for the attention of the enemy's intelligence organization. PSYOP are directed toward enemy forces in general. Propaganda, a tool of PSYOP, is disseminated by such media as leaflets, newspapers, pamphlets, loudspeakers, radio, television, and rumors. PSYOP support the deception operation by disseminating information that confirms or supports the deception story presented to the enemy through his intelligence channels. Prior consideration should be given to the possibility that such use may degrade or jeopardize the credibility sought or achieved by PSYOP supporting tactical forces. It is important that PSYOP in support of deception be thoroughly coordinated at all levels of command during the planning and execution phases of the operations.

## Chapter 7

### DECEPTION IN JOINT, COMBINED, AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable; and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory by force.

-- Machiavelli, The Discourses

AirLand Battle Doctrine, as set forth in FM 100-5, provides guidance for operational and tactical employment of Army forces on a worldwide basis. Chapters 2 and 3 provide guidance on conducting operational and tactical deceptions on a worldwide basis. AirLand Battle and Army deception doctrine is based on the assumption that other service participation in Army operations will be routine. It is further assumed that Army deployments in mid- to high-intensity conflicts will result in routine combined operations as well.

### JOINT OPERATIONS

Joint forces include--


- ° Unified commands.
- ° Specified commands.
- ° Joint task forces (JTF).

The Army provides contingents--service (Army) components--to unified and specified commands. Army forces are normally ASSIGNED to unified or specified commands and ATTACHED to JTFs.

Joint forces operate within two distinct chains of command, one for operations and one for administrative and logistic matters. The operational and administrative and logistic chains of command are displayed in Army terms in Figure 7-1.

Both wartime strategic and departmental-level deception plans impact on how Army contingents, to specified and unified commands as well as JTFs, plan their respective wartime operational-level deceptions. This is done in one of two ways:

- ° As campaigns and deceptions conducted to support strategic operational requirements.
- ° As independent campaigns and deceptions to support the outcomes of battles and engagements conducted by subordinate tactical commands.



For the following reasons, a conscious, concerted effort should be made to harmonize strategic, departmental, and operational deception plans:

- ° Army EAC sustainment-oriented portions of deception plans are preconditioned on sustainment capabilities provided to EAC commanders from headquarters, DA.
- ° Army operational deception plan requirements are preconditioned on mission taskings directed by unified or specified commands or JTFs.

The optimum organizational location to coordinate or harmonize wartime strategic-departmental-operational deception plans is found in emerging joint tactical deception doctrine: the tactical deception support element (TDSE) operating in J3. Designated C<sup>3</sup>CM personnel should be routinely consulted as well.

Joint force commanders should establish deception objectives in all major exercises to ensure that wartime planning and execution requirements are identified and practiced as part of the normal mission planning process.

#### COMBINED OPERATIONS

Army forces must be prepared for combined operations with land, air, and naval forces of our Allies. Operational-level deception planning in combined theaters imposes these special considerations for the deception planner:

- ° Combined military effectiveness and cohesion are functions of the political will of all nations involved in maintaining the coalition. (There may exist political proscriptions against, or constraints on, the employment of deception.)
- ° Political and military objectives among the Allies may differ. This directly impacts on--
  - Who can be targets of deception?
  - What deception objectives are politically affordable?
  - What deception perceptions can be created?
  - What channels can be used to portray the story to the enemy?
  - What means can be used to execute deception plans?
- ° Differences in deception capabilities (concepts, doctrine, training, force structure, materiel) will require tailored planning, coordination, and liaison.
- ° Complex host-nation and organic sustainment systems, or combinations thereof, will stretch the creative and imaginative capabilities of the deception planner to the limit.

Wherever the US Army has been employed in a combined context, special efforts have been necessary to coordinate operations and deceptions. Continuation of such efforts is necessary to facilitate future combined operations. As with regular operations, the following are the chief considerations in planning and conducting combined deceptions:

- ° Command and control.
- ° Intelligence.
- ° Operational procedures.
- ° CSS.

#### COMMAND AND CONTROL

Unity of command is essential in all wartime operations. The commander responsible for the operation is also responsible for its accompanying deceptions. When command relationships are established between US units and superior, subordinate, or adjacent Allied headquarters, special deception liaison arrangements are required through operations channels.

Specialist (deception) liaison officers should be exchanged when Allied or US forces employ deception personnel with which either army is unfamiliar.

During World War II, the British in the Middle East were the Allied deception experts. However, through the process of personnel assignments, this expertise naturally moved to, and matured within, other theaters and units. US Army deception planners should be willing to learn from our allies who demonstrate that expertise. They should also be willing to transfer our expertise when opportunities to do so are presented.

#### INTELLIGENCE

During war, national intelligence products relating to deceptions must be shared. Deception-specific PIR and IR must be coordinated. Combined feedback mechanisms and procedures should be established.

Arrangements must be made to ensure the rapid dissemination of intelligence for the use of multinational assets and capabilities which may be used to portray the deception story. Some of those are--

- ° Rumors.
- ° Newspapers.
- ° Military communications and noncommunications emissions.
- ° Public radio.
- ° Diplomats.
- ° False documents.
- ° Agents.

Combined intelligence staffs, or the use of liaison and exchange officers, facilitate the contributions that intelligence systems of all nations must make to the deception effort.

#### OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

The design process for combined deception should maximize the use of US and Allied capabilities and minimize individual and collective deficiencies.

SOPs should be established to integrate deception planning into the combined mission planning process.

The planning of campaigns and major operations include branches and sequels, which are deceptive in nature. This requires particular attention to the organic and improvisation capabilities of US and Allied units to display, demonstrate, and feign. The disparities that combined deception planners must take into account include--

- ° Dissimilar deception control measures.
- ° Dissimilar operational styles and tactics.

- ° Dissimilar deception-specific organizations and equipment.
- ° Differences in the multispectral (technical) signatures resulting from different weapons, radios, vehicles, and other materiel, and the different operational procedures which give operational fidelity to technically-based replications.

The use of deception-specific liaisons, equipment exchanges, and combined deception training programs can minimize these kinds of problems before war breaks out.

#### COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Although logistic support is normally a national responsibility, combined commanders will have to take those measures necessary to preserve the robustness and survivability of supporting sustainment systems.

The sustainment system supporting combined commanders will be a mix of--

- ° Host nation.
- ° United States.
- ° Other-army capabilities.

Deceptive uses and protection of these capabilities should be arranged early in any combined operation. Chapter 2 addresses sustainment considerations that are equally applicable to combined military settings.

#### CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The use of Army assets to satisfy contingency requirements which are inherently strategic must be addressed despite the battlefield focus of this manual.

Contingency operations are National Command Authority (NCA)-directed military actions requiring rapid deployment to perform military tasks in support of national policy objectives. Contingency operations are normally undertaken--

- ° When vital national interests are at stake.
- ° When direct or indirect diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation have been exhausted or need to be supplemented militarily.

Contingency operations are usually executed to--

- ° Rapidly show force to support a threatened ally.
- ° Blunt the invasion of a friendly country.

- ° Protect the property of US nationals.
- ° Evacuate endangered US nationals from hostile environments.
- ° Rescue hostages.
- ° Execute other NCA taskings.

