## Islamic Republic of R A N

Permanent Mission to the United Nations

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful

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# Statement by The Islamic Republic of Iran Main Committee III of the 2010 NPT Review Conference New York, 11 May 2010

### Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. My Delegation pledges its support and cooperation.

My Delegation would also like to associate itself with the statement made by the distinguished representative of Egypt on behalf of the Non- Aligned Movement.

### Mr. Chairman,

The inalienable right of all States parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination indeed constitutes the very foundation of the Treaty. This inalienable right in itself emanates from two broader propositions. First, scientific and technological achievements are the common heritage of humanity. The second general proposition is the requisite balance between rights and obligations, which is the basis of any sound legal instrument. This balance guarantees the longevity of the legal regime by providing incentives for membership and compliance.

The Importance and relevance of Article IV of the NPT has been highlighted as a result of increasing applications by States Parties of nuclear energy and technologies in various fields such as human health, medical, industrial, agriculture, environmental,

protection and sustainable economic development, especially in the developing areas of the world. We have been witnessing this trend in our region, a trend that confirms the long standing positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the need for diversifying the energy resources in order to meet its future needs.

## Mr. Chairman,

The IAEA has a fundamental role and responsibility in the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, the IAEA in carrying out this its statutory mandate continues to face shortcomings in resources as well as restrictions imposed by some States. For example, the funding policy of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation is based on voluntary contributions which are unpredictable, unsecured and subject to political motivations of the donors. We believe that IAEA's technical cooperation like its safeguards activities should be funded from the regular budget.

We have always taken a consistent position to support IAEA Technical Cooperation Program. In this regard, the head of the Atomic energy organization of Iran has declared during the last General Conference of the IAEA that Iran is ready to fully cooperate with countries in the region to hold technical workshops and seminars to transfer related radio isotopes for medical purposes and nuclear medicine under the auspices of the IAEA.

It is a matter of deep concern that existing export control regimes continue to create unde restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of States Parties. Such regimes which operate in non-transparent and arbitrary manner have hampered the access of developing States Parties to nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes in contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, namely the undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange for peaceful purposes. We call for the establishment of a mechanism within the framework of the Review Process in order to address this challenge facing the implementation of Article IV.

Another source of serious concern is that the countries outside the Treafy are given preferential in nuclear trade. In this context, the Nuclear Supplier Group as an exclusive and non-transparent export control regime, which claims to have been established to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, has adversely damaged the credibility of the NPT by adopting its infamous decision in September 2008.

This decision was made in total defiance of the paragraph 12 of the 1995 Decision of the NPT Parties on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament which requires" Acceptance of the Agency's full scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons" as a necessary precondition for any new supply arrangements. Such a disappointing development clearly reveals the long distance that exists between the words and the deeds of the main sponsor of the NSG decision.

Iran's position on the issue of fuel cycle is crystal clear. The inalienable right of States Parties included all aspects of nuclear technologies including fuel cycle for peaceful purposes and, contrary to what some Parties argue, this right is not limited to certain areas. As states in Article IV "Nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of the Parties to develop nuclear energy". It is also essential to note the fact that in the IAEA's Statute and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or even the Additional Protocol, there is no provision to prohibit or restrict the rights of the States Parties to enrichment and reprocessing activities.

In this connection, the 2000 NPT Review Conference reiterated that" each country's In this connection, the Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies". Any new division among the States Parties and interpretation incompatible with the letter of the Treaty should be strictly avoided.

On the issue of multilateral approaches to fuel cycle and assurances of nuclear fuel supply, we share the view of the NAM that this issue is a very complex and multi-dimensional concept with technical, legal, commercial and economic implications. In order to reach a consensual conclusion, it is premature for this issue to be considered before undergoing extensive, comprehensive and transparent consultations.

With regard to nuclear safety and security, I would like to bring to your kind attention that the Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to this issue and to that end, Iran under the Act of Radiation Protection, has established national regulatory body to ensure safety and security of its peaceful nuclear facilities.

We share the view that safety and security are national responsibilities and the IAEA should play the key role in the development of international nuclear safety and security standards.

### Mr. Chairman,

The task before us in this committee is of utmost importance. Full implementation of Article IV of the Treaty has been always a key element of strengthening NPT regime. Many years has been passed, but still this legitimate expectation of developing countries for full implementation of this fundamental pillar of the NPT yet to be realized.

With the increasing gap between developing and developed countries in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose, it is a high time for this Review Conference to take certain concrete steps towards full implementation of Article IV.

The following recommendations should be reflected in the report of this committee:

- Reaffirm the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without any discrimination,
- Confirm each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of
  nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or
  international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of
  nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies,
- Emphasize that full implementation of Article IV is essential to realize object and purposes of the Treaty,
- Reject any interpretation which would affect the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
- Decide that Technical Cooperation Fund should be predictable, secured and sufficient to enable the Agency to respond positively to ever increasing need of developing countries to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
- Urge the developed countries to fulfill their commitment to assist the development of nuclear energy of the developing Parties by facilitating their participation in the fullest possible exchange of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes,
- Emphasize that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their "sensitivity" and only stipulates that such equipment and material must be subject to full scope IAEA safeguards,
- Reiterate that strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. The allocation of resources should take into account all of the Agency's Statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer.
- Reiterate that safeguard shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply
  with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or
  technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field
  of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear
  material and equipment for the processing, use of production of nuclear material
  for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the
  principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty,

- Determine that imposition of restrictions and /or limitations on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would hamper the access of developing countries to nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes and therefore, urge the removal of restrictions and /or limitations posed in contravention of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty,
- Establish a standing Committee by the Review Conference to consider cases of transfer denials upon request by concerned States Parties, and report to the States Parties for further consideration and taking appropriate decisions. Members of Such committee should be duly experienced and competent, consisting of well qualified governmental individuals from the States members of the Bureau of the previous Review Conference.
- Reconfirm 1995 NPT Review Conference that "new supply arrangement for the
  transfer of source or especial fissionable material or equipment or material
  especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
  fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary
  precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and
  internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or
  other nuclear explosive devices".

Thank you