Planning to support contingencies places the deception planner squarely between the horns of the time-surprise dilemma.

Time becomes a critical factor in terms of--

- ° Capabilities and limitations to develop deception targets, objectives, perceptions, stories, and plans.
- ° Letting the story unfold to have the desired effect in relevant time frames.
- ° Intelligence community capabilities to quickly clarify the situation and produce the necessary products to support deception.
- ° Justifiable political (NCA) inclinations to terminate the contingency situation at the lowest level of political (domestic/international) risk.
- ° Justifiable military (Joint Chiefs of Staff and commander-in-chief) inclinations to terminate the contingency situation at the lowest level of military violence to prevent the threat from developing the situation on favorable terms.

Surprise becomes a critical factor because of--

- ° Justifiable predispositions to use military force as a last resort.
- ° Its potential contribution to minimizing the level of political risk-taking and military violence to the force, the target, and noncombatants.
- ° The fact that strategic, operational, and tactical distinctions collapse and blur into a set of contingency indicators for which the deception planner, depending upon his position in the chain of command, may or may not have an opportunity to manipulate for surprise purposes.
- ° Domestic and international media predispositions to collect and report the story, particularly the response option aspects.
- ° Potential targets can logically conclude that military and political options to resolve the situation are proceeding in parallel.
- ° Potential political constraints on using every means available to portray the deception story.

The above considerations are formidable obstacles for the Army operational deception planner; but they can be overcome. First, deception planners at all echelons in the contingency chain of command must realize that strategic, operational, and tactical deception considerations rapidly collapse. This happens to the point that no meaningful distinctions among the three levels exist. Second, the contingency chain of command must predispose itself to deceive--

- ° To facilitate winning militarily at the lowest political and military cost.
- ° To keep the full range of options open--political, economic, and military.

## APPENDIX A

### BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION ELEMENTS

#### CORPS

Corps provides deception planning support, supports corps deception operations, and executes limited deception events with organic resources (such as decoys, communications deception, and logistic or critical node replication). The deception element is organic to the operation's battalion, corps MI Brigade. It is collocated with the G3 section of the corps tactical operations center (CTOC) and operates under the staff supervision of the corps G3. This section coordinates with other elements within the CTOC, adjacent tactical operations center (TOC) support elements, and higher and lower echelons. It ensures that deception operations are synchronized with integral aspects of corps operation plans. It provides deception training for corps elements.

The headquarters element provides C2 of the plans and operations section. It coordinates with the corps G3 to determine the planning and execution of combat, CS, and CSS events within corps deception operations.

The plans and operations section--

- ° Recommends the deception objective.
- ° Recommends a deception story to reach the deception objective.
- ° Develops the deception plan which presents the deception story to the enemy's intelligence collection system.
- ° Recommends those deception events which must be conducted to execute the deception plan.
- ° Prepares the deception annex to the corps OPORD.
- ° Monitors, through coordination with the appropriate elements, the execution of the deception plan.
- ° Recommends appropriate changes to the deception operation as the situation dictates.
- ° Interprets the deception event taskings which it executes or supports. In doing so, it must determine the--
  - Signatures to be replicated.
  - Deception devices required to replicate those signatures.
  - Methods to employ those devices which will achieve event reality and plausibility.

- ° Task organizes materiel and manpower assets to implement deception events. This is done by deploying and employing those deception devices organic to the element.
- ° Is responsible for corps deception training.

#### DIVISION

Division provides deception planning support to--

- ° Execute derivatives of the next higher headquarter's deception operations.
- ° Execute the next higher headquarter's deception operations.
- ° Execute limited deception events with organic resources such as decoys, communications deception, and logistic or critical node replication.

The deception element which performs this planning is organic to the MI battalion comat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI). It is collocated with the G3 section of the division TOC and operates under the staff supervision of the division G3. It coordinates with other elements within the division TOC, adjacent TOC support elements, as well as higher and lower echelons to ensure that deception operations are synchronized with integral aspects of division operations plans. It provides deception training for division elements.

The headquarters element provides C2 of subordinate sections. Coordinates with division G3 to determine the planning and execution of combat, combat support, and CSS deception events within division deception operations.

The plans and operations section--

- ° Functions as the net control station for the battlefield deception element.
- ° Recommends the deception objective.
- ° Recommends a deception story to achieve the deception objective.
- ° Develops the division deception plan which presents the next higher headquarter's deception story to the enemy intelligence collection system.
- ° Recommends those division deception events which must be conducted to execute the division deception plan.
- ° Prepares the deception annex to the OPORD.
- ° Monitors, through coordination with appropriate elements, the execution of the deception plan.

- ° Recommends appropriate changes to the division deception operation as the situation dictates.
- ° Task organizes team materiel and manpower assets to execute or support the execution of division deception events.

#### COMMUNICATIONS SIGNATURE TEAM

The section chief--

- ° Defines electromagnetic signatures.
- ° Identifies deception devices to be used in replicating electromagnetic signatures and profiles.
- ° Deploys and employs deception devices in support of unit deception operations.
- ° Provides communications input to the deception annex of the unit OPORD.
- ° Recommends selection and use of specific electronic equipment in deception operations.
- ° Plans the establishment of field sites.
- ° Prepares special, periodic, and project reports on communications signatures deception activities.
- ° Provides advice and assistance on deception systems.

The communications specialist --

- ° Provides SIGINT expertise to support battlefield deception operations.
- ° Establishes and maintains the SIGINT data base.
- ° Assists in the preparation and establishment of field sites.
- ° Evaluates SIGINT activities to support deception operations.
- ° Prepares reports for dissemination to higher headquarters.
- ° Provides advice and assistance on OPSEC surveys, communications security (COMSEC) activities, and counter-SIGINT activities.

#### PHYSICAL SIGNATURE TEAM

The section chief--

- ° Prepares the physical signature deception plan for the deception annex of the unit OPLAN.

- ° Selects physical deception measures and organizes material and personnel to be employed.
- ° Provides physical profile data base, CI threat estimates, studies, and reports.
- ° Conducts liaison with other staff sections for consolidation and coordination of deception tasking.
- ° Produces, disseminates, and evaluates physical deception measures for supported units.

The combat engineer performs the following duties:

- ° Prepares route, road, bridge, tunnel, ferry, and ford engineering reports for deception operations.
- ° Maintains unit data base for profiles for employment of deception systems.
- ° Prepares and enacts systems to stimulate deception emplacement, equipment, activities, and personnel.
- ° Advises supported units in camouflage and concealment techniques to increase OPSEC to support deception.
- ° Recommends emplacement of and evaluates effectiveness of decoy deployment.
- ° Supervises, advises, and assists in the fabrication of deception decoys, camouflage, and other activities.

The combat arms specialist--

- ° Supervises tactical deployment of elements in offensive, defensive, and retrograde battlefield deception operations.
- ° Evaluates terrain for deployment of deception equipment and systems.
- ° Uses technical and tactical expertise to evaluate effectiveness of decoy deployment.
- ° Supervises the construction of deception fortification and camouflage.
- ° Establishes site security.

The visual specialist--

- ° Analyzes aerial and ground photos to assist in planning, execution, and evaluation of deception operations.
- ° Provides input on mission planning.

- ° Prepares situation maps and maintains target folders.
- ° Assists in the preparation of map overlays, plots, mosaics, and charts to support deception operations.
- ° Supervises the preparation and maintenance of required administration, intelligence, and reference files.

#### ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE TEAM

The section chief--

- ° Establishes and maintains noncommunications profile of replicated units for deception operations.
- ° Establishes and maintains the noncommunications electromagnetic signature data base and technical reference material for deception employment.
- ° Determines mission objectives and priorities based on tasking received from higher headquarters.
- ° Provides input for the deception annex of the unit OPORD.

The electronics specialist--

- ° Identifies noncommunications indicators associated with friendly forces that should be considered in deception planning.
- ° Provides advice and assistance on deception plans and operations.
- ° Assists in developing noncommunications data base.

APPENDIX B

DECEPTION PLANNING WORKSHEET

(Classified when filled in)

1. Situation:

a. Current situation:

(1) Friendly: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Enemy: \_\_\_\_\_

b. Projected situation (no deception): \_\_\_\_\_

c. Desired situation: \_\_\_\_\_

d. Assumptions (list key assumptions): \_\_\_\_\_

2. Deception Objective:

a. Five elements:

(1) Who? \_\_\_\_\_

(2) What? \_\_\_\_\_

(3) When? \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Where? \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Whom? \_\_\_\_\_

b. List two or more deception objectives: \_\_\_\_\_

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c. Which deception objective is better? \_\_\_\_\_

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d. Do objective actions lead to the desired situation? \_\_\_\_\_

3. Desired Perception:

a. What are the target's current perceptions about our capabilities and intentions? \_\_\_\_\_

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b. Should these perceptions be altered or maintained? \_\_\_\_\_

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c. Write a desired perception statement containing the three key elements:

(1) Who? \_\_\_\_\_

(2) What (threat or opportunity)? \_\_\_\_\_

(3) When and for how long? \_\_\_\_\_

d. Will this desired perception result in the deception objective actions necessary to reach the desired situation? \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Deception Story:

a. What must you tell the target to create or maintain the desired perception? \_\_\_\_\_

b. Write the deception story you have developed for this exercise (minimum of two sentences): \_\_\_\_\_

c. Evaluate your deception story for feasibility and believability:

5. Deception Plan:

a. List means selected to convey the deception story to the target: \_\_\_\_\_

b. Have you considered all possible channels? \_\_\_\_\_

c. Do the means you have selected conform with our standard operating practices? \_\_\_\_\_

d. Are other disciplines needed to hide or protect something? \_\_\_\_\_

6. Other Information:

a. Feedback:

(1) List indicator priority intelligence requirements to help guide intelligence monitoring for enemy reactions to the deception: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Is your deception flexible enough to allow for change if feedback reveals change is required to ensure success of the deception? \_\_\_\_\_

b. Risks (list most significant): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX C

### SAMPLE DECEPTION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

Although the preparation of a deception annex to an OPORD may or may not be required, a deception implementation schedule is often required to ensure a coordinated, controlled, multidisciplined effort. The degree of detail and method of dissemination will vary according to the deception plan, but an implementation plan is an essential tool.

The schedule is completed through the initiation of the true operation to include final actions in terminating the deception. In constructing the implementation schedule, the planner must visualize the battle area, use his imagination, and keep in mind that the schedule is a chronological presentation of the deception plan, bringing together all activities to provide a scenario of the operations. It then becomes a script for the actors (units) as illustrated in figure C-1.

Figure C1. Sample implementation schedule

IMPLEMENTATION TIME	ASPECT OF DECEPTION STORY SUPPORTED	TASK	ACTIONS	UNIT(S) RESPONSIBLE	REMARKS
171630	2d Bde begins build-up of troops to south.	Begin movement controls of troops for demonstration.	Vehicle traffic movement and control points.	1-3d Arty Bn 1-79 Inf Bn 1-80 Inf Bn	Movement control enforced throughout deception ops.
171730	1-3d Arty Bn shows shift of direction toward city of Bucoda.	Notional shift of A/B Co 1-79 and 1-80 INF Bns.	Use visual/C-E to indicate recce end movement.	1-3d Arty Bn 1-79 Inf Bn 1-80 Inf Bn	Emission patterns to indicate rapid build-up of forces in 1-3d Arty Bn sector. Continue until 180500 (H-hour).
171850	A and B Co of 1-79 Inf Bn link up with 1-3d Arty Bn sector.	Show heavy traffic in 1-3d ARTY Bn sector.	Recce and coordination parties in 1-3d ARTY Bn sector.	A/B Co 1-79 Inf Bn	HHC and C Co 1-79 Inf Bn must conceal true actions as covering force for retrograde ops.
171930	1-80 Inf Bn begins movement toward 1-3d Arty Bn sector for main attack.	Begin actual activities to show normal actions associated with movement of Bn.	Recce and coordination parties along 1-3d ARTY and 1-79 INF Bn zones.	1-80 Inf Bn	Must conceal actual intent of 1-80 Inf Bn using electronic deception to replicate heavy movement traffic.
172130	All 2d Bde units prepare for attack in south.	Begin notional activities to show normal actions in preparation of attack.	Route air recce through sector of attack.	Request support from Div assets.	All air recon flights should take in city of Bucoda to increase plausibility of deception.
172330	2d Bde issues radio silence order in preparation for attack.	Prepare notional unit for attack (set up demonstration).	Use camouflage to conceal 1-79 INF Bn set up of perimeter defense for retrograde ops.	HHC and B Co 1-79 Inf Bn 1-80 Inf Bn	Mask or conceal all preparation for 1-80 Inf Bn commitment at Tnon air field.

**Figure C1. Sample implementation schedule (Continued)**

IMPLEMENTATION TIME	ASPECT OF DECEPTION STORY SUPPORTED	TASK	ACTIONS	UNIT(S) RESPONSIBLE	REMARKS
180300	Combat support to 2d Bde increases for attack.	Break radio silence. Portray heavy C-E traffic levels throughout the bde.	Increase vehicle traffic within 2d Bde sector to indicate readiness for movement. Also ped traffic on bde comm nets to give indication to impending movement (attack).	1-3d Arty Bn 1-79 Inf Bn 1-80 Inf Bn	
180430	Begin road march toward Bucoda.	Establish road controls and checkpoints via FM radio.	Notional units attachment to 1-3d Arty Bn by MCD Also 1-80th Inf Bn deception display.	1-3d Arty Bn 1-79 Inf Bn 1-80 Inf Bn	Units to provide RTDs and radios for MCD.
180445	Road march toward Bucoda continues.	Indicate artillery support to bde attack.	Notional attachment of 1-41st Arty Bn.	1-3d Arty Bn 1-41st Arty Bn	1-41st to provide RTDs and radios for attachment exercise.
180500	Road march toward Bucoda continues.	Co's A and B 1-79 Inf Bn performs feint to hold adversary forces in Bucoda.	1-80th Inf Bn diverts its force to mission objectives: Tono Airfield.	1-80 Inf Bn	1-80 Inf Bn will use secure communications during attack on Tono Airfield.
180950	Combat support to 1-80 INF Bn is given.	Show artillery and armor support to 1-80 Inf Bn.	Secure and set perimeter defense of Tono Airfield.	1-80 Inf Bn 1-3d Arty Bn 1-41 Arty Bn	Continue deception operations until 1-3d Arty Bn and A and B Co's have returned to defensive posture.

## APPENDIX D

### EMPLOYMENT OF DECOYS

A decoy is used to draw the enemy's attention away from a more important area. Generally, a decoy is an imitation of something on the battlefield. Decoys may be specially manufactured items or constructed locally (using salvage). Unserviceable or combat loss items may also be used as decoys.

The primary purpose of a decoy is to provide something for the enemy's intelligence system to find. For example, enemy HUMINT might locate a two-dimensional display. If the enemy decides to use IMINT for confirmation, all he will see in his photos are lines. However, the enemy was forced to use some of his intelligence assets on the deception, rather than on the true operation. If a decoy momentarily draws enemy attention from a real installation, it has served its purpose.

Decoys can be used for these additional purposes:

- ° As a survivability measure to draw enemy fire.
- ° To deceive the enemy about the number of friendly weapons, troops, or equipment.
- ° To replace withdrawn equipment.
- ° To add realism to a deception story.
- ° To confuse the enemy on the of key terrain and reference points.

When constructing dummy or decoy installations, the following must be considered:

- ° Location.
- ° Movement.
- ° Signatures.
- ° Camouflage.

#### LOCATION

Decoys must be located in logical positions. They should be far enough away from actual targets to prevent enemy fire directed at the decoy from hitting the real installation. This distance will depend on the size of the installation, the type of enemy observation, and the fire expected.

A decoy simulating a permanent or semipermanent installation, such as an airfield, should have approximately the same relationship to nearby landmarks as the target itself. This is necessary to deceive the enemy, since he will use landmarks as reference points (terrain points).

## MOVEMENT

Visual deception requires realistic progression. The deception activity must present personnel and vehicular movement. By comparing photographs taken at different times, the enemy can detect a lack of movement. Logical activity can be accomplished by movement of decoys and by operation of equipment. If possible, real troops should be used to provide evidence of occupancy. The activities must continue day and night and during periods of bad weather.

Various tracks may be simulated as follows:

- ° Desired foot tracks should be made by actual foot traffic. In a presumably occupied position, tracks must be continually increased in wear and width.
- ° The best way to provide wheeled vehicle tracks is to run several vehicles through the area. This will create the illusion of movement.
- ° Chains or logs may be dragged to create a greater scarring of the ground.
- ° Tracked vehicle tracks are very difficult to duplicate accurately without using real equipment. Actual tracked vehicles should be used.

## SIGNATURES

Since every unit has its own signature, decoy installations must be constructed in accordance with the friendly unit's SOP. To be effective, the decoy installation must include features normally associated with the real installation. Following are some considerations:

- ° Spoil often indicates dug-in positions. If the unit normally practices good camouflage discipline and disposes of its spoil, the same practice must be followed with the simulated units. On the other hand, if camouflage and spoil discipline are poor, spoil must appear around the decoy position.
- ° Latrines are present at virtually every occupied site. They are usually disclosed by tracks that converge and become more marked as time passes.
- ° Concertina wire is a feature of almost all infantry combat positions. The presence of wire may be revealed by the tracks and trampling made by the wiring party. Gaps in the wire are often disclosed because of tracks which converge and diverge at the gaps.
- ° Buried cable is often associated with important headquarters. It may also be associated with radar installations. Buried cable appears as a track, straight with angular turns, and light in tone.

- ° Shelters, such as dugouts, appear as dark spots in a lighter area of man-made tracks and trampling. Spoil is also present. Airing blankets, laundry, and so forth may also be visible. Tenting or shacks are easily improvised and may be used as decoy shelters.
- ° Thermal. All vehicle decoys have the ability to produce a thermal effect.
- ° Electronic deception (see FM 90-2A).

### CAMOUFLAGE

A decoy installation should be constructed so that its disclosure appears to be the result of poor camouflage. This may be done by--

- ° Leaving parts of the decoy exposed.
- ° Leaving exposed tracks.
- ° Incompletely concealing the shadows of decoys.
- ° The improper use of surface texture and color.

Decoys that are intended to divert attention from real objects (or installations) are effective only if the real objects are completely camouflaged.

When employing visual deception, all or part of a real or false military object may be camouflaged to project the desired effect. Camouflage may be done poorly (intentionally) so that the enemy will observe what we want him to observe, or a friendly unit may be completely concealed to avoid detection.

In any type or size of deception, it is important that projection of visual evidence be consistent. If a unit is being concealed by camouflage, all elements must be concealed totally.

### DECOYS

Camouflage is essential; however, when it is impossible to conceal from the air the fact that a CP is in a certain area, a decoy CP should be erected in the vicinity. In this instance it is obvious that the decoy must look more like the real thing than its genuine counterpart. After all, we are hiding the real and portraying the false. Certain characteristic signs of occupancy should be made at the decoy. This includes--

- ° Cross-country tracks simulating those made by a wire-laying detail.
- ° Antenna arrays to simulate communications facilities.
- ° SED devices to provide an electromagnetic signature.
- ° Smoke and occasional lights.

- ° A few poorly camouflaged tents.
- ° New vehicle tracks and activity from day to day.
- ° Other signs of activity.

Other signs which enhance the illusion of the presence of a CP are explained in the following examples:

- ° Converging wire lines and vehicle tracks. Also various types of antenna arrays for communications.
- ° Concentration of vehicles.
- ° Heavy traffic causing widened turn-ins.
- ° New vehicle tracks to a position which could house a CP.
- ° Protective wire, foxholes, and other barriers surrounding the installation.
- ° Defensive weapons emplacements around the installation.

One of the most difficult activities to conceal is the use of aircraft and its related support. The movement of aircraft into and out of an area is an immediate indicator to the enemy that something is happening or that an important facility (such as a CP) is located there. Since these signs cannot be eliminated, deception techniques must be used to mislead the enemy.

The enemy can detect either electronically or visually a pattern or location where aircraft continually fly over land or disappear from sight. Indiscriminate helicopter flights which can be visually, optically, and electronically detected call attention to the assembly areas, forward area rearm and refuel points, or brigade trains. Therefore, helicopter assembly areas must either be out of the enemy's radar detection range or have concealed routes into and out of the area. Entry and exit routes should be planned in as many areas as possible and used in a manner which avoids establishing a pattern. An assembly area should provide terrain masking to break the enemy radar line of sight. A thorough map analysis, coupled with the latest intelligence reports of enemy radar activity, helps determine radar-free areas.

#### LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS

Logistic and ammunition storage facilities are difficult to conceal. The size of these facilities and the vehicular movement into and out of the area attract the enemy's attention. The commander should consider requiring vehicles to move randomly (not in convoy) or only during periods of reduced visibility. The commander might consider using civilian trucks, converted buses, and civilian cars to carry supplies in rear areas.

Trains, houses, factories, buildings, subways, tunnels, caves, or buses should be used for physical storage of supplies and ammunition. These can also be used for maintenance, transportation, and medical operations. If practical, installations that have been partially destroyed by the enemy can be used or repaired to serve as a supply installation. The fact that the enemy considers the facility destroyed may serve to increase the realism of added camouflage.

Containers or packages can be disguised. This includes making packages look as though they contained civilian, not military, supplies. To conceal the supply activities in the combat area, supply personnel could be sent with the assault forces at the beginning of the operation. They could locate suitable logistic areas and camouflage them before supplies are brought forward.

Notional ammunition and supply dumps can be employed in a deception. Heavy concentrations of ammunition and supplies should be concealed. When the physical characteristics and size of the logistic activities make concealment impractical, construction of decoy facilities in the same general area should be considered.

Deception supply routes should be used. In the past, friendly installations and disposition of forces have been dictated by road network availability. Careful consideration should be given to using secondary or noncentrally located road networks for logistic functions. The main supply route can be used as part of the deception plan. The forward area road networks can be made deceptive by using civilian personnel and animals whenever time and the situation permit. Another means of concealing supply movement is to use civilian vehicles over several secondary roads, selecting the routes at random.

A decoy supply point or log base should be near enough to appear to be realistic. However, it should be far enough away to allow for possible errors in marksmanship of any attacker.

Prominent landmarks must be noted and the decoy located as the real installation would be. (See Figure D-1 for the positioning of decoy supply points.) The decoy must appear to have a road net pattern the same as the real installation. In addition, personnel must be detailed to the decoy site to maintain the appearance of activity. If at all possible, route and control all traffic through the decoy area to the real supply point. If successful deception is essential, this measure will greatly enhance the decoy's chance of success. For a night deception, certain types of night lighting, such as light shown through a tent opening and a decoy fire, are very effective.


#### COMMON FAULTS AND DEFECTS

The following are some general defects that often cause a decoy to fail:

- Regularity or irregularity of tracks.

- Lack of litter associated with military occupation.
- Flatness or no stereoscopic relief.
- Failure to faithfully simulate a particular type of installation.
- Absence of motor transportation and lack of movement.
- No daily change in appearance.
- Incorrect tactical positioning.
- Unreasonable speed in buildup or removal.
- Lack of real air defenses.
- Failure to simulate all necessary components of a particular installation.

It should be evident that these defects apply to almost all types of decoys and deceptions. Any one of them could render worthless an otherwise perfect effort.



## APPENDIX E

### DECEPTION EVALUATION CHECKLIST

#### G3 EVALUATION CHECKLIST

1. What integration of deception operations into tactical maneuvers occurred?
2. Did the OPSEC annex support the deception annex?
3. Was the deception annex to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations?
  - a. Were individuals at all echelons identified and aware of their responsibilities in relation to deception activities?
  - b. What were the required unit tasks?
  - c. How was the deception annex coordinated? Was it complementary? Did it address a common list of indicators that required either display or concealment?
  - d. Did other supporting annexes contain option choices addressed in the deception annex without alluding to deceptive intent?
  - e. Does the deception annex address main and alternate courses of action in the basic operational concept?
4. Were surveys conducted of both concealed sensitive indicators (OPSEC) and displayed deceptive indicators to access visibility?
5. What was the deception objective?
  - a. Did the deception objective closely support the objective of the tactical operation?
  - b. Did the deception objective support corresponding OPSEC objectives?
  - c. Were phase-out actions planned to disguise that deception was used?
  - d. Was an implementing schedule prepared?
  - e. Did the implementing schedule identify the start and finish times of event, location, unit involved, and means to be used?
6. What was the deception story?
  - a. Was it employed as planned.

- b. Did the deception story provide adequate information to deter the enemy from taking undesirable actions?
  - c. Was the story flexible enough to allow changes during its execution to take advantage of unexpected enemy actions?
7. Did compromise of intent of deception or OPSEC activity occur?
- a. If yes, what was the compromise?
  - b. If yes, did the compromise degrade the overall success of the operation?
8. What were the EEFI and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?
9. What deception technique was employed?
- a. Were C-E deception and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) or C3 protection measures planned for and used? What was the desired effect?
  - b. Were non-C-E deception and ECCM measures planned for and used? What was the desired effect?
  - c. If the following nonelectronic deception techniques were employed, what was the desired effect of the techniques?
    - (1) Ground reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.
    - (2) Aerial reconnaissance or activity.
    - (3) Engineer activity.
    - (4) Agent activity.
    - (5) Vehicular movements.
    - (6) Demonstrations, rehearsals, feints, and supporting attacks.
    - (7) Communications and coordination patterns.
    - (8) Fire support and artillery activity.
    - (9) Unit subordination.
    - (10) Boundaries and phase lines.
    - (11) Timing of operations.
    - (12) Cover names and designations.

(13) Camouflage.

(14) Other.

10. What resources (personnel, equipment, and time) were tasked to conduct operations with deceptive intent?
  - a. Were sufficient resources available?
  - b. What was the experience level of deception element personnel?
  - c. What specific deception items (dummies, decoys, and so forth) were constructed, used, and how? Numbers?
  - d. What other resources or services were required and were they available?
  - e. What real missions could not be accomplished because these resources were being used for deception?
  - f. Do the benefits of deception justify any loss of operational resources?
11. Were dedicated, secure communications lines and other means of transmission of the plan available? Were they adequate?
12. Was sufficient time available to formulate, write, and execute the deception and OPSEC plans?
13. What were the results of deception activities?
14. Did the deception assist in the successful execution of the overall operation?

#### G2 EVALUATION CHECKLIST

1. Were deception and OPSEC annexes to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations?
2. Does intelligence have an established enemy data base and an understanding of enemy doctrine?
  - a. Were operations conducted mindful of enemy intelligence capabilities and collection schedules?
  - b. What were the PIR and IR for the deception and OPSEC plan?
  - c. What intelligence activities were targeted at discovering deceptions in progress against friendly forces?

- d. What intelligence activities were targeted at determining enemy reaction to friendly deceptions?
- e. What enemy activities were identified as being deception related? Why?

3. What was the deception story?

- a. At what level of the enemy organization was it focused?
- b. Did the deception story cause the enemy decision maker to make the desired decision?
- c. Was the story consistent with the friendly unit's tactical doctrine, established patterns, and normal operational sequences?
- d. Was the story consistent with the target's perception of the friendly unit's real capabilities?
- e. Did the story permit verification by various enemy collection systems?

4. What countersurveillance techniques were used to deny the enemy knowledge of true intentions and evaluate indicator visibility?

5. What were the EEFI and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?

6. What deception steps were employed?

- a. If C-E deception and ECCM/C3 protection measures were planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?
- b. If non-C-E deception and ECCM measures were planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?
- c. If the following nonelectronic deception and OPSEC techniques were employed, what was the actual effect of the techniques?

(1) Ground reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.

(2) Aerial reconnaissance or activity?

(3) Engineer activity.

(4) Agent activity.

(5) Vehicular movements.

(6) Demonstrations, rehearsals, feints, and supporting attacks.


(7) Communications and coordination patterns.

- (8) Fire support and artillery activity.
- (9) Unit subordination.
- (10) Boundaries and phase lines.
- (11) Timing of operations.
- (12) Cover names and designations.
- (13) Camouflage.
- (14) Other.

- 7. Did the enemy's intelligence estimate of friendly capabilities warrant the use of deception with the expected expenditure of personnel and equipment?
- 8. Was there adequate time for the enemy to observe the deception and react in a desired manner?
- 9. What were the results of deception activities?
- 10. Were intelligence means and indicators established to measure enemy reaction to the friendly unit's deception?

# APPENDIX F

## BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION ACTIVITIES CHART



### NOTES


- 1 MUST HAVE AVAILABLE INTEL DATA AND OPERATIONAL INPUT BEFORE DECEPTION COURSES OF ACTION CAN BE DEVELOPED
  - A DETERMINES COLLECTION SYSTEMS TO BE USED FOR FEEDBACK
  - B INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO DECEPTION SYSTEM TO BE NEUTRALIZED
- 2 DEVELOPS COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA
  - A APPROPRIATENESS WITHIN CAPABILITY
  - B PLAUSIBILITY
  - C ENEMY REACTION<sup>1</sup>
- 3 COURSES OF ACTION ANALYZED MUST SUPPORT COURSE OF ACTION BEING DEVELOPED BY THE G3
- 4 CONSIDERS DECEPTION TECHNIQUES
  - VISUAL SONIC OLFACTORY ELECTRONIC

### NOTES

- 1 DEVELOPS DECEPTION OBJECTIVE AND STORY AND MEANS TO PRESENT STORY
- 2 SUPPORTS COMMANDER'S CONCEPT AND INTENT
- 3 COORDINATED WITH OPSEC EW AND CISO EFFORTS
- 4 DETERMINES HOW TO PHASE OUT PLAN TO DISGUISE THE FACT THAT DECEPTION WAS USED
  - CONTROL OVER TIMING SCHEDULE
  - EMPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES
  - OPSEC FSE FSCOOO EW AND SIGSEC INTEGRATION
  - IS IN LINE WITH FRIENDLY PATTERNS (PROFILES)
  - COORDINATES ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES WITH G3
  - WITH OPSEC OFFICER DETERMINE ACTION OF THE SEPARATION AND DECEPTION OPERATION THAT MUST BE CONCEALED FROM THE ENEMY
  - WITH G2 DEVELOPS NEED TO KNOW LIST

Chart is continued on the following page.

# BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION ACTIVITIES CHART (continued)



## NOTE

A SEPARATE DECEPTION ANNEX IS NOT RECOMMEND. DECEPTION TASKS AND OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE CAREFULLY INTEGRATED INTO APPROPRIATE PRIMARY STAFF ANNEXES APPENDICES.

- EVALUATION DECEPTION
- WAS DECEPTION EXECUTED AS PLANNED?
- WERE TECHNIQUES EFFECTIVE? WHY OR WHY NOT?
- REEVALUATE HOSTILE COLLECTION THREAT AND THE FRIENDLY UNIT PROFILE AND DETERMINE IF ALL FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE ORIGINAL DECEPTION PLAN STILL EXIST
- INCORPORATE THE ACTUAL ENEMY REACTION TO THE DECEPTION MEASURES UPON RECEIVING THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTIVE DATA BASE (OBTAINED BY G2 C1)
- RECOMMENDED TO THE G3 CHANGES TO DECEPTION MEASURES UPON RECEIVING INFORMATION CONCERNING ENEMY REACTION TO DECEPTION MEASURES

## GLOSSARY

### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

admin	administration
APC	armored personnel carrier
ASPS	all-source production section
arty	artillery
BAT-D	battlefield deception
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
bde	brigade
bn	battalion
C3	command, control and communications
C3CM	command, control, and communications countermeasures
CAA	combined arms army
C-E	communications-electronics
CESO	C-E staff officer
CEWI	combat electronic warfare intelligence
CI	counterintelligence
co	company
comd	command
COMINT	communications intelligence
comm	communications
COMSEC	communications security
cons	consideration
CP	command post
CS	combat support
CSS	combat service support
CTOC	corps tactical operations center
DA	Department of the Army
D-day	a day set for launching an operation, specifically, June 6, 1944, on which Allied forces began the invasion of France in World War II.
div	division
DOD	Department of Defense
EAC	echelons above corps
ECB	echelons corps and below
ECCM	electronic counter-countermeasures
ECM	electronic countermeasures
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EW	electronic warfare

FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FLOT	forward line of own troops
FM	field manual
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FSE	fire support element
FTI	fixed target indicators
G1	Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel)
G3	Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations and Plans)
G4	Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 (Logistics)
G5	Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 (Civil Affairs)
HHC	headquarters, headquarters company
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVT	high value target
ICD	imitative communications deception
IED	imitative electronic deception
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INCD	imitative noncommunications deception
intel	intelligence
inf	infantry
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR	information requirements
J3	Operations Directorate
JTF	Joint Task Force
LIC	low intensity conflict
LOC	lines of communication
log	logistics
LOS	line of sight
MCCD	multispectral close contact decoy
MCD	manipulative communications deception
MED	manipulative electronic deception
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
MI	military intelligence
MNCD	manipulative noncommunications deception
MOP	Memorandum of Policy
MTI	moving target indicators
MTOE	modified table of equipment
MSD	multispectral decoy

NBBS	New British Broadcast Station
NCA	National Command Authority
NLT	not later than
no	number
obsn	observation
OIC	officer in charge
OMG	operation maneuver group
op	operation
QPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
photo	photographic
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
prelim	preliminary
PSYOP	psychological operations
PWE	Political Warfare Executive
RAF	Royal Air Force
recon	reconnaissance
RF	radio frequency
RTO	radio telephone operator
S1	Adjutant (United States Army)
S3	Operations and Training Officer (United States Army)
S4	Supply Officer (United States Army)
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SED	simulative electronic deception
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIGSEC	signal security
sit	situation
SOP	standing operating procedures
TAC-D	tactical deception
tech	technical
TDSE	tactical deception support element
TOC	tactical operations center
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UAV	unmanned air vehicles
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
vol	volume

## DEFINITIONS

acoustical intelligence  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD)

Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign sources that generate acoustical waves.

acoustical surveillance  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD)

Employment of electronic devices including sound recording, receiving, or transmitting equipment for the collection of information.

battlefield deception (DA)  
(AR 310-25)

Those operations or measures conducted at echelons Theater and below to purposely mislead enemy forces by distorting, concealing, or falsifying indicators of friendly intent.

camouflage (JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

The use of concealment and disguise to minimize the possibility of detection and/or identification of troops, materiel, equipment, and installations. Includes taking advantage of the natural environment as well as application of natural and artificial materials.

chaff (JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

Radar reflectors, which consist of thin, narrow metallic strips of various lengths and frequency responses, used to reflect echoes to confuse opponents.

clandestine operation  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

An activity to accomplish intelligence, CI, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (It differs from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of sponsor.)

code (JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

a. Any system of communication in which arbitrary groups of symbols represent units of plain text of varying length. Codes may be used for brevity or for security.

b. A cryptosystem in which cryptographic equivalents (usually called "code groups"), typically consisting of letters or digits (or both) in otherwise meaningless combinations, are substituted for plain text elements that are primarily words, phrases, or sentences.

code word (JCS Pub 1-DOD, NATO, IADB)

- a. A word that has been assigned a classification and a classified meaning to safeguard intentions and information regarding a classified plan or operation.
- b. A cryptonym used to identify sensitive intelligence data.

collection (acquisition)  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD)

Obtaining information in any manner, including direct observation, liaison with official agencies, or soliciting from official, unofficial, or public sources.

collection (intelligence)

Exploiting information sources by the proper intelligence processing unit to produce and report intelligence. Collection is divided into four main functions: guidance, coverage, reporting, and selection.

command, control, and  
communications countermeasures  
(C<sup>3</sup>CM)

Integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction supported by intelligence to deny information to the enemy, to influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C<sup>3</sup> capabilities, and to protect friendly C<sup>3</sup> against such actions.

communications cover and  
communications deception  
(or communications cover and  
deception) (JCS MOP 116-DOD)

Terms that broadly identify deception and cover activities in communications. Communications cover encompasses activities not considered deception:

a. Communications cover (JCS MOP 116-DOD). The technique of concealing or altering the characteristics of communication patterns for the purpose of denying valuable information to an enemy.

b. Communications deception (JCS MOP 116-DOD). Deliberate transmission, retransmission, or alteration of communications in a manner intended to cause a misleading interpretation.

(1) ICD. Introduction by unauthorized parties of signals or traffic, which imitate valid messages, into communications channels to deceive authorized users of the communications system.

(2) MCD. Alteration or simulation of friendly communications for purposes of deception.

communications intelligence  
(COMINT) (JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.

communications security (COMSEC)  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny to unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such study. Also called COMSEC, communications security includes:

a. Crypto security. The component of COMSEC that results from providing technically sound crypto systems and their proper use.

b. Transmission security. The component of communications security that results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis.

c. Emission security. The component of COMSEC that results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from interception and analysis of compromising emanations from crypto equipment and telecommunications systems.

d. Physical security. The component of COMSEC which results from all physical measures needed to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons.

communications security  
monitoring (JCS Pub 1-DOD,  
IADB)

The act of listening to, copying, or recording transmissions of one's own circuits (or when specially agreed, such as, in allied exercise, those of friendly forces) to provide material for COMSEC analysis in order to determine the degree of security being provided to those transmissions. In particular, the purposes include providing a basis for advising

commanders on the security risks resulting from their transmissions, improving the security of communications, and planning and conducting MCD operations.

concealment (JCS Pub 1-DOD)

Protection from observation or surveillance.

confusion reflector (JCS Pub 1-DOD, NATO)

A reflector of electromagnetic radiation used to create echoes for confusion purposes. Radar confusion reflectors include such devices as chaff, rope, and corner reflectors.

corner reflector (JCS Pub 1-DOD, NATO)

a. A device, normally consisting of three metallic surfaces or screens perpendicular to one another, designed to act as a radar target or marker.

b. In radar interpretation, an object that, by means of multiple reflections from smooth surfaces, produces a radar return of greater magnitude than might be expected from the physical size of the object.

counterdeception (JCS Pub 1-DOD)

Efforts to negate, neutralize, and diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from, a foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations.

cover (JCS Pub 1-DOD, NATO)

a. The action by land, air, or sea forces to protect by offense, defense, or threat of either or both.

b. Shelter or protection, either natural or artificial.

c. Protection guise used by a person, organization, or installation to prevent identification with clandestine activities.

covert operations (JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

Operations that are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

deception (JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)	Those measures designed to mislead enemy forces by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
deception concept (JCS MOP 116-DOD)	Ideas or potential courses of action for using deception.
deception means (JCS Pub 1-DOD)	<p>Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey or deny information to a foreign power. There are three categories of deception means:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Administrative means. Resources, methods, and techniques designed to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a foreign power.</li> <li>b. Physical means. Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. Examples include military operations, including exercises; reconnaissance, training activities, and movement of forces; the use of dummy equipment and devices; tactics; bases, logistic actions, stockpiles, and repair activity; and test and evaluation activities.</li> <li>c. Technical means. Military materiel resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the emission or suppression of nuclear particles.</li> </ul>
deception objectives (JCS MOP 116-DOD)	The ultimate purpose of a deception plan in terms of the action or lack of action desired from the target against whom the deception is directed.
deception plan	A complete plan which details and formalizes a deception operation and, when approved, authorizes execution.

a. Deception measures (DA). The deliberate provision of false indicators to meet enemy EEI. Deception measures are visual, sonic, electronic, and olfactory.

b. Deception story (DA). False information provided to the enemy to lead him to an incorrect estimate of our capabilities and intentions.

c. Deception tasks (DA). The directions given to subordinate units to carry out their roles in the projection of the deception story. Units are directed to conduct feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays.

deception target

Foreign decision makers against whom deception operations are ultimately directed.

decoy (JCS Pub 1-DOD, NATO, IADB)

An imitation in any sense of person, object, or phenomenon that is intended to deceive enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation.

demonstration (JCS Pub 1-DOD, NATO, IADB)

An attack or a show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy.

dissimulation

Altering or hiding physical, technical, or administrative evidence by concealing or protecting it from enemy observation.

diversion (JCS Pub 1-DOD)

a. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack alarm or feint that diverts attention.

b. A change made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons.

diversionary attack (JCS Pub 1-DOD, NATO, IADB)

An attack wherein a force attacks, or threatens to attack, a target other than the main target for the purpose of drawing enemy defenses away from the main effort.

dummy

A simulated object used to camouflage an installation, serve as a decoy, or lend reality to a decoy situation.

dummy message (JCS Pub 1-DOD,  
NATO, IADB)

A message sent for some purpose other than its content, which may consist of dummy groups or meaningless text.

electromagnetic intrusion  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD)

The intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy into transmission paths in any manner, with the objective of deceiving operators or causing confusion.

electronic warfare (EW)  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD)

Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and action which retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. There are three divisions within electronic warfare.

a. Electronic countermeasures (ECM). That division of EW involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic countermeasures include:

(1) Electronic jamming. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of disrupting enemy use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems.

(2) Electronic deception. The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information and to deny valid information to an enemy or to enemy electronics-dependent weapons. Among the types of electronic deception are:

(a) Imitative electronic deception (IED). The introduction of radiations into unfriendly channels that imitate hostile emissions.

(b) Manipulative electronic deception (MED). Actions to eliminate revealing, or convey misleading, telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces.

(c) Simulative electronic deception (SED). Actions to represent friendly notional or actual capabilities to hostile forces.

b. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). That division of EW involving actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of EW.

c. EW support measures. That division of EW involving actions taken under direct control of an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus EW support measures provide a source of information required for immediate decisions involving ECM, ECCM, avoidance targeting, and other tactical employment forces. EW support-measures data can be used to produce SIGINT, both COMINT and ELINT.

electronics intelligence (ELINT)  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.

enemy capabilities (JCS Pub  
1-DOD, NATO, IADB)

Those courses of action which the enemy is physically capable of and that, if adopted, will affect accomplishment of our mission. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy such as attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. "Enemy capabilities" are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of enemy forces. In strategic thinking, the capabilities of a nation represent the courses of action within the power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives in peace and war.

essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) (JCS Pub 1-DOD)	Key questions about friendly intentions and military capabilities likely to be asked by opposing planners and decision makers in competitive circumstances.
execution schedule	Chronological schedule of actions required to execute a deception plan.
feint (Webster's New World Dictionary)	Something feigned or intended to deceive to gain advantage; a false or deceptive act or trick; a mock blow or attack on or toward one area in order to distract the opposition while one attacks another area.
imitative electronic deception (IED)	The introduction of radiation into unfriendly channels that imitate hostile emissions.
infrared deception	The use of sources of infrared energy for purposes of deception.
indicator (JCP Pub 1-DOD, NATO)	In intelligence usage, an item of information that reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action.
meaconing (JCS Pub 1-DOD)	A system of receiving radio beacon signals and rebroadcasting them on the same frequency to confuse navigation. The meaconing stations cause inaccurate bearings to be obtained by aircraft or ground stations.
military deception (JCS Pub 1-DOD).	<p>Actions executed to mislead foreign decision makers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originator's objectives. There are three categories of military deception:</p> <p>a. Strategic military deception. Military deception planned and executed to result in foreign national policies and actions that</p>

support the originator's national objectives, policies, and strategic military plans.

b. Tactical military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational commanders against the pertinent threat, to result in opposing operational actions favorable to the originator's plans and operations.

c. Battlefield deception (Army Only). Those operations or measures conducted at echelons Theater and below to purposely mislead enemy forces by distorting, concealing, or falsifying indicators of friendly intent.

d. Departmental/service military Deception. Military deception planned and executed by military services about military systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques, personnel, or service operations, or other activities to result in foreign actions that increase or maintain the originator's capabilities relative to adversaries.

minimize (JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

A condition wherein normal message and telephone traffic is drastically reduced so that messages connected with an actual or simulated emergency shall not be delayed.

misinformation (Webster's New World Dictionary)

Information which is false, partially false, or correct, but calculated to mislead; a technique used to mislead, confuse, or otherwise present an enemy with a seemingly authentic story which is actually false and of no real intelligence value.

notional (Webster's New World Dictionary)

Imaginary; not actual (to inhabit a notional world). The adjective "notional" is used to modify such military terms as "plans," "weapons," and "order of battle," when referring to false objects or plans that the friendly force seeks to make the enemy accept as real.

observable (Webster's New World Dictionary)

Anything that is noteworthy or unusual, capable of being observed, discerned, detected, or noticed.

operations security (OPSEC)  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD).

The process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities.

psychological warfare (JCS  
Pub 1-DOD IADB).

The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

radio deception (JCS Pub 1-DOD,  
IADB)

The employment of radio to deceive the enemy. Radio deception includes sending false dispatches, using deceptive headings, and employing enemy call signs.

repeater-jammer (JCS Pub 1-DOD,  
NATO)

A receiver-transmitter device that amplifies, multiplies, and retransmits signals received for purposes of deception or jamming.

ruse

A stratagem or trick usually intended to deceive.

signals intelligence (SIGINT)  
(JCS Pub 1-DOD, IADB)

A category of intelligence information comprising all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence.

simulation

Using fabricated or imitative, physical, technical, or administrative evidence to deceive enemy surveillance (detection, identification, and analysis). (Simulate what isn't, mask what is.)

sonic deception

Use of special sonic equipment to simulate such sounds as troop and equipment movements, landing force operations, and gunfire, to cause the target to react in a specific manner.

spot jamming (JCS Pub 1-DOD,  
NATO, IADB)

The jamming of a specific channel or frequency.

vulnerability (JCS Pub 1-DOD,  
IADB)

a. The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished.

b. The characteristics of a system which cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment.

## REFERENCES

### REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.

#### Army Regulations (ARs)

310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title: AD)

#### Field Manuals (FMs)

5-20 Camouflage  
100-5 Operations  
101-5 Staff Organization and Operations

### RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.

#### Army Regulations (ARs)

525-20 Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM)  
Policy  
530-1 Operations Security (OPSEC)  
525-25 (S) Responsibilities for Tactical Air Control Parties (AFR 55-9)

#### Field Manuals (FMs)

3-50 Deliberate Smoke Operations  
27-10 Law of Land Warfare  
34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations  
100-20 Low Intensity Conflict

#### Miscellaneous Publications

JCS Pub 1 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms  
JCS MOP 116 Military Deception (May be obtained from: DA, ATTN: ODSO,  
Washington, D.C. 20310)

### PROJECTED PUBLICATIONS

Projected publications are sources of additional information that are scheduled for printing but are not yet available. Upon print, they will be distributed automatically via pinpoint distribution. They may not be obtained from the USA AG Publications Center until indexed in DA Pamphlet 310-1.

#### Field Manual (FM)

90-2A Electronic Deception

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## INDEX

### AirLand Battle, 1-30

- doctrine, 1-36
- integration and synchronization, 1-35
- intelligence support, 1-34
- patterns, 1-36, 6-14

### Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures, 1-33

### Campaign Plans, 2-5

- branches, 2-6
- defense, 2-10
- offense, 2-8
- sequels, 2-5

- deception plan, 1-41
  - desired perception, 4-12
  - policy, 1-37
  - strategic, 2-11
  - tactical, 3-4

### dummies and decoys, 5-1

- signatures, D-2

### Level of War

- operational, 2-1
  - strategic, 2-11
    - center of gravity, 2-1
    - culminating points, 2-2
    - planning and execution, 2-5
- tactical, 3-1
  - planning and execution, 3-1
  - operational, 3-3

### Maxims or principles, 1-3

- Axelrod's Contribution, 1-11
- Cry-Wolf, 1-7
- Elephantiasis, 1-24
- Jone's Dilemma, 1-9
- Law of Small Numbers, 1-5
- MaGruder's Principles, 1-3
- Monkey's Paw, 1-14
- sequencing, 1-12
- soviet tactical radio deception 1-25

## Operations

- close, 3-2
- combined, 7-2
- contingency, 7-5
  - CSS, 7-5
  - liaison officer, 7-3
- defensive, 6-0, 6-3
  - concealed artillery positions, 6-4
  - tracks, 6-5
- components, 1-40
  - events, 1-41
  - objectives, 1-40
    - evaluation, 4-11
  - story, 1-41
  - target, 1-40
- deep, 3-3
- joint, 7-1
- low intensity conflict, 6-10
- plan, 1-41, 3-3
- profile, 1-36
- psychological, 6-14
- rear, 3-3, 6-9
- retrograde, 6-6
  - passage of lines, 6-8
- normal procedures, 6-2

## resources, 5-9

- materiel, 5-10
- personnel and equipment, 5-10
- time, 5-9

## security, 1-35, 1-36

- factors, 1-37
- relief in place, 6-7

## tactical deception support element (TDSC), 7-2

## techniques, 4-1, 5-12

- demonstrations, 5-14
- disguises, 5-17
- displays, 5-16
- feints, 5-12
- portrayals, 5-17
- ruses, 5-15
  - illegitimate, 1-43

legitimate, 1-44  
simulations, 5-16

types of deception, 1-10

ambiguity, 1-10  
feedback, 1-13  
misdirection, 1-10



